Howell v. Raymours Furniture Co.

26 F.Supp.3d 366

Rebecca C. HOWELL, Plaintiff

v.RAYMOURS FURNITURE CO., INC., individually and t/d/b/a Raymour & Flanigan, Defendant.

No. 3:12–cv–1171.

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Filed June 12, 2014.

Bruce J. Phillips, Wetzel, Caverly, Phillips & Rodgers, Wilkes–Barre, PA, for Plaintiff.

Edward T. Groh, Raymour & Flanigan, Phillipsburg, NJ, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROBERT D. MARIANI, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Rebecca C. Howell filed a two-count Complaint against Defendant Raymours Furniture Company, trading as Raymour and Flanigan. (Doc. 1). This case involves claims of wrongful termination pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Stat. § 951 et seq. Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 21). For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny Defendant's motion.

II. Statement of Undisputed Facts

Defendant is a retail furniture company. (Def.'s Statement of Material Undisputed Facts (“Def.'s Stmt.”), Doc. 21–2, at ¶ 1). In 1998, Defendant hired Plaintiff as an at-will employee to perform the duties of a Visual Merchandiser. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 12–13). Visual Merchandisers are responsible for maintaining “the overall appearance of the showroom” and ensuring that it is “updated, professional, inviting and pleasing to the buying public[.]” (Id. at ¶ 4). Specifically, the Visual Merchandiser's responsibilities include: (1) developing showroom display plans within Defendant's guidelines, (2) working with the sales agents and warehouse employees to ensure furniture is placed on the showroom consistent with those display plans, (3) “[c]hecking in all new merchandise arriving at the showroom” and (4) tagging accessories. (Id. at ¶ 16). After working as a Visual Merchandiser in several of Defendant's locations, Plaintiff became the Visual Merchandiser exclusively for the Scranton showroom. (Id. at ¶¶ 14–15).

Plaintiff testified that her “direct supervisor” was the Regional Director of Sales (“RDS”), who oversaw all the Visual Merchandisers in her region. (See id. at ¶ 20, see also Howell Dep., Dec. 18, 2012, Doc. 21–3, Def.'s Ex. 1, at 35:16–23).¹ As the Scranton Visual Merchandiser, Plaintiff also worked with the Scranton Store Manager. (Def.'s Stmt. at ¶ 22). From July 2008 to October 2010, the RDS was Angela Miller² (“Miller”). (Id. at ¶ 21). The Scranton Store Manager between October 2008 and September 2010 was Diane Wondoloski (“Wondoloski”). (Id. at ¶ 23).

In 2010, Defendant had several personnel changes affecting its Scranton store. In mid- to late September, Lee Soto (“Soto”) replaced Wondoloski as Scranton Store Manager. (Id. at ¶ 58; Soto Dep., Doc. 21–3, Def.'s Ex. 4, at 76:15–16). In December 2010, Lawrence Haring (“Haring”) replaced Miller as RDS. (Def.'s Stmt. at ¶ 44). Haring reported to Robert Resnik (“Resnik”), who became Vice President of Sales for Defendant's Philadelphia market in August 2010. (Id. at ¶¶ 43–44). Plaintiff believes that Haring and Resnik, like Miller and Wondoloski, generally treated her fairly and never discriminated against her. (Id. at ¶¶ 41–42, 46–47). In contrast, Plaintiff believes Soto treated her unfairly and discriminated against her on the basis of her age.

In the roughly four-month period Soto worked with Plaintiff, he routinely and roundly criticized her performance. (See Soto Dep., Def.'s Ex. 4, at 76:15–16; Def.'s Stmt. at ¶¶ 62–64, 68–69, 77, 88, 99). Soto criticized the amount of time it took her to complete assigned tasks. (Id. at ¶ 63). He criticized the way she set up furniture displays. (Def.'s Stmt. at ¶ 64). Further, Soto told Plaintiff that the showroom was not up to par and that she was not doing a good job. (Id. at ¶ 62).

In December 2010, Soto criticized Plaintiff for leaving work without ensuring that an open space on the showroom floor had been filled. (Id. at ¶ 68). After censuring Plaintiff in person for the incident, he reiterated his disappointment to Plaintiff in an email with an attached photo of the open space. (Doc. 21–3, Def.'s Ex. 1F). Soto again met with Plaintiff two days later to discuss Plaintiffs performance. (Def.'s Stmt. at ¶ 77). Soto documented the discussion in a subsequent email, which he simultaneously sent to Haring as well as Plaintiff. (Doc. 21–3, Def.'s Ex. 1H). Ultimately, this email was forwarded to be placed in Plaintiffs personnel file. (Id. ).

Sometime between late-December 2010 and early-January 2011, Soto sought the assistance of the Visual Merchandiser for Defendant's Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania store, Jennifer Conklin (“Conklin”), to help improve the appearance of the Scranton showroom. (Def.'s Stmt. at ¶ 85; see also Howell Dep., Dec. 18, 2012, at 128:2–9). Conklin spent about a day in the showroom providing “fresh eyes” and a “new perspective” as to how it might be rearranged. (Howell Dep., Dec. 18, 2012, at 126:25–127:19,129:15–21).

