Horton v. Rangos

1

DION HORTON, et al., Plaintiffs v. JILL RANGOS, et al., Defendants.

No. 22-cv-1391-NR

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

December 22, 2023

OPINION

J. NICHOLAS RANJAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This case is a putative class action brought by probationers in the Allegheny County, Pennsylvania court system. Plaintiffs allege that the probation procedures implemented by Allegheny County fall short of constitutional due-process requirements because when they were arrested for probation violations they should have been-but were not-given a meaningful opportunity to seek release from jail pending a final revocation determination.

Before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. After extensive fact and expert discovery several rounds of briefing, and a complete evidentiary record-which includes the live testimony of five witnesses and exhibits submitted before, during, and after the April 18, 2023, injunction hearing-the motion is ready for disposition. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are not substantially likely to succeed on the merits and so the Court will deny the motion on that basis.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Court makes the following findings based on the evidentiary record before it. This specifically includes any undisputed allegations in the pleadings; the prehearing and post-hearing exhibits that were submitted by the parties; the exhibits that were admitted into evidence at the preliminary-injunction hearing; and the testimony from the injunction hearing.^[1]

The Parties

1. Plaintiffs are Dion Horton, Damon Jones, Craig Brownlee Rahdnee Oden-Pritchett, Tate Stanford, and Elijah Bronaugh. They were all serving probationary sentences imposed by judges in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas. They were all charged and arrested for violating the terms of their probation. ECF 1, ¶¶ 40-48.

2. Several of them picked up new charges, which gave rise to their probation violations and also led to separate criminal actions against them. Id., ¶¶ 40 (Mr Stanford), 41 (Mr. Bronaugh), 42 (Mr. Horton), 44 (Mr Jones), 46 (Mr. Brownlee).

3. The “County Defendants” are Judge Jill Rangos in her capacity as the Administrative Judge of the Criminal Division; Frank Scherer, the former Director of Adult Probation and Parole of Allegheny County; and Orlando Harper, the former Warden of the Allegheny County Jail. Id., ¶¶ 49-52.

4. The “Judicial Defendants” are Allegheny Court of Common Pleas Judges Anthony Mariani and Kelly Bigley. Id., ¶¶ 53-54.

5. The “Hearing Officer Defendants” are Charlene Christmas, Robert O'Brien, Stephen Esswein, and Renawn Harris. They are probation officers with Allegheny County and aspects of their jobs have included conducting what are referred to as “Gagnon I' hearings.^[2]Id., ¶ 55.

The Gagnon hearings generally, and the County's Detainer Policy.

6. Once arrested for a probation violation, probationers remain incarcerated until they appear for a Gagnon I hearing, which usually occurs within two weeks of the arrest. ECF 116, 10:21-24, 87:20-23; ECF 1, ¶ 10.

7. A hearing officer presides over the Gagnon I hearing. ECF 1, ¶ 11.

8. Hearing officers are employed by Allegheny County Adult Probation and

Parole and are neither judges nor attorneys. Id.

9. Hearing officers receive a copy of each probationer's violation report the day before the Gagnon I hearing. Deposition of Robert O'Brien (O'Brien Dep.), Def. Ex. 7, 52:24-53:9.

10. Probationers are represented by counsel (usually county public defenders) at the Gagnon I hearings. ECF 116, 12:8-11. But, for reasons that are unclear from the record, sometimes those attorneys do not confer with their clients in advance of the Gagnon I hearings. Id., 12:10-22, 89:10-12.

11. At the Gagnon I hearings, the probationers are informed of the charge against them. Id., 12:24-13:7 12. Probationers are given the opportunity to speak at the Gagnon I hearings, even without being formally called as a witness. Id., 68:11-13. 13. Probationers' counsel also can speak, and present evidence. O'Brien Dep., Def. Ex. 7, 170:6-10.

14. Gagnon I hearings can be relatively short, and generally may last between two and 20 minutes, but that may also depend on the specific hearing officer who conducts the hearing. ECF 3-1, Ex. 3 at ¶ 9; O'Brien Dep., Def. Ex. 7, 74:17-75:3 (“[M]y hearings go long...Pm very confident of that.”).

15. Hearing officers fill out a form after the Gagnon I hearing that memorializes whether they have determined that probable cause exists that the probationer has violated his or her probation. Plaintiffs' Ex. 19.

16. With respect to the probable-cause determination, the hearing officer can make several findings, including whether probable cause has been established, whether it has not been established, and when the Gagnon II hearing should be scheduled. Id.

