Horton v. Holloway

1

RICHARD PATRICK HORTON PLAINTIFF v. SHERIFF SHAWN HOLLOWAY, Benton County, Arkansas; LIEUTENANT WYATT BANTA; LIEUTENANT TYLER ROSS; DEPUTY KENNETH COGDILL; DEPUTY JOSHUA SUMLER; SERGEANT GREG HOBELMAN; PAROLE OFFICER CRAIG FOREMAN; CAPTAIN GAGE, Jail Administrator; CORPORAL TAYLOR; DEPUTY K. KILLMAN; SERGEANT VOLNER; MATT ETRIS; CORPORAL MONDAY; and FORMER DEPUTY TEDDY DALTON DEFENDANTS

CIVIL No. 5:20-cv-05138

United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Fayetteville Division

December 1, 2021

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

CHRISTY COMSTOCK, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

This is a pro se civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff, Richard P. Horton (“Horton”), contends his constitutional rights were violated during his arrest on February 19, 2020, and subsequent incarceration in the Benton County Detention Center (“BCDC”). Specifically, Horton alleges excessive force was used against him during his arrest. He further maintains that while incarcerated he was denied due process; was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement; and was retaliated against when his commissary and/or newspapers were taken away.

The case is before the Court on the following motions: (1) the Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 77) filed by Sheriff Holloway, Lieutenant Banta, Lieutenant Ross, Deputy Cogdill Deputy Sumler, Sergeant Hobelman, Captain Gage, Corporal Taylor, Deputy Killman Sergeant Volner, Corporal Monday, and Former Deputy Teddy Dalton (collectively “the Benton County Defendants”); (2) the Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 78) filed by Matt Etris (“Etris”); (3) the Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 86) filed by Parole Officer Craig Foreman; and (4) the Response and Cross-Motion (ECF No. 90) filed by Horton. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, United States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making this Report and Recommendation.

I. APPLICABLE STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), the record "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). "Once a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” National Bank of Com. v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999).

The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "They must show there is sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor." Nat. Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). "A case founded on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment." Id. (citing, Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Excessive Force Claim Against Officer Foreman

(1). Summary of the Facts

Officer Foreman is employed by the Arkansas Community Correction as a parole officer. (ECF No. 86-1 at 1). He was assigned to supervise Horton. Id. On February 19, 2020, when Horton reported for a visit, his urinalysis was positive for methamphetamine. Id. Because of the positive test and other parole violations, Horton was arrested. Id. Horton was handcuffed by Officer Foreman.^[1] Id. After Horton was handcuffed and his vehicle was searched, he was transported to the BCDC for booking. Id. at 2. Officer Foreman indicates he never heard Horton complain that the handcuffs were bothering him. Id. at 3.

When he arrived at the BCDC, Horton was complaining of shoulder pain and was taken to the Northwest Medical Center emergency room.^[2] (ECF No. 86-3 at 1). Horton's differential diagnosis was listed as: “contusion, sprain, fracture, scapula.” (ECF No. 86-3 at 5). Horton's x-ray was normal. Id. Horton was advised to use rest, ice, compression, and evaluation (“RICE”) and to use his choice of over-the-counter nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (“NSAIDs”). Id. He was to follow-up with an orthopedic appointment. Id. Horton gave a history of having a prior rotator cuff injury but denied ever having it examined. Id.

At his deposition, Horton testified that the hospital told him his shoulder was not dislocated and there was nothing wrong with it. (ECF No. 83-9 at 6). However, Horton believed his right rotator cuff had been torn again; he testified that this type of injury cannot be diagnosed by an x-ray. (ECF No. 86-2 at 16). He had access to Tylenol and ibuprofen but the medications did not relieve his pain and he ceased taking them. Id. at 15-16. He had no further shoulder treatment. Id. at 15. Horton submitted no medical requests regarding his shoulder while at the BCDC. (ECF No. 83-3 at 23-44).

(2). Analysis of the Claim

Different standards apply to excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees and those brought by convicted individuals. In this case, Horton was arrested on February 19, 2020, on a parole violation charge and various other criminal charges resulting from items found during the search of his vehicle. (ECF No. 83-2 at 1-3). He did not sign his parole violation papers until February 26th. Both Horton and Officer Foreman agree that Horton was in pretrial status on February 19, 2020. (ECF No. 88 at 7).

The objective reasonableness standard applies to excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396-97 (2015). “[T]he defendant's state of mind is not a matter that a plaintiff is required to prove.” Id. at 394. A pretrial detainee “must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 396. The objective reasonableness of a use of force “turns on the ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case.'” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). This determination must be made “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id.; see also Ryan v. Armstrong, 850 F.3d 419, 427 (8th Cir. 2017). “[O]bjective circumstances potentially relevant to a determination of excessive force” include:

the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the force used; the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether plaintiff was actively resisting.

Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397 (citing Graham 490 U.S. at 396). An action is objectively unreasonable if it is not reasonably related to legitimate governmental interests, such as maintaining order and security, or is excessive in relation to that objective. Id. at 398-99.

The nature or quantum of the force must be the focus of the Court's inquiries. The absence of injury is a factor the Court considers in determining whether excessive force was used. The Court must also keep in mind that the mere fact that injuries occurred does not support an excessive force claim if they are the result of a “de minimus use of force.” Hunter v. Namanny, 219 F.3d 825, 831 (8th Cir. 2000).

In the context of the use of handcuffs, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has made it clear that a detainee must suffer more than de minimus injuries to support an excessive force claim. Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 907 (8th Cir. 2011). This is true because the use of handcuffs or other physical restraints frequently results in minor injuries to the inmate. Id. In Crumley v. City of St. Paul, 324 F.3d 1003, 1008 (8th Cir. 2003), the Eighth Circuit rejected an excessive force claim when, as a result of handcuffing, the only injury shown was some bleeding. Id. It noted there was no evidence of “long term or permanent injury.” In Foster v. Metro. Airports Comm'n., 914 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1990), the Plaintiff maintained he had suffered “nerve damage” in his arms as a result of being in handcuffs. Id. at 1082. The Eighth Circuit rejected the claim noting that the Plaintiff presented “no medical records indicating he suffered any long-term injury as a result of the use handcuffs.” Id. The Court in Foster noted that the Plaintiff's “allegations of pain as a result of being handcuffed, without some evidence of more permanent injury, ” were insufficient to support an excessive force claim. Id.

Here, Horton claims he suffered a torn rotator cuff. Although he was seen at the emergency room, no such diagnosis was made. Once he was booked into the BCDC, he sought no treatment for his shoulder. He has sought no treatment for his shoulder since being incarcerated in the Arkansas Division of Correction (“ADC”). Without any medical records supporting Horton's claim or evidence of treatment while incarcerated, the foregoing cases dictate that summary judgment be granted in Officer Foreman's favor.

Officer Foreman additionally contends he is entitled to qualified immunity. The qualified...