Horn v. Transdev Servs.

RONALD HORN, SR. v. TRANSDEV SERVICES, INC. ET AL.

Civil Action No. 20-3323

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

July 29, 2021

SECTION “S” (3)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DANA M. DOUGLAS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant Transdev Services, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Petition. (Rec. Doc. No. 7). The motion is opposed. (Rec. Doc. No. 19). Having reviewed the pleadings and the case law, the Court rules as follows.

I. BACKGROUND

This matter was originally filed on October 26, 2020, in Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. (Rec. Doc. No. 1-2 at p. 1). The petition was amended on November 12, 2020. (Rec. Doc. No. 1-1 at p. 13). On December 12, 2020 defendant, Transdev, removed the case to this Court. (Rec Doc. No. 1).

The petition, as amended, alleges the following facts. Plaintiff, Ronald Horn, Sr. (“Plaintiff” or “Horn”), was a transportation operator employed by RTA, the predecessor of Transdev Services, Inc. (“Transdev”), from 1994 to 2009, and Transdev from 2009 to 2019. (Rec. Doc. No. 1-1 at p. 14). While employed by Transdev, Horn was a member of the Amalgamated Transit Union (“ATU”), the exclusive collective bargaining representative for Transdev employees. (Id.).

As a member of ATU, Horn was asked to sign an ATU Constitution, which offered ATU members certain privileges, protections, and benefits. (Id.) Under the terms of the ATU Constitution and a collective bargaining agreement between Transdev and ATU, Horn could only be discharged from his employment for “just cause.” (Id.) Horn was also entitled to union representation that included a union steward to address potential grievances for violations of the collective bargaining agreement. (Id.)

On April 11, 2019, Transdev's Human Resources Department offered to promote Horn to an Operations Training Instructor position. (Id.). Horn accepted the position and was given a start date of April 22, 2019. (Id. at 14-15). This position was highly sought by many applicants, including Valarie Jefferson, local union president and business agent of Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1560 (“ATU Local 1560”), who applied for the Operations Training Instructor position after Horn accepted the position. (Id.).

On April 24, 2019, Transdev's Executive Director, Darryl Simpson, asked Horn to reinterview for the Operator Training Instructor position. (Id. at 15). Horn refused on the basis that he had already accepted the position and had completed a full day of training. (Id.). After the meeting, Horn was instructed to await further instruction but was never called back in to complete his training for the Operations Training Instructor position. (Id.).

On May 17, 2019, via certified letter, Transdev asked Horn to return to his position as Operator. (Id.). Plaintiff claims that this letter effectively constructively discharged him from the Operations Training Instructor position. (Id. at 15). Consequently, Horn filed a grievance with the ATU regarding his removal. (Id.). In addition, Plaintiff did not immediately return to the Operator position as instructed and instead opted to use vacation time. (Id.) While on vacation, Horn attempted to follow up with ATU representatives regarding his grievances against Transdev, but no immediate action was taken. (Id. at 16).

On June 6, 2019, Horn filed formal charges against Transdev with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”). (Id.) On September 10, 2019, after union members voted not to pursue arbitration, Horn filed formal charges against ATU Local 1560 with the NLRB for breach of contract and its duty of fair representation. (Id.). In response to Plaintiff's NLRB complaint, the ATU denied all material claims. (Id.).

Horn believes that his removal was requested by Valerie Jefferson. (Id. at 15). He alleges that Ms. Jefferson conspired with Transdev executives to have him removed from the Operations Training Instructor position and without just cause. (Id.).

Horn asserts causes of action for breach of contract, violations of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), violations of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), discrimination on the basis of sex, and civil conspiracy. (Id. at 17-19). Transdev now moves to dismiss each of these claims under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Standard for a Motion to Dismiss

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead enough facts “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). A claim is “plausible on its face” when the pleaded facts allow the court to “draw reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A court must accept the complaint's factual allegations as true and must “draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009). The court need not, however, accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 at 678. To be legally sufficient, a complaint must establish more than a “sheer possibility” that the plaintiff's claims are true. Id. If it is apparent from the face of the complaint that an insurmountable bar to relief exists, and the plaintiff is not entitled to relief, the court must dismiss the claim. Lormand, 565 F.3d at 255-57. A court considering a motion to dismiss “must limit itself to the contents of the pleadings, including attachments thereto.” Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). Attachments to a motion to dismiss are, however, “considered part of the pleadings” if “they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to her claim.” Id. “In so attaching, the defendant merely assists the plaintiff in establishing the basis of the suit, and the court in making the elementary determination of whether a claim has been stated.” Id.

In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), dismissal is proper when it appears certain that the plaintiffs cannot prove any set of facts in support of their claim which would entitle them to relief. Saraw Partnership v. United States, 67 F.3d 567, 569 (5th Cir.1995) (citing Hobbs v. Hawkins, 968 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir.1992)). A court may base its disposition of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the complaint alone, the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts. Ynclan v. Department of the Air Force, 943 F.2d 1388, 1390 (5th Cir.1991) (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981). The burden of proof on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 160 (5th Cir.1996).

B. Preemption of State Law Breach of Contract Claims

Transdev argues that the state law breach of contract claim asserted by Horn is preempted by section 301 of the LMRA. The petition alleges that “defendants breached their contractual obligation to Petitioner as set forth in the collective bargaining agreement to which they were all bounds.” (Rec. Doc. No. 1-1 at p. 17, ¶18). Plaintiff further alleges that “Defendants are each liable for breach of contract insofar as they violated the terms of the collective bargaining agreements.” (Id. at ¶19).

The Court agrees that the asserted breach of contract claim is preempted by section 301 of the LMRA which expressly “provides the requisite jurisdiction and remedies for individual employees covered under a collective-bargaining agreement between that individual's employer and the union.” Thomas v. LTV Corp., 39 F.3d 611, 616 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Landry v. Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1989)). Section 301 of the LMRA provides in pertinent part:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.

29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The preemptive effect of this section applies to causes of action arising out of contract and tort, and “[p]reemption occurs when a decision on the state claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract or when the application of state law to a dispute requires interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement.” Thomas, 39 F.3d at 616-17. (internal citations omitted). Those claims that only tangentially involve provisions of collective-bargaining agreements, however, are not preempted by section 301. Id. at 617 (citing Lingle v. Norge Div., Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 406-07, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1881-82, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988)).

In this case, Horn's breach of contract claim is “inextricably intertwined” with the collective bargaining agreement in that it expressly seeks damages for breach of obligations under the collective bargaining agreement. The claim asserted by Horn would, therefore require this Court to interpret the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Specifically, Horn has alleged that, inter alia, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, he could only be discharged for just cause. Horn also contends that any violation of his rights under the collective bargaining agreement entitles him to union...