17. In addition to the probable-cause determination, the hearing officers may make recommendations as to whether a probationer should be released pending the Gagnon II hearing (i.e., that the probationer's probation detainer should be lifted). This decision is guided by a formal Detainer Policy, among other policies. Id.

18. The Detainer Policy was made effective November 20, 2019, and was approved by Judge Rangos, as the administrative judge, and Mr. Scherer, as the then-director of probation. Detainer Policy, Def. Ex. 3, p. 1.

19. In 2018, the Adult Probation Office engaged in a Safety and Justice Challenge, which was a program to reduce the length and number of probation detainers. Declaration of Alan Pelton (Pelton Decl.), Def. Ex. 1, ¶¶ 12-13.

20. The Adult Probation Office instituted the Detainer Policy in collaboration with the Safety and Justice Challenge to “have a consistent practice in deciding whether to lodge a detainer for a violation and to reduce incarceration[.]” Id., ¶ 14.

21. The Detainer Policy provides the hearing officers with criteria to determine whether the probationer should be detained pending the Gagnon II hearing. Detainer Policy, Def. Ex. 3, p. 1.

22. For example, under the Detainer Policy, the probationer must be detained if he violated a zero tolerance or mandatory detention court condition, or he has a new charge that represents a serious threat to public safety. Id.

23. Zero tolerance and mandatory court conditions depend on the sentencing judge's description of probation conditions; for example, a judge may impose as a mandatory condition a “no victim contact” condition for a domestic violence sentence. O'Brien Dep., Def. Ex. 7, 99:21-100:16.

24. That said, it is somewhat rare for zero-tolerance conditions to be imposed by sentencing judges. Pelton Decl., Def. Ex. 1, ¶ 37 (“As of April 4, 2023, there were 399 probationers with zero tolerance sentencing conditions, which is approximately 4% of total supervision population.”).

25. For other violations (i.e., “lower-level technical violations” and “arrests for non-violent offenses”), the Detainer Policy instructs the hearing officer to exhaust non-custodial options, such as halfway houses, treatment facilities, and release on electronic monitoring. Detainer Policy, Def. Ex. 3, p. 1.

26. The hearing officers then, based on the Detainer Policy, make a recommendation as to release on the violation report form: (1) lift detainer; (2) remain detained; (3) transfer to alternative housing; or (4) recommend for the Drug and Alcohol Diversion Program. O'Brien Dep., Def. Ex. 7, 62:2-10.

27. Hearing officers may, in some instances, base their recommendation on the nature of the charges, without as much emphasis placed on the underlying facts giving rise to the charge. Id., 157:5-158:13. 28. Hearing officers can keep a probationer detained after the Gagnon I hearing, but, if that occurs, under the Detainer Policy, the judge is notified of that decision. Deposition of Frank Scherer (Scherer Dep.), Def. Ex. 6, 102:14-17.

29. If a judge disagrees with the hearing officer's recommendation, the judge will notify the probation office through the court liaison. Id., 156:15-158:17.

30. A judge must sign off on every request to lift or transfer a detainer. Id., 102:4-13.

31. Two particular judges (Judges Bigley and Mariani) allegedly have their own “no lift” policies, where they have informed the hearing officers that detainers shouldn't be lifted for any probation violations. O'Brien Dep., Def. Ex. 7, 112:5-12; Scherer Dep., Def. Ex. 6, 96:16-97:1.

32. While Defendants contest whether there is such a no-lift policy for Judges Bigley and Mariani, the statistics bear out that these judges rarely lift detainers, and it appears that these judges, at a minimum, have a routine practice to not lift detainers when a probationer has been arrested on a warrant. O'Brien Dep., Def. Ex. 7, 112:13-16, 127:11-25; Scherer Dep., Def. Ex. 6, 159:5-161:8.

33. Judge Mariani lifts probation detainers in approximately 6 percent of cases. ECF 116, 77:22-78:5.

34. Judge Bigley lifts probation detainers in approximately 3.7 percent of cases. Id., 78:1-2, 6-7.

35. That said, overall, in Allegheny County, detention appears to be the exception rather than the rule. As of April 4, 2023, just 6% of people being supervised by Adult Probation in Allegheny County were detained in the Allegheny County Jail or alternative housing sites in the county. Declaration of Sanjeev Baidyaroy (Baidyaroy Decl.), Def. Ex. 2, Exhibit 1, p. 2.

36. As of April 4, 2023, 2,308 people on probation had new pending criminal charges and only 510 of them were detained. Id.

Plaintiffs' Gagnon I hearings and court watcher observations

37. In addition to the declarations that were filed, two Plaintiffs and two court watchers testified at the preliminary-injunction...