Hous. Auth. of Cty. of King v. Knight

543 P.3d 891

The HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the COUNTY OF KING, a Washington municipal corporation, Appellant,

v.Angela KNIGHT, and all occupants, including Andre Knight and Delaney Knight, Respondents.

No. 85031-8-I

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

Filed February 26, 2024

Honorable Mark J. Hillman.

Andrew Richard Chisholm, Christopher Michael Reed, Montgomery Purdue PLLC, 701 5th Ave. Ste. 5500, Seattle, WA, 98104-7096, Henry Graham Ross, K&L Gates LLP, 1 Sw Columbia St. Ste. 1900, Portland, OR, 97204-4041, for Appellant.

Edmund Robert Witter, Attorney at Law, 1200 5th Ave. Ste. 700, Seattle, WA, 98101-1116, Yuan Ting, Christina Eugenie Jaccard, King County Bar Association, 1200 5th Ave. Ste. 700, Seattle, WA, 98101-1116, Ashleen Elisabeth O’brien, Housing, Justice Project, 1200 5th Ave. Ste. 700, Seattle, WA, 98101-1116, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of King County Bar Association Housing Justice Project.

PUBLISHED OPINION

Dwyer, J.

¶1 Does the federal Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act¹ (CARES Act) require 30 days’ notice for any eviction from dwellings covered by the Act? With all due respect to our colleagues at Division II, we conclude that the answer is no.² The CARES Act requires such notice only for evictions stemming from a tenant’s nonpayment of rent.

I

¶2 In January 2023, the King County Housing Authority served a notice to vacate on a rental unit, alleging that its occupants had engaged in nuisance and criminal activity on the premises. The unit was occupied by Angela Knight, Andre Knight, and Delaney Knight. The notice provided them with three days to vacate the unit. Three days later, they had not done so. The Housing Authority subsequently filed an unlawful detainer petition and a motion to show cause in King County Superior Court.

¶3 A superior court commissioner denied the Housing Authority’s petition and dismissed its eviction action without prejudice. The commissioner stated that he had relied on our opinion in Sherwood Auburn LLC v. Pinzon, 24 Wash. App. 2d 664, 521 P.3d 212 (2022), review denied, 1 Wash.3d 1005, 526 P.3d 848 (2023), to conclude that the CARES Act requires 30 days’ notice for all evictions from dwellings covered by the Act, and that, regardless of the Housing Authority’s assert- ed basis for evicting the Knights, it had only given them three days’ notice.³

¶4 The Housing Authority now appeals.⁴

II

¶5 The superior court commissioner herein dismissed the Housing Authority’s unlawful detainer action in reliance on our opinion in Pinzon. However, because that opinion did not resolve the matter presented herein, such reliance was misplaced.

¶6 In the Pinzon opinion, we summarized that,

[t]he federal CARES Act, enacted by Congress in response to the economic disruption resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, provides protections for tenants living in housing units owned by landlords that have received the financial benefits of certain federal programs. 15 U.S.C. § 9058. The statute applies to tenants living in any "covered dwelling," which includes housing units, on properties with "[f]ederally backed mortgage loan[s]." 15 U.S.C. § 9058(a)(1), (2)(B)(i). In addition to imposing a 120-day moratorium on eviction actions for nonpayment of rent or other charges, 15 U.S.C. § 9058(b), the CARES Act established a 30-day notice requirement, which provides that "[t]he lessor of a covered dwelling unit … may not require the tenant to vacate the covered dwelling unit before the date that is 30 days after the date on which the lessor provides the tenant with a notice to vacate." 15 U.S.C. § 9058(c)(1).

Pinzon, 24 Wash. App. 2d at 671-72, 521 P.3d 212 (alterations in original). We stated that,

[i]n the federal CARES Act, Congress mandated that landlords who have accepted certain federal financial benefits must provide to tenants living in covered housing units a 30-day notice to cure the rental payment deficiency or vacate the premises before the landlord may commence an eviction action.

Pinzon, 24 Wash. App. 2d at 667, 521 P.3d 212 (footnote omitted) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 9058).

¶7 The tenants therein had fallen behind on their rent as a result of the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic. Pinzon, 24 Wash. App. 2d at 668, 521 P.3d 212. Their landlord had issued them two notices to vacate, a 14-day notice stemming from their failure to pay rent and a 30-day notice stating that such notice period would begin upon a superior court’s order to vacate. Pinzon, 24 Wash. App. 2d at 668-69, 521 P.3d 212. On appeal, and as pertinent here, the parties disputed whether "lessor" as set forth in the 30-day notice to vacate provision of the CARES Act meant a lessor or a superior court. Pinzon, 24 Wash. App. 2d at 672-73, 521 P.3d 212. We concluded that "lessor" meant lessor and reversed and remanded the matter. Pinzon, 24 Wash. App. 2d at 672-76, 681-82, 521 P.3d 212 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 9058(c)(1)).