On Saturday, January 15, 2011, Soto sent Plaintiff another email requesting that “[f]irst thing Monday morning” she “plan on addressing” several specific “concerns ... regarding merchandise placement on the floor.” (Doc. 21–3, Def.'s Ex. 11). In the email, which was simultaneously sent to Haring, Soto instructed Plaintiff to refrain from making any further merchandise moves until he “was satisfied with [their] placement.” (Id. ). Soto also instructed Plaintiff to seek his approval only via e-mail going forward. (Id. ).

At 11:48 AM the following Monday, January 17, 2011, Soto resent the email to Haring. (Id. ). In the forwarded email, Soto including the following message for Haring:

... I was not satisfied with the walk thru [sic] early this morning. [Plaintiff] Becky was deflecting and making excuses It is more of the same that has led me to have no confidence in her and her abilities as a visual [merchandiser]. I will document the walk thru [sic] this morning in an email and include you. My recommendation moving forward is that I do not see her making the adjustments necessary to continue as a visual for P1.³

(Id. ).

Haring responded approximately twenty minutes later stating, “I want you to terminate her today based on performance Just tell her that she is not meeting ... expectation[s] and based on her poor performance we will have to part ways. Time to say good bye [sic]. Let me know when this is complete.” (Id. ). As Plaintiff was leaving for lunch, Soto told her she was being fired for poor performance. (Def.'s Stmt. at ¶ 100; Howell Dep., Dec. 18, 2012, at 122:15–123:4). Upon Plaintiff's discharge, she was replaced by Conklin. (See Conklin Dep., Doc. 21–3, Def.'s Ex, 3, at 18:24–19:6).

III. Statement of Disputed Facts

There are four key issues of fact. First, there is an issue regarding the relationship between Soto and Plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that, in addition to RGA Haring, Soto was her supervisor at the time of her firing. (Pl.'s Stmt. at ¶ 20). Plaintiff points to Soto's deposition testimony in which he refers to himself as her “manager.” (Soto Dep., Pl.'s App., Doc. 26, at 46:5–25). In its Reply Brief, Defendant claims that Soto misspoke and corrected his testimony during cross-examination. (Doc. 28 at 16 n. 6 (citing Doc. 21–3, Def.'s Ex. 4, at 120:14–121:15, 123:3–124:1)). According to Defendant, RDS Haring was Plaintiffs sole supervisor at the time of her discharge. (See Def.'s Stmt. at ¶ 20).

Relatedly, there is a dispute of fact as to the role Soto played in Plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff appears to put forth two theories implicating Soto in the discharge decision. First, Plaintiff asserts that Soto made the decision and “personally terminated” her based on her age. (Pl.'s Stmt. at ¶ 104). Second, Plaintiff alleges that even if Haring made the decision to fire Plaintiff, Haring based his determination on Soto's discriminatory recommendation. (See id. at ¶ 105).

In response, Defendant maintains that Haring was the only one who fired Plaintiff. (Def.'s Stmt. at ¶ 105). According to Defendant, “Soto did not have the power to discharge Plaintiff.” (Id. ). Haring states that his decision was based on his own observations, conversation with Miller and Resnik and the owners' dissatisfaction with the appearance of the Scranton showroom. (Haring Certification, Doc. 21–6, at ¶ 13). Notably, Haring does not state that he considered Soto's opinion. (See id. ). Further, Haring alleges, “Mr. Soto did not recommend that Ms. Howell's employment be terminated.” (Id. at ¶ 12, emphasis in original). Finally, Haring states that he “did not take into consideration at all Ms. Howell's age which, in any event, I was not even aware of.” (Id. at ¶ 16).

The third area of dispute relates to Plaintiffs work performance both before and after the arrival of Soto. Plaintiff claims that she “always performed her job in an exemplary manner” during her twelve-year tenure as a Visual Merchandiser for Defendant. (Pl.'s Stmt. at ¶¶ 48–50; Howell Dep., Apr. 26, 2013, Def.'s Ex. 2 at 43:15–17). Plaintiff relies on the certifications of her former supervisor and coworker Norm Welsh (“Welsh”) and David Remetz (“Remetz”). (Pl.'s Stmt. at ¶ 31). Further, Plaintiff states that Defendant “never undertook any disciplinary or adverse employment action against” her. (See id. at ¶¶ 31–34). Notably, the only documented records of disciplinary action provided to the Court are Soto's emails to Haring. (See Def.'s Exs. 1F–1I, 5). Accordingly, Plaintiff contends that complaints about her performance only arose after Soto's arrival. (Pl.'s Br. in Opposition, Doc. 25, at 12).

In contrast, Defendant contends that Plaintiff exhibited poor work performance prior to Soto becoming the Scranton Store Manager and up until her discharge. According to Defendant, every managerial employee that set foot in the Scranton showroom noticed and criticized its subpar appearance. Haring certifies that, in addition to Soto's dissatisfaction, he “was disappointed with its appearance”...