Huard v. Kennebec Cnty., Docket no. 1:16-cv-00473-GZS

DEBORAH HUARD, Plaintiff, v. KENNEBEC COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

Docket no. 1:16-cv-00473-GZS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE

March 19, 2019

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION

This case is one of three related cases brought by former female corrections officers against Kennebec County and multiple employees of Kennebec County alleging various discriminatory and illegal practices at the Kennebec County Correctional Facility. While this case originally included the claims of all three plaintiffs, the Court ordered the claims of the three plaintiffs severed after the close of discovery. (See Order on Mot. to Sever (ECF No. 56).)

Now before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 70). For reasons explained herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the Motion.

I. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Before the Court turns its attention to Defendants' arguments for summary judgment, the Court considers two discrete issues for which Defendants seek judgment on the pleadings in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). In considering these arguments, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 3) and accepted all of her "well-pleaded factual averments" and drawn "all reasonable inferences in her favor." Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 788 (1st Cir. 1998). The Court recognizes at the outset that judgment on the pleadings may be entered where the complaint fails to "contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Grajales v. Puerto Rico Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, "[t]o cross the plausibility threshold a claim does not need to be probable, but it must give rise to more than a mere possibility of liability." Id. at 44-45.

First, the individual Defendants¹ seek judgment on the employment discrimination claims that remain pending against them (Counts I, II, VIII, IX & X)² arguing that there is no individual liability under the respective federal and state statutes. On this point, the Court agrees with Defendants. The First Circuit has clearly held that "there is no individual employee liability under Title VII." Fantini v. Salem State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2009). Likewise, the First Circuit has applied the same holding to the ADA. See Roman-Oliveras v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth., 655 F.3d 43, 52 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that "Title I of the ADA, like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, addresses the conduct of employers only and does not impose liability on co-workers") (internal quotation and citation omitted).

With respect to Maine's companion state statute, the Maine Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), 5 M.R.S.A. § 4551 et seq., this Court has previously held, "there is no individual liability under the MHRA." Charette v. St. John Valley Soil & Water Conservation Dist., No. 1:17-CV-35-GZS, 2017 WL 2683951, at *12 (D. Me. June 20, 2017) (discussing Fuhrmann v. Staples OfficeSuperstore East, Inc., 58 A.3d 1083 (Me. 2012)). While Plaintiff has cited a 2013 guidance memorandum from the Maine Human Rights Commission³ as offering support for individual liability after Fuhrmann, the Court does not believe this memo can override the clear case law that supports judgment as a matter of law in favor of the individual Defendants named in this case. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Worthy v. E. Maine Healthcare Sys., No. 14-cv-00184-JAW, 2017 WL 211609, at *32 (D. Me. Jan. 18, 2017) (concluding that "only an employer can be liable" for employment discrimination and whistleblowing retaliation); Fisk v. Mid Coast Presbyterian Church, No. 16-cv-00490-JDL, 2017 WL 1755950, at *4-5 (D. Me. May 4, 2017).⁴ Thus, the Court concludes that each individual Defendant is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff's statutory employment discrimination claims (Counts I, II, VIII, IX & X).

Next, Defendants seek judgment on the pleadings as to Count XVI, which Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint describes as "criminal liability of Kennebec County, Kennebec County Sheriff's Office and its Corrections Division, Kennebec County Correction Facility, Kennebec County Commissioners and Kennebec County Administrator" and cites 17-A M.R.S.A. § 60. (First Am. Compl. (ECF No. 3), PageID # 145). As framed, this Count fails to state a claim upon which Plaintiff could recover any relief in the context of this civil case. See, e.g., Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc., 486 A.2d 97, 101 (Me. 1984). To the extent Plaintiff has arguedthat Count XVI should be read to state a plausible civil RICO claim, the Court notes that Plaintiff's civil RICO claims are captured in Counts XIII-XV.

Therefore, the Court grants Defendants' request for judgment on the pleadings as to all Defendants on Count XVI and as to the individually named Defendants on Counts I, II, VIII, IX & X. The Court next considers Defendants' request for summary judgment on Plaintiff's remaining claims.

II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Legal Standard

Generally, a party is entitled to summary judgment if, on the record before the Court, it appears "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). An issue is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248. A "material fact" is one that has "the potential to affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law." Nereida-Gonzalez v. Tirado-Delgado, 990 F.2d 701, 703 (1st Cir. 1993).

The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). In determining whether this burden is met, the Court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. See Santoni v. Potter, 369 F.3d 594, 598 (1st Cir. 2004).

Once the moving party has made this preliminary showing, the nonmoving party must "produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, to establish the presence of a trialworthy issue." Triangle Trading Co., Inc. v. Robroy Indus., Inc., 200 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1999) (quotation marks and internal ellipsis omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). "Mere allegations, or conjecture unsupported in the record, are insufficient." Barros-Villahermosa v. United States, 642 F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Rivera-Marcano v. Normeat Royal Dane Quality A/S, 998 F.2d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 1993)); see also Wilson v. Moulison N. Corp., 639 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2011) ("A properly supported summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, periphrastic circumlocutions, or rank speculation."). "As to any essential factual element of its claim on which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial, its failure to come forward with sufficient evidence to generate a trialworthy issue warrants summary judgment for the moving party." In re Ralar Distribs., Inc., 4 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir. 1993). "However, summary judgment is improper when the record is sufficiently open-ended to permit a rational factfinder to resolve a material factual dispute in favor of either side." Morales-Melecio v. United States (Dep't of Health and Human Servs.), 890 F.3d 361, 368 (1st Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted).

B