Horton v. Westling

284 F.Supp.3d 213

Schuyler HORTON, Plaintiff,

v.Susan T. WESTLING, Defendant.

5:17–cv–45 (MAD/ATB)

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

Signed February 15, 2018

O'HARA, O'CONNELL LAW FIRM, 7207 East Genesee Street, Fayetteville, New York 13066, Attorneys for Plaintiff

OF COUNSEL: STEPHEN CIOTOLI, ESQ.

HANCOCK, ESTABROOK LAW FIRM, 100 Madison Street—Suite 1500, Syracuse, New York 13202, Attorneys for Defendant Westling

WHITNEY M. KUMMEROW, ESQ.

MEMORANDUM–DECISION AND ORDER

Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff commenced this action on January 16, 2017, asserting two claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arising out of a student disciplinary proceeding that occurred while Plaintiff was a student of the Sherburne–Earlville Central School District (the "District") during the 2014–2015 school year. See Dkt. No. 1. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was deprived substantive and procedural due process by the imposition of an out of school suspension after Plaintiff was found in a superintendent's hearing held pursuant to New York Education Law § 3214 to have committed acts that violated the District's student code of conduct. Id. at ¶ 28. Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of his property interest in receiving his education without due process. Id. Plaintiff also contends that he was deprived of his liberty interest in his good name and reputation by wrongful suspension from school without due process. Id. at ¶ 38.

On March 9, 2017, Defendants Board of Education of Sherburne–Earlville Central School District and Eric A. Schnabl, as Superintendent of Schools, moved pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for dismissal of the complaint in its entirety. See Dkt. No. 15. After the motion was fully briefed, on April 20, 2017, the Court held oral argument. Defendant Schnabl and the Board of Education's motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted and they were dismissed from this action. On April 14, 2017, Defendant Susan T. Westling ("Defendant") moved pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for dismissal of the complaint in its entirety. See Dkt. No. 26. As set forth below, Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted.

II. BACKGROUND

According to the complaint, Plaintiff was a student of the District who was suspended from school through the remainder of the 2014–2015 school year. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 8. Plaintiff's suspension was initially imposed following a hearing held pursuant to New York Education Law § 3214 on November 13, 2014, at which Defendant Susan Westling, Esq., presided as hearing officer. See id. at ¶¶ 11–21. Upon receiving notice of Superintendent Schnabl's decision to suspend Plaintiff after the November 13 hearing, Plaintiff requested that the hearing be reopened to consider additional evidence. See id. at ¶¶ 20–23. The District granted Plaintiff's request and a second day of testimony was held on January 27, 2015, during which additional evidence was entered into evidence and Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, was provided the opportunity to testify in his defense. See id. After the rehearing, Defendant Westling issued supplemental findings of fact and recommendations and ultimately confirmed the findings and penalty recommended after the November hearing. Superintendent Schnabl accepted Defendant Westling's recommendations and confirmed the suspension by letter dated January 29, 2015. See id. at ¶ 22.

Plaintiff appealed Superintendent Schnabl's decision to the Board of Education, which heard the appeal on February 9, 2015. See id. at ¶ 24. The Board upheld the suspension. See id.

On February 16, 2015, Plaintiff appealed these adverse decisions to the New York State Commissioner of Education ("Commissioner"). See Dkt. No. 15–5 at 1–19. On October 5, 2015, Plaintiff sent a letter to the Commissioner indicating that, since Plaintiff graduated in June of 2015, the appeal is now moot. See Dkt. No. 22 at 19. As such, Plaintiff indicated that he wished to "withdraw this appeal, without prejudice, and [would] proceed in Federal Court where his constitutional claims may be heard." Id. In a letter dated October 8, 2015, the Commissioner accepted Plaintiff's request to discontinue his appeal. See id. at 22.

On January 16, 2017, Plaintiff commenced this action alleging procedural and substantive due process violations. See Dkt. No. 1. Currently before the Court is Defendant Westling's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "after the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). When a party makes a Rule 12(c) motion, the court applies the same standard as when a party files a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Hayden v. Paterson , 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the party's claim for relief. See Patane v. Clark , 508 F.3d 106, 111–12 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). In considering the legal sufficiency, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the pleading and draw all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor. See ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd. , 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). This presumption of truth, however, does not extend to legal conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation omitted). Although a court's review of a motion to dismiss is generally limited to the facts presented in the pleading, the court may consider documents that are "integral" to that pleading, even if they are neither physically attached to, nor incorporated by reference into, the pleading. See Mangiafico v. Blumenthal , 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc. , 282 F.3d 147, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2002) ).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a party need only plead "a short and plain statement of the claim," see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), with sufficient factual "heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief[,]’ " Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quotation omitted). Under this standard, the pleading's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right of relief above the speculative level," see id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted), and present claims that are "plausible on [their] face," id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citation omitted). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement to relief." ’ " Id. (quoting [ Twombly , 550 U.S.] at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Ultimately, "when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief," Twombly , 550 U.S. at 558, 127 S.Ct. 1955, or where a plaintiff has "not nudged [its] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[ ] complaint must be dismissed[,]" id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

B. Collateral Estoppel

Pursuant to collateral estoppel, "when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.' " Schiro v. Farley , 510 U.S. 222, 232, 114 S.Ct. 783, 127 L.Ed.2d 47 (1994). Collateral estoppel bars a plaintiff from relitigating issues in federal court where "a state agency ‘acting in a judicial capacity ... resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate.’ " Univ. of Tennessee v. Elliott , 478 U.S. 788, 799, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986) (quoting United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co. 384 U.S. 394, 421, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966) ). In order "for collateral estoppel to give preclusive effect to administrative agency findings, ‘the issue sought to be precluded [must be] identical to a material issue necessarily decided by the administrative agency in a prior proceeding.’ " Locurto v. Giuliani , 447 F.3d 159, 171 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Jeffreys v. Griffin , 1 N.Y.3d 34, 39, 769 N.Y.S.2d 184, 801 N.E.2d 404 (2003) ). For the reasons stated below, collateral estoppel bars Plaintiff's procedural due process claim.

First, for collateral estoppel to apply, Plaintiff must have "had an adequate opportunity to litigate." Elliott , 478 U.S. at 799, 106 S.Ct. 3220 (quoting Utah Construction & Mining Co. 384 U.S. at 421, 86 S.Ct. 1545 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist. , the court found the plaintiff to have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in a hearing where, inter alia , plaintiff was represented by counsel who called and cross-examined witnesses on his behalf. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist. , No. 5:02CV1403, 2006 WL 1741023, *6 (N.D.N.Y. June 20, 2006), aff'd , 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). A plaintiff, however, has not been provided an "adequate opportunity to litigate" when "denied adequate discovery into the" evidence central to the administrative agency's findings. See Locurto, 447 F.3d at 171.

Plaintiff contends he was deprived adequate discovery into said evidence at the November 13, 2014 hearing when "Defendant[ ] intentional[ly] conceal[ed] and disregarded a video tape recording ... and later [told] Plaintiff about it." Dkt. No. 29 at 15. However, Plaintiff was not "denied adequate discovery" because upon receiving said evidence, Plaintiff requested, and the District allowed, the...