¶8 Pinzon does not resolve the matter before us. Nowhere in that opinion did we set forth a holding that the CARES Act requires 30 days’ notice to vacate in all eviction actions in dwellings covered by the Act. Moreover, the tenants therein had received the notices to vacate arising from their nonpayment of rent, and the extent of our interpretation of the CARES Act was whether a "lessor" was a lessor under the Act.

¶9 In contrast, the notice to vacate herein stemmed from the Knights’ alleged nuisance and criminal conduct on the premises, and we are tasked with interpreting whether the Act requires 30 days’ notice for all eviction actions regarding a dwelling covered by the Act. Thus, we plainly did not decide in Pin- zon the matter now before us. Accordingly, by so relying on that opinion to dismiss the Housing Authority’s unlawful detainer action herein, the superior court commissioner erred.⁵ However, because Pinzon does not resolve the matter before us, we next look for guidance from the text of the CARES Act itself.

III

¶10 The Housing Authority asserts that the CARES Act requires 30 days’ notice only for evictions stemming from nonpayment of rent. The Housing Authority is correct.

A

[1–7] ¶11 The CARES Act is a federal enactment. In interpreting such an enactment, our objective is to ascertain Congress’s intent, Kitsap County Consol. Hous. Auth. v. Henry-Levingston, 196 Wash. App. 688, 701, 385 P.3d 188 (2016).⁶ "‘[I]f the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, then [we] must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.’ " Pinzon, 24 Wash. App. 2d at 670, 521 P.3d 212 (alterations in original) (quoting Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)). A statute’s plain meaning is derived from inquiring into "all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question." Dep’t of Ecology, 146 Wash.2d at 11, 43 P.3d 4.

In determining the plain meaning of a statute, we consider "the ordinary meaning of words, the basic rules of grammar, and the statutory context to conclude what the legislature has provided for in the statute and related statutes." In re Forfeiture of One 1970 Chevrolet Chevelle, 166 Wash.2d 834, 839, 215 P.3d 166 (2009). In so doing, we "construe a statute ‘so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous.’ " Seattle City Light v. Swanson, 193 Wash. App. 795, 810, 373 P.3d 342 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rapid Settlements, Ltd. v. Symetra Life Ins. Co., 134 Wash. App. 329, 332, 139 P.3d 411 (2006)). "Common sense informs our analysis, as we avoid absurd results in statutory interpretation." State v. Alvarado, 164 Wash.2d 556, 562, 192 P.3d 345 (2008).

Linville v. Dep’t of Ret. Sys., 11 Wash. App. 2d 316, 321; 452 P.3d 1269 (2019).

[8, 9] ¶12 "[I]f, after this inquiry, the statute remains susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, the statute is ambiguous and it is appropriate to resort to aids to construction, including legislative history." Dep’t of Ecology, 146 Wash.2d at 12, 43 P.3d 4 (citing Cockle v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 142 Wash.2d 801, 808, 16 P.3d 583 (2001); Timberline Air Serv., Inc. v. Bell Helicopter-Textron, Inc., 125 Wash.2d 305, 312, 884 P.2d 920 (1994)). " ‘However, a statute is not ambiguous merely because of different conceivable interpretations.’ " Smith v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 22 Wash. App. 2d 500, 507, 512 P.3d 566 (quoting Bennett v. Seattle Mental Health, 166 Wash. App. 477, 483-84, 269 P.3d 1079 (2012)), review denied, 200 Wash.2d 1013, 519 P.3d 588(2022).

B

¶13 The United States Congress enacted the CARES Act on March 27, 2020 "in response to the economic disruption resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic." Pinzon, 24 Wash. App. 2d at 671-72, 521 P.3d 212.

¶14 At issue herein is a 30-day notice to vacate provision set forth in the CARES Act bill, located within Section 4024, "Temporary Moratorium on Eviction Filings." That section reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

SEC. 4024 TEMPORARY MORATORIUM ON EVICTION FILINGS

(a) DEFINITIONS⁷…

….

(b) MORATORIUM.—During the 120-day period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, the lessor of a covered dwelling may not—

(1) make, or cause to be made, any filing with the court of jurisdiction to initiate a legal action to recover possession of the covered dwelling from the tenant for nonpayment of rent or other fees or charges; or

(2) charge fees, penalties, or other charges to the tenant related to such nonpayment of rent, (c) Notice.—The lessor of a covered dwelling unit—

(1) may not require the tenant to vacate the covered dwelling unit before the date that is 30 days after the date on which the lessor provides the tenant with a notice to vacate; and

(2) may not issue a notice to vacate under paragraph (1) until after the expiration of the period described in subsection (b).

Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 4024, 134 Stat. 281, 492-94 (202...