Howard v. Jacobs Eng'g Inc.

716 F.Supp.2d 510

Kevin HOWARD, Plaintiff,

v.JACOBS ENGINEERING, INC., Defendant.

No. H-7-cv-01359.

United States District Court,

S.D. Texas,

Houston Division.

Nov. 12, 2008.

Jermaine Savoy Thomas, Barnes and Turner, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.

Marjorie A. Murphy, Timothy Mitchell Watson, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendant.

ORDER

KEITH P. ELLISON, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is the Defendant Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 12.) For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion should be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUNDA. Factual History

Plaintiff Kevin Howard is an African-American male. He alleges that he was discriminated against based on race and sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and § 1981 when he was denied advancement in the company and eventually terminated, without cause, in March 2006.

Plaintiff attended college for several years in the early 1990s, and afterwards worked at companies and law firms in various roles providing office services such as copying and filing. In late 2002, Plaintiff began working at Defendant Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc. (“Jacobs”) as a contract employee through an employment agency. Plaintiff was hired directly on or about January 27, 2003, in Jacobs' Facilities Department, under Richard Connelly, to perform tasks such as filling copiers and performing office moves. (Pl. Dep., Doc. No. 12, Ex. B, 36-37.) After about one year at the company, Plaintiff was promoted to the front desk in the Reprographics Department, under Sean Boyles. (Pl. Dep., Doc. No. 12, Ex. B, 45-47; 51.) In the summer of 2004, Manager Jim Guidry promoted Plaintiff to the Document Control Department (“DCD”), and he was assigned to the Premcor Project. Over this time period, Plaintiff's hourly salary rose from approximately $10/hr to $13/hr.

On or about August 7, 2004, Plaintiff took the position “Document Control I” in the DCD. (Doc. No. 12, Ex. A, ¶ 4.) All DCD employees are required to learn and operate “Engineering JPI” or “JPI Vendocs,” two software programs. Jacobs claims that knowledge of JPI is a critical skill in the DCD. (Doc. No. 12, Ex. A, ¶ 3.) Plaintiff was assigned to distribute mail and other materials for the Premcor project until he learned JPI. (Doc. No. 12, Ex. A, ¶ 5.) On or about June 2005, Cristina Dunn, a white female, took over as DCD Manager. (Pl. Compl. ¶ 6.) Before Guidry left, he arranged for Jennifer Phillips, a white female, to train Plaintiff to operate Engineering JPI.

As is typical at Jacobs, after the Premcor Project was terminated, the employees on the Project were “destaffed:” employees were laid off pending reassignment to other jobs. (Doc. No. 12, Ex. A, ¶ 2.) Six employees, including Plaintiff, were originally scheduled to be destaffed throughout September, October, and November 2005. This destaffing was delayed, and, in December, Plaintiff approached Dunn to ask what he needed to do to ensure his assignment to a new project. (Pl. Dep., Doc. No. 12, Ex. B, 77; Dunn Dep., Doc. No. 24, Ex. C, 90.) Dunn allegedly told him that he needed to possess a minimum skill set to perform as a DCD employee and extended his destaffing date to February 2006 to allow him to receive training. (Doc. No. 12, Ex. A, ¶ 12.) Dunn explained that Plaintiff's options, given that he was having difficulties meeting the minimum skill set in the DCD, were to return to Reprographics, seek work in another department, or “he would have to not work at Jacobs.” (Dunn Dep., Doc. No. 24, Ex. C, 90.)

Dunn then arranged for Plaintiff to receive six weeks of individualized JPI training and basic computer skills from Courtney Fletcher, Linda Giles, and Gina Arias in the DCD. (Doc. No. 12, Ex. A, ¶ 13.) While the progress reports from this training were mixed, Fletcher reported some improvement, and asked that Plaintiff's assignment be extended, a request Dunn approved. (Doc. No. 12, Ex. A, ¶ 16.) Plaintiff claims that, during this training period, he had no interest in remaining in the DCD under Dunn because he expected to be staffed in the Piping Department. (Pl. Dep., Doc. No. 12, Ex. B, 124; 126-27.)

In March 2006, Dunn allegedly recommended that Plaintiff's employment be terminated. Human Resources Director John Kadash approved the recommendation and Plaintiff was terminated on March 31, 2006. Dunn did not hire another “Document Control I” employee, until October 2006. This new employee, an African-American male, was not assigned mail-distribution duties. (Doc. No. 12, Ex. A, ¶ 24.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed a formal complaint with the EEOC, and the EEOC issued a right to sue letter. Plaintiff then filed this lawsuit, alleging that Defendant unlawfully terminated him in violation of Title VII and Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act because of his race and sex. Plaintiff seeks attorney's fees, back pay, costs, front pay, and compensation for emotional pain, and past and future mental anguish. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires the Court to determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the evidence thus far presented. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Kee v. City of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir.2001) (quotations omitted). A genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could enter a verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (“The existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.”); Crawford v. Formosa Plastics Corp., 234 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir.2000). The Court views all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Crawford, 234 F.3d at 902. “Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505).

III. RACE DISCRIMINATIONA. Title VII and Section 1981 Standard

“Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Grimes v. Texas Dep't of Mental Health, 102 F.3d 137, 140 (5th Cir.1996). Title VII claims are subject to the burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The elements of Section 1981 claims, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), are identical, and will be analyzed together. ¹ See Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., Inc., 26 F.3d 1277, 1284 n. 7 (5th Cir.1994); Wheeler v. BL Development Corp., 415 F.3d 399, 405 (5th Cir.2005) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to Section 1981 claims).

The plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. The facts in this case resemble a reduction in force because after the Premcor Project was destaffed, employees were reassigned to new roles under different projects throughout the company. In addition, as is often the case in a reduction in force, Plaintiff's position was eliminated, a fact that Defendant concedes. (Doc. No. 12, at 19.) To put forward a prima facie case of race discrimination when termination accompanies a reduction in force, a plaintiff must provide evidence that: “(1) [he or she] is within the protected [group]; (2) he or she is adversely affected by the employer's decision; (3) he or she was qualified to assume another position at the time of the discharge or demotion; and (4) ... [is] either circumstantial or direct, from which a fact finder might reasonably conclude that the employer intended to discriminate in reaching the decision at issue,” or “that after [the] discharge others who were not members of the protected class remained in similar positions.” See Faruki v. Parsons S.I.P., Inc. 123 F.3d 315, 318 (5th Cir.1997); ² Chavarria v. Despachos Del Notre, Inc., 390 F.Supp.2d 591, 596-597 (S.D.Tex.2005); Ortiz v. Shaw Group, Inc., 250 Fed.Appx. 603, 606 (5th Cir.2007); Woodhouse v. Magnolia Hosp., 92 F.3d 248, 252 (5th Cir.1996); Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 41 (5th Cir.1996); Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 654 (5th Cir.1996).

If a plaintiff makes this prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. “The defendant's burden during this second step is satisfied by producing evidence, which, ‘taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.’ ” Price v. Federal Exp. Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 720 (5th Cir.2002) (citing ( St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)). “This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it ‘can involve no credibility assessment.’ ” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (citing St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 509, 113 S.Ct. 2742)).

If the defendant meets its burden of production, “the McDonnell Douglas framework-with its presumptions and burdens” disappears, and “the sole...