Howard v. Proviso Twp. High Sch. S.D. 2019 Bd. of Educ.

PAULA HOWARD, Plaintiff, v. PROVISO TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL S.D. 2019 BOARD OF EDUCATION and PROVISO TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL S.D. 209, Defendants.

No. 21-cv-3573

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

April 21, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JORGE L. ALONSO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Paula Howard sues Proviso Township High School's board of education and its school district (collectively “Defendants”) for alleged sex and race-based discrimination, as well as retaliation, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Howard alleges that Defendants improperly refused to allow her to withdraw her retirement application after a dispute arose about her number of years of service. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss [5]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion.

Background

The Court takes as true the following facts from Howard's complaint. Proviso High School employed Howard, an African American female, as a teacher from 2003 to 2017. Around December 2012, she applied for Proviso's Retirement Incentive Program, which required at least 20 years of service to qualify. At the time, human-resource notifications indicated that Howard had 20 years of service credited to her. In January of 2013, the Superintendent approved and submitted Howard's application to the Board of Education for a vote. The submission, however showed only 14 years of service rather than the 20 she had applied with, which equated to fewer benefits under the program.

Hours before the Board meeting, Howard learned that the Superintendent submitted her application with 14 years of service instead of 20. She asked the Superintendent's office to correct the error and was assured by the Superintendent's secretary that the issue would be fixed. No. corrections were ever made to the application. On January 28, 2013, Proviso's Executive Director of Human Resources advised Howard that her application would be submitted with 14 years of service rather than 20.

In February 2013^[1], Howard asked Proviso to withdraw her application given its failure to explain or correct the years-of-service issue. Proviso's Superintendent told her that it was the Board's policy to accept a retirement application as presented and that no corrections or withdrawals were allowed once submitted. On March 29, 2013 Proviso's Superintendent requested that the Board make a final determination on Howard's request to withdraw or correct her application. Howard continued working at Proviso until 2017 when she left the school, hoping still that the Board would formally withdraw her application and reinstate her as a fulltime employee.

On July 22, 2019, the Board issued a formal decision that Howard's application could not be corrected or withdrawn. Later, on May 26, 2020, Howard learned that the Board allowed a similarly-situated employee-Daniel Johnson, a white male-to withdraw and amend his retirement application.

On March 4, 2013, Howard filed a charge of discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”).^[2] In her charge, Howard alleged that she was subjected to harassment and a hostile work environment between January 22, 2013 and March 1, 2013. The IDHR investigated this charge and, on April 15, 2014, filed a complaint on Howard's behalf before the Illinois Human Rights Commission (“IHRC”). The complaint alleged that the Proviso Board created a “hostile intimidating, and offensive work environment that substantially interfered with Complainant's ability to perform her job” and that such conduct amounted to retaliation for filing prior charges of discrimination. [6-2] at p.3. In summary, Howard alleged that two Proviso employees made harassing comments to her, yelled at her for trivial reasons, falsely accused her of returning late to work for lunch, refused to approve travel expenses that had previously been approved, and threatened to write her up because she would not tell one of the individuals about conversations she had with co-workers.

Several years later, on June 28, 2019, Howard filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint in the IHRC matter. She sought to amend her complaint to include allegations that Defendants made an error in calculating her number of years of service and that the Defendants discriminated against her by not letting her withdraw her retirement application because of her sex, race, and the prior discrimination charges she filed. On March 9, 2020, the administrative law judge in the IHRC proceeding issued an order denying Howard's request to amend her complaint. The order ruled that the request to amend was untimely and that the new allegations did not relate to the original allegations.

Discussion

Defendants argue that: (1) the Court should dismiss Howard's claims based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (2) the Court should dismiss Howard's claim based on the statute of limitations; (3) if the Court does not dismiss the claims, it should stay this case under the Colorado River abstention doctrine; and (4) Defendant Proviso School District is a non-suable entity and therefore must be dismissed. The Court addresses each argument in turn.

I. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Defendants first argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes Howard from challenging in federal court the denial of her request for leave to amend in the administrative proceeding. The Court disagrees. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents federal courts from deciding cases “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). But the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to state administrative proceedings. Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1349 (7th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, it does preclude Howard from bringing her claims despite what happened in the administrative proceeding.

II. Statute of Limitations

Next, Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss this case based on the statute of limitations. A complaint need not foresee nor overcome affirmative defenses, including one based on the statute of limitation. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); Xechem, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 372 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2004). A court, therefore, cannot dismiss a plaintiff's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) simply because it fails to plead around an affirmative defense. See Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. N. Trust Co., 372 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2004). Only if the plaintiff affirmatively “pleads itself out of court” by alleging facts in the complaint that are sufficient to establish the defense should a court grant a motion to dismiss based on an affirmative defense. Xechem, 372 F.3d at 901.

Title VII requires that, in states like Illinois that have an equal opportunity employment commission, a charge of unlawful employment practices be filed with the EEOC within 300 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir. 2006). Failure to file a timely charge with the EEOC precludes a subsequent lawsuit under Title VII. Martinez v. United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 772 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 1985). Like other defenses, the statute of limitations defense under Title VII is subject to equitable doctrines. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002); Beamon v. Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co., 411 F.3d 854, 860-61 (7th Cir. 2005); Hedrich v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wisc. Systems, 274 F.3d 1174, 1182 (7th Cir. 2001).

Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss Howard's claim based on the statute of limitations because she filed her charge more than 300 days after the discriminatory event occurred. The Board issued a formal decision on July 22, 2019 denying Howard's request to withdraw her application, but she filed her discrimination charge on October 9, 2020-more than 300 days after the Board's decision. In response, Howard argues that: (1) her claim did not accrue until May 26, 2020, when she heard about the other individual being allowed to withdraw and amend his retirement application and (2) the continuing violation doctrine makes her claim timely because her current status as a retired teacher is a continuing violation.

First, with respect to the continuing violation doctrine, this doctrine does not apply to Title VII cases after Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan. Indeed, Morgan makes clear that claims under Title VII related to discrete acts, such as the one Howard alleges, accrue on the day that they happen. 536 U.S. at 110-11. Only in a hostile environment claim-which is not the claim here-can repeat conduct be considered part of the same actionable claim, even if some of the acts fall outside the 300-day filing window. Id. at 115-121. Because Howard alleges a discrete act, her claim accrued on July 22, 2019 when the Board issued a decision about her request to withdraw her retirement application.

Nor does her continued status as a retired employee alter the accrual date for the statute of limitation. Howard's position conflates a continuing violation with a continuing harm. If a discrete act causes a continuing harm, such as in this case, the 300-day window still runs from the day of the act. Bass v. Joliet Public School Dist. No. 86, 746 F.3d 835, 839-40 (7th Cir. 2014).

Second although she incorrectly frames it in terms of when her claim accrued, her argument related to the May 26, 2020 date effectively requests that the Court...