Horn v. Wal-Mart Stores

JOSHUA HORN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., Defendant and Respondent.

C089684

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sutter)

October 1, 2020

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Super. Ct. No. CVCS160001624)

Plaintiff Joshua Horn appeals following defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc's successful motion for summary judgment. On appeal, Horn raises an array of contentions under headings including: (1) "Trial Court's Retaliation/Abuse of Discretion"; (2) "Trial Court's Racial and Disability Discrimination"; (3) "Trial Court's Refusal to Uphold the California Constitution and Willful Neglect of Duty"; (4) "Trial Court's Willful Misinterpretation of [the California Rules of Court]"; and (5) "Trial Court's Employees['] Breach of Oath and/or Affirmation." (Capitalization omitted.)

We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Pleadings

In 2016, Horn, acting in pro per, sued Wal-Mart for fraud and wrongful termination. Two years later, he filed an amended complaint adding counts for Americans with Disabilities Act discrimination, racial discrimination, retaliation, intentional negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Six months after that, the trial court granted Wal-Mart's motion for summary judgment. The court's written order noted Horn had filed no evidentiary objections to Wal-Mart's evidence submitted in support of its motion. And Horn had filed no response to Wal-Mart's statement of undisputed material facts.

The court concluded summary adjudication was appropriate for all counts, for reasons including that Wal-Mart undisputedly made no false misrepresentation of fact to Horn, and Horn suffered no resulting damages; Wal-Mart's actions were taken for a legitimate business reason, and Horn could not show Wal-Mart's actions were pretextual; certain claims were time barred; and the Workers Compensation Exclusivity Act barred other claims.

Between the time Horn filed suit and the time Wal-Mart was granted summary judgment, Horn unsuccessfully moved to transfer venue,¹ Walmart successfully moved to compel discovery and for sanctions, and Horn brought multiple motions to continue.

Horn appealed from entry of judgment following the grant of summary judgment.²

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Horn is proceeding in pro per, as he did before the trial court. Pro per litigants are required to follow the rules of appellate procedure; they are treated like any other party and receive no greater consideration. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.) Horn's briefing suffers from a number of flaws.

I. Sanctions

Under the headings, "Trial Court's Retaliation/Abuse of Discretion," and "Trial Court's Racial and Disability Discrimination," Horn challenges the award of sanctions as part of Wal-Mart's motion to compel.³ We find no error. (Capitalization omitted.)

A. Additional Background

The day after Horn moved to transfer venue, Wal-Mart moved to compel discovery responses and sought monetary sanctions for misuse of the discovery process. Through a declaration, Wal-Mart represented that it had incurred $2,750 in attorneys' fees in preparing the motion, $60 in filing fees, and anticipated incurring $3,910 total in bringing the motion. Wal-Mart also cited Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.290 and 2031.300⁴, which require the imposition of monetary sanctions when motions to compel responses to interrogatories or production requests are unsuccessfully opposed.

Horn did not file an opposition. A subsequent minute order reflects the motion was submitted with argument and taken under submission.

The trial court granted the motion, ordering Horn to respond to Wal-Mart's interrogatories, production requests, and request for admissions. It found Horn had "abused and misused the discovery process by asserting objections without substantial legal or factual justification and by failing to respond to defendant's relevant discovery requests." It ordered Horn to pay Wal-Mart $1,750 in attorney fees and $60 in costs.

B. Analysis

On appeal, Horn challenges the trial court's ruling on multiple grounds. He writes that Wal-Mart's counsel "failed to provide adequate legal fee quantification via anymethod such as the Lodestar method . . . ." He avers the ruling was in retaliation for filing a complaint with the Commission on Judicial Performance. He argues the trial court "failed to substantiate why and how it came to its decision," and failed to provide "any case law, citation, statutory authority or publication of any kind expressing judicial authority." He also maintains the trial court ignored this court's decisions regarding low-income litigants, which purportedly "establish a precedent that prohibits courts from imposing improper and/or unduly burdensome sanctions, penalties and/or legal fees/costs against self-represented litigants of low-income with an inability to pay."

