Howard-Elliot v. Stamford Health, Inc.

Laura HOWARD-ELLIOT v. STAMFORD HEALTH, INC.

No. CV166066733S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Haven, New Haven

November 15, 2018

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Markle, J.

I Procedural History

On December 7, 2016, the plaintiff, Laura Howard-Elliot, filed a six-count complaint against the defendants, Stamford Health Inc., and Stamford Health Medical Group, Inc. The plaintiff alleges in first count one of her complaint, the defendants retaliated against her by terminating her employment in violation of General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(4).^[1] The plaintiff was employed by Stamford Health, Inc. as a treatment adherence case manager from July 30, 2012 to April 18, 2016. During her employment she alleges that her direct supervisor created a hostile work environment as alleged in further detail in the complaint. The plaintiff claims that as a result she suffered an emotional breakdown and suffered from stress and anxiety for nearly two years. On January 28, 2016, the plaintiff took a medical leave of absence effective April 18, 2016, until May 22, 2016. On April 18, 2016, the plaintiff met with human resources to discuss possible accommodations for her stress and anxiety when she returned to work. But the human resources staff informed that she was being terminated effective April 18 2016, for alleged violations of the Stamford hospital photography policy. Stamford Health, Inc. claimed that the plaintiff had videotaped a hospital patient with her cell phone, which was prohibited conduct under the policy barring written consent of the recorded patient. The plaintiff claims she did not violate the policy because the patient was not an active patient at the time of the videotaping, it was off hospital premises, and there was prior written consent and those reasons were a pretext for Stamford Health, Inc. to terminate the plaintiff because of her complaints.

The plaintiff alleges in the second count that Stamford Health Inc. negligently supervised their employees who engaged in sexual harassment that intimidated female employees and that Stamford Health, Inc., knew or should have known of this continuing course of conduct by its employee but yet no action was taken to prevent or discourage this conduct.

In count three, the plaintiff further claims a count of invasion of the plaintiff’s privacy, in that her supervisor accessed deleted, and tampered with the plaintiff’s emails and data contained therein, exceeded his authority as an administrator and supervisor of the department, and by doing so, intruded upon her seclusion violating General Statutes § 53a-251.

The fourth count alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress claimed as to the previously named defendant Parry, to which this action was withdrawn.

In count six, ^[2] the plaintiff claims Parry’s previously described conduct was committed within the scope of his duties as the chairperson of the department and any or all of the defendants knew or should have known that the conduct claimed created an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress to the plaintiff, which could result in illness or bodily harm.

In count five, the complaint alleges that the defendants committed assault, battery, and sexual assault against the plaintiff, as defined and described in General Statutes § 53a-73a(a)(2) and (3). The plaintiff prays for back pay, front pay, benefits, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys fees, costs, and any further relief the court deems necessary and proper.

On January 12, 2017, the defendants filed an answer and raised ten special defenses, which include: (1) the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; (2) any damage the plaintiff suffered is not attributable to the defendants’ actions; (3) the plaintiff failed to mitigate any damages she may have suffered; (4) contributory negligence bars some or all of the plaintiff’s claims; (5) the defendants would have taken the same actions anyways in absence of any alleged protected conduct; (6) the defendant’s good faith effort to enforce anti-retaliation and anti-discrimination policies preclude any award of punitive damages; (7) the actions of the defendants were all done in good faith for legitimate business reasons; (8) the defendants exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct unlawful harassment and the plaintiff failed to take advantage of preventative or corrective opportunities to avoid harm; (9) the plaintiff had no reasonable, expectation of privacy in her work-issued computer and email; and (10) a corporation is not liable for an intentional tort.^[3]

On June 26, 2018, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the defendants’ special defenses. On July 20, 2018, the defendants filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the plaintiff’s motion. No reply was filed. The court heard oral argument on the plaintiff’s motion on August 27, 2018.

II Discussion

"[I]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of [self-represented] litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the [self-represented] party ... we are also aware that [a]lthough we allow [self-represented] litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with the relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Berka v. Middletown, 181 Conn.App 159, 163, 185 A.3d 596, cert. denied, 328 Conn. 939, 184 A.3d 268 (2018).

"[A]lthough, generally, the device used to challenge the sufficiency of the pleadings is a motion to strike; see Practice Book § 10-39; our case law [has] sanctioned the use of a motion for summary judgment to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading [if a party has waived its right to file a motion to strike by filing a responsive pleading]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 535 n.10, 51 A.3d 367 (2012). "[T]he use of a motion for summary judgment to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint is appropriate when the complaint fails to set forth a cause of action and the defendant can establish that the defect could not be cured by repleading ..." Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 317 Conn. 223, 236, 116 A.3d 297 (2015). Where the nonmoving party argues that any purported defects could be cured by repleading, and the moving party fails to demonstrate that, if the nonmoving party were permitted to replead, the legal deficiency underlying the motion for summary judgment would not be cured, the trial court should treat the motion for summary judgment as a motion to strike, under which the nonmoving party would be afforded the opportunity to replead upon the granting of the motion. American Progressive Life & Health Ins. Co. of New York v. Better Benefits, LLC, 292 Conn. 111, 124-25, 971 A.2d 17 (2009). "Although no appellate court has addressed whether the Larobina [v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394, 876 A.2d 522 (2005) ] and American Progressive Life & Health Insurance Co. of New York [v. Better Benefits, LLC, 292 Conn. 111, 971 A.2d 17 (2009) ] holdings are applicable when the motion for summary judgment challenges the sufficiency of a special defense, our Superior Courts have answered that inquiry in the affirmative. See WM Specialty Mortgage, LLC v. Brandt, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV-09-5001157-S (February 10, 2009), citing Bank of New York Trust Co. v. Gbeh, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV-07-5002495-S (February 26, 2008) (‘the rationale set forth in Larobina applies in circumstances where the defendants’ special defenses would survive, given an opportunity to amend’). We agree that such an extension is both legally and logically sound." GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Ford, 144 Conn.App. 165, 180, 73 A.3d 742 (2013).

"[A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court ... [The court] construe[s] the [special defenses] in the manner most favorable to sustaining [their] legal sufficiency ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 398, 142 A.3d 227 (2016). "[F]acts must be pleaded as a special defense when they are consistent with the allegations of the complaint but demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff has no cause of action ... The fundamental purpose of a special defense, like other pleadings, is to apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, so that basic issues are not concealed until the trial is underway ... Whether facts must be specially pleaded depends on the nature of those facts in relation to the contested issues." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Almada v. Wausau Business Ins. Co., 274 Conn. 449, 456, 876 A.2d 535 (2005). "[T]he total absence of any factual allegations specific to the dispute renders [the special defense] legally insufficient." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Jackson, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-14-6024411-S (August 21, 2015, Roraback, J.) (60 Conn.L.Rptr. 864, 865).

Broadly construing the self-represented plaintiff’s memorandum of law, the plaintiff moves to strike the defendants’ special defenses as legally insufficient on the grounds that some or all of the special defenses are not proper affirmative defenses and some or all of the special defenses are conclusory or are not pleaded with sufficient specificity.^[4] The defendants argue that the plaintiff’s motion to strike is untimely, and, as such, the court should deny the plaintiff’s motion.^[5] The defendants do not address the legal...