Howard v. Reid Hosp.

CORBIN J. HOWARD, Plaintiff,

v.REID HOSPITAL, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:11cv00287

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

April 4, 2012

District Judge Thomas M. Rose

Magistrate Judge Sharon L. Ovington

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS¹

I. INTRODUCTION

On July 29, 2009, a man entered the emergency room at Reid Hospital in Richmond, Indiana, in order to receive care for a laceration to his left forearm. The man received relatively minor treatment and was discharged a short time thereafter. According to Reid Hospital, the man who received care that day was Plaintiff Corbin J. Howard. (Doc. #18). Plaintiff, however, alleges he was the victim of identity fraud, perpetrated in part with his ex-wife's assistance, and never visited the hospital that day nor received the services rendered. (Doc. #2 at 3-6). Because he denied responsibility for the bill, it not surprisingly remained unpaid. Eventually, in April 2010, Reid Hospital assigned the debtto Finance System of Richmond, Inc. (Doc. #18-1 at 29-30). Thereafter, on May 6, 2010, Finance System of Richmond, Inc., filed a small claims action in Wayne County, Indiana, against Corbin J. Howard for the debt. (Doc. #18 at 1; Doc. #2 at 3).

Plaintiff Corbin J. Howard, proceeding pro se, subsequently filed this action against Reid Hospital, Reid Hospital employee Shannon Roshan, and an attorney for Finance System of Richmond, Inc., Ronald J. Moore. (Doc. #2 at 2). Previously, upon initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), this Court found that Plaintiff's pro se Complaint had raised at least one arguable claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., and that sua sponte dismissal of Plaintiff's case was not warranted. (Doc. #3).

The case is presently before the Court upon Defendants Reid Hospital and Shannon Roshan's ("Reid Defendants") Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #'s 17, 18); Plaintiff's "Notice"/Response in Opposition (Doc. #23); Reid Defendants' Reply (Doc. #24), Motion to Designate Trial Attorneys (Doc. # 19), Motion to Strike and for Sanctions (Doc. # 25); and the record as a whole.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

Reid Defendants argue Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. (Doc. #18) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (2), (6), 8(a)). Plaintiff opposes Reid Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, but generally focuses his pro se memorandum in opposition on attacking the accuracy of factual issues not significant to the analysis setforth below. (See Doc. #23).

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Reid Defendants request this Court "dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)." (Doc. #18 at 3).

"Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss generally come in two varieties: a facial attack or a factual attack." Gentek Bldg Products, Inc. v. Steel Peel Litigation Trust, 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). A facial attack challenges the sufficiency of the Complaint's assertion of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. When countering a facial attack, Plaintiff's burden to prove subject matter jurisdiction is "not onerous." Musson Theatrical v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1248 (6th Cir. 1996). The allegations in the Complaint are taken as true, id., and "[i]f those allegations establish federal claims, jurisdiction exists." Gentek, 491 F.3d at 330. "Where, on the other hand, there is a factual attack on the subject-matter jurisdiction alleged in the complaint, no presumptive truthfulness applies to the allegations. When a factual attack ... raises a factual controversy, the district court must weigh the conflicting evidence to arrive at the factual predicate that subject-matter does or does not exist. In its review, the district court has wide discretion to allow affidavits, documents, and even a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve jurisdictional facts." Gentek, 491 F.3d at 330 (citations omitted).

Reid Defendants argue that "[t]he core fact at issue in the instant cause was adjudicated by the Indiana Small Claims Court, which found that, contrary to Howard'sclaims then and now, he did receive services at Reid and he was liable for his debts." (Doc. #18 at 3). Reid Defendants contend that as a result of the small claims court's ruling, "Mr. Howard is collaterally estopped from bringing forth the basis of the instant cause." (Id. at 4). Reid Defendants argue that Plaintiff "is clearly requesting this Court review and overturn the ruling made by the Indiana State Courts on the identical issues," and that such review is precluded under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Id. at 4-15). Reid Defendants also argue that due to the Indiana small claims court case against Mr. Howard, this Court is precluded by Indiana preclusion law from reviewing Mr. Howard's claims. (Id. at 7).

To the extent Plaintiff's pro se Complaint can be construed as an attack on the judgment of the small claims court, Reid Defendants are correct that this Court cannot provide the relief requested therein. In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923), the Supreme Court "found that federal district courts were only empowered with original jurisdiction, and that they did not have appellate jurisdiction to hear a claim that a state court's decision was in error." Todd v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., 434 F.3d 432, 436 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416). More recently, in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 161 L. Ed. 2d 454, 125 S. Ct. 1517 (2005) the Supreme Court "held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied only to 'cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.'" Todd,434 F.3d at 436 (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 1521-22).

Thus, to the extent Plaintiff seeks review of the small claims court's judgment, this Court is precluded from doing so under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. To the extent Plaintiff's pro se Complaint can be construed as a request for this Court to determine whether he is liable for the unpaid medical bills, Rooker-Feldman does not preclude review, but the claims cannot be reviewed due to preclusion law. In dicta, the Exxon Mobil Court noted that where the plaintiff brought a federal claim after a state court decision, a district court is not stopped "'from exercising subject matter jurisdiction simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in state court.'" Todd, 434 F.3d at 436 (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 1527). Instead, "even if the independent claim was inextricably linked to the state court decision, preclusion law was the correct solution to challenge the federal claim, not Rooker-Feldman." Id. at 437. Accordingly, in this case Indiana law determines whether the issues are precluded from being litigated by this Court. See Young v. Twp. of Green Oak, 471 F.3d 674, 680 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Well-settled law directs federal courts to 'give to a state court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.'" (quoting Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S. Ct. 892, 79 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1984)).

Under Indiana Small Claims Rule ("S.C.R.") 11(F), "[a] judgment shall be res judicata only as to the amount involved in the particular action and shall not be considered an adjudication of any fact at issue in any other action or court." Accordingly,S.C.R. 11(F) makes clear that Plaintiff cannot relitigate his liability for the medical debt, and any claims he raised attempting to do so must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff is liable for the amount of the unpaid medical bills and this issue cannot be relitigated.

Plaintiff, however, not only challenged the determination of his liability for the medical debt, but sought to recover expenses due to "numerous trips" he took to Richmond, Indiana "to try to correct this matter." (Doc. #2 at 7). Such expenses were due, in part, to legal actions brought against him in Wayne County, Indiana. (Id. at 3-7). Howard, a resident of Eaton, Ohio, alleged in his Complaint, however, that he did not sign a financial responsibility form at Reid Hospital. (Id.).

Assuming such facts to be true raises an arguable claim under the venue provision of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692i. Two actions - the original small claims court action and the garnishment action - were brought against Plaintiff in Indiana. The venue provision of the FDCPA specifically provides that "[a]ny debt collector who brings any legal action on a debt against any consumer shall . . . bring such action only in the judicial district or similar legal entity - (A) in which such consumer signed the contract sued upon; or (B) in which such consumer resides at the commencement of the action." 15 U.S.C. § 1692i(a)(2). Regardless of the amount in controversy, the FDCPA provides district courts with jurisdiction over claims made pursuant to the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d).

Neither the Rooker-Feldman doctrine nor Indiana's Small Claims Rule 11(F)preclude this Court's subject matter jurisdiction over the FDCPA claims. Rooker-Feldman does not do so because any injury involved was not caused by the state court judgment. See Todd, 434 F.3d at 437 (holding Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not preclude subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims under the FDCPA where plaintiff does not complain about injuries caused by the state court judgment in a garnishment proceeding, but by the filing of a false affidavit by defendant in that action). Small Claims Rule 11(F) also does not preclude subject matter...