Horn cites no authority supporting his claim that the order of sanctions was error. Indeed, a trial court is required to award sanctions following a successful motion to compel discovery responses, unless it finds the party subject to sanctions acted with substantial justification or other circumstances make the imposition of sanction unjust. (§§ 2030.290; 2031.300; Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 404 ["If a party fails to serve a timely response, and the propounding party moves for and obtains a court order compelling a response, the trial court must impose a monetary sanction against the delinquent party unless that party acted with 'substantial justification' or the sanction would otherwise be unjust"].)

And Horn offers no explanation — neither here nor before the trial court — as to how he acted with substantial justification or how sanctions were unjust, beyond his frivolous suggestion the trial court acted in retaliation or his vague references to this court's decision regarding low-income litigants and the lodestar method.⁵ None of these undermine the ruling.

This contention therefore fails.

II. Motions to Continue

Under the headings, "Trial court's refusal to uphold the California Constitution and willful neglect of duty," and "Trial Court's [Willful] Misinterpretation of [the California Rules of Court]," Horn appears to challenge the trial court's denial of his motions to continue. We find no error. (Capitalization omitted.)

A. Additional Background

Horn filed his original complaint in 2016. Two years later, Wal-Mart moved for summary judgment. In response, Horn moved to "dismiss" Wal-Mart's motion for summary judgment, arguing the motion was premature and should be dismissed to allow Horn to conduct discovery.

In early November 2018, the trial court granted Horn's request to conduct discovery and reset the summary judgment hearing, then scheduled for January 28, 2019, to April 15th, "to allow plaintiff to complete the necessary discovery and to file appropriate opposition to pending Motion."

In March 2019, Horn moved for a continuance. He wrote that he had a worker's compensation trial hearing (also involving Wal-Mart) to prepare for and attend, which had been moved from February to April. He added: "It will be several months before I will be able to adequately prepare my response to the Defendant's motion for summary judgment due to my conflicting engagement in a separate trial hearing . . . ."

Wal-Mart opposed the motion, arguing it was untimely noticed, and Horn had failed to provide a declaration that essential facts may exist and why additional time is needed to obtain them as required under section 437c subdivision (h). It also argued that good cause had not been shown in that the case had been pending for more than twoyears, Horn had had 175 days to oppose the motion for summary judgment, and a previous continuance had been provided.

The motion was submitted without argument and denied as untimely noticed.

Three days later, Horn filed an ex parte motion for a continuance. He again wrote in his declaration: "It will be several months before I will be able to adequately prepare my response to the Defendant's motion for summary judgment due to my conflicting engagement in a separate trial hearing and the trial date's continuation from the previously set trial date was unanticipated by myself."

Wal-Mart opposed the motion, arguing that under Rule of Court Rule 3.1204,⁶ Horn had failed to state the date, time and place of the presentation of his application and made no attempt to determine if Wal-Mart would appear to oppose the application. It further argued it was Horn's lack of diligence that prevented the case from moving forward.

Denying the ex parte motion, the trial court cited the failure to comply with ex parte notice requirements.

Later at the summary judgment hearing, Horn again requested a continuance over Wal-Mart's objection. In its written order, the trial court explained that Horn's "oral request for another continuance was denied. Plaintiff had already been granted a two and one-half month continuance of the original hearing date of this motion to complete discovery to oppose this motion, and there was no good cause shown by plaintiff to grant a second continuance."

B. Analysis

On appeal, Horn contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to continue. He argues the refusal to reschedule the hearing "provid[ed] theDefendant's legal counsel an advantage while presiding with a clear bias and favoritism toward the Defendant's legal counsel." He takes issue with the court's reliance on the fact that a continuance had previously been granted, arguing he had not asked for an extension, rather the extended deadline had been given...