Hous. Auth. of Cnty. of Cass v. Assisted Hous. Risk Mgmt. Ass'n

2020 IL App (4th) 180737-U

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE COUNTY OF CASS, ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ASSISTED HOUSING RISK MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION (AHRMA), Defendant-Appellee.

NO. 4-18-0737

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT

April 13, 2020

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cass County

No. 11L8

Honorable Bob Hardwick Jr., Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Holder White concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to deem facts admitted, denying its motion to strike defendant's affirmative defenses, denying its motion to bar an adverse witness, or denying its motion barring defendant from referencing the Federal Emergency Management Association (FEMA). Additionally, the trial court did not err in granting defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on lost rental income.

¶ 2 After a windstorm in June 2010, plaintiff, Housing Authority of the County of Cass, Illinois, the owner of an apartment building, filed insurance claims with defendant, Assisted Housing Risk Management Association (AHRMA), its insurance provider. Plaintiff claimed the windstorm caused structural damage to the apartment building covered under the insurance contract. Plaintiff filed its complaint in December 2011, alleging it had suffered lost rental income and other losses associated with either demolishing or rehabilitating the inhabitable structure. Plaintiff alleged the relevant insurance contract with defendant (spanning January 1, 2010, to January 1, 2011) covered both claims.

¶ 3 In June 2018, after approximately seven years of litigation, a jury found in favor of defendant. The jury's verdict found coverage for structural damage caused by the windstorm was provided by the insurance contract; however, defendant proved at least one affirmative defense defeating coverage.

¶ 4 Plaintiff appeals, arguing the trial court erred in (1) denying its motion to deem facts admitted, (2) incorrectly concluding defendant's affirmative defenses were jury questions (3) denying its motion to strike defendant's third amended affirmative defenses, (4) denying plaintiff's motion to bar adverse witness Steve Horton from testifying, (5) denying plaintiff's motion to bar any mention of involvement of the Federal Emergency Management Association (FEMA), and (6) granting defendant's partial motion for summary judgment on the issue of loss of rental income.

¶ 5 We affirm.

¶ 6 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 7 In June 2010, plaintiff owned an apartment complex with approximately 16 rental units in Beardstown, Illinois. That month, a storm with high winds blew through the town, causing structural damage to the apartment complex. After the storm, the building's foundation shifted, and the building eventually became uninhabitable. Plaintiff alleged the windstorm caused or significantly contributed to the building's damaged foundation and such damage was covered under the insurance contract between plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiff further alleged the foundation damage required the property to be vacated. Plaintiff filed a property claim with defendant in June 2011. Following inspections by an architect and a structural engineer,defendant denied plaintiff's insurance claim. Plaintiff filed its complaint in December 2011, claiming it suffered lost rental income and other losses associated with either demolishing or rehabilitating the structure. Plaintiff alleged the relevant insurance contract with defendant (applicable from January 1, 2010, to January 1, 2011) covered both claims.

¶ 8 Defendant argued that under the applicable contract between the parties, there was no coverage for these claims. Defendant asserted as affirmative defenses five specific exclusions within the insurance contract exempting coverage.

¶ 9 This case plodded through approximately seven years of litigation before culminating in a weeklong jury trial in June 2018. On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in deciding numerous pretrial discovery issues as well as motions raised during both the pretrial and trial phases of litigation. In addressing those issues raised by plaintiff's brief and argument, we provide only relevant background information as it relates to those particular claims.

¶ 10 In June 2018, the jury returned a verdict for defendant, finding coverage for structural damage caused by the windstorm was provided by the insurance contract; however, defendant proved at least one affirmative defense defeating coverage.

¶ 11 This appeal followed.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 A. Plaintiff's Motion to Deem Certain Facts Admitted

¶ 14 Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 216(a) (eff. May 30, 2008), "[a] party may serve on any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the truth of any specified relevant fact set forth in the request." The facts contained in the request are admitted within 28 days, unless the responding party denies the admissions, providing reasons why the party cannot either admit or deny the request, or raises a written objection to the request. Ill. S.Ct. R. 216(c) (eff. May 30, 2008). A responding party must make a reasonable effort to respond to an opposing party's request to admit within the responding party's reasonable control. Szczeblewski v. Gossett, 342 Ill. App. 3d 344, 349, 795 N.E.2d 368, 372 (2003). "A request to admit is proper if it relates to statements or opinions of fact or the application of law to fact." Troyan v. Reyes, 367 Ill. App. 3d 729, 739, 855 N.E.2d 967, 976 (2006) (citing P.R.S. International, Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 184 Ill. 2d 224, 236, 703 N.E.2d 71, 77 (1998)). However, a reviewing court will not disturb a trial court's ruling on discovery matters unless the trial court abused its discretion. Reda v. Advocate Health Care, 199 Ill. 2d 47, 54, 765 N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (2002). An abuse of discretion occurs when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Kim v. Mercedes-Benz, U.S.A., Inc., 353 Ill. App. 3d 444, 452, 818 N.E.2d 713, 720 (2004). As noted by defendant, requests to admit may be contained within the pretrial discovery section of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules (Part E.) and are considered a part of the discovery process. However, their true purpose is not the discovery of facts but to establish as fact certain material facts in a cause of action without the necessity of formal proof at trial. Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas, 226 Ill. 2d 334, 346, 875 N.E.2d 1065, 1074 (2007) (quoting P.R.S. International, 184 Ill. 2d at 237).

¶ 15 In January 2013, plaintiff served on defendant 24 requests to admit certain facts. In February 2013, defendant responded to plaintiff's requests. For each response, defendant either objected to the request or indicated it could neither admit nor deny the fact and provided reasons why it could not do so. Rather than seek a hearing on the objections to have them addressed by the trial court, plaintiff filed a motion to deem the facts as admitted that same month. Even plaintiff acknowledges in its brief that "striking unresponsive or evasive answers and deeming requests admitted is the only sanction contemplated by Rule 216." True as that maybe, plaintiff skipped a step in the process—seeking a ruling on defendant's objections, since only the trial court, and not plaintiff unilaterally, would be invested with the authority to determine whether a response was, in fact, "unresponsive" or "evasive" and determine the appropriate sanction.

¶ 16 Although plaintiff does not cite the record to provide an example of its request and defendant's response, we were able to locate them within the record. However, it is not our responsibility to search the record for the appellant to find reasons for reversal. See Farwell Construction Co. v. Ticktin, 84 Ill. App. 3d, 791, 802, 405 N.E.2d 1051, 1060 (1980). By way of example, plaintiff's request to admit fact No. 7 states, "Admit that from June 1, 2008 through December 31, 2011, Defendant insured the subject property against risks of direct physical loss." Defendant responded it could not admit or deny these requests as the address discrepancy in plaintiff's request could affect the alleged damages at issue in the case. Defendant argued plaintiff's requests contained inconsistent addresses when identifying the subject property. The statement of values attached to plaintiff's complaint indicated there were two buildings that contain 16 apartment units for which defendant allegedly provided coverage, and the addresses listed on the statement of values are different than the addresses listed in plaintiff's request to admit facts. Plaintiff, in its request to admit facts, provides the address of the subject property as Eddie Garnier Apartments, Building B, 900 West 6th Street. The addresses listed on the statement of values for the Garnier Apartments is 201 and 202 Garnier in Beardstown, Illinois.

¶ 17 Another example we found in the record illustrates one of defendant's objections. Plaintiff's request to admit fact No. 17 states, "Admit damage caused by or resulting from wind in a Covered Cause of Loss under the terms of any and all insurance contracts between Plaintiff and Defendant which were in effect during the time period from January 1, 2010 to January 1,2012." Defendant objected to this request to the extent it was vague and ambiguous and called for a legal conclusion. A request to admit that seeks the admission of a conclusion of law is improper, and a failure to respond to such a question does not result in a judicial admission. Robertson v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 344 Ill. App. 3d 196, 200, 799 N.E.2d 852, 856 (2003). Although plaintiff claims defendant simply provided "boiler-plate responses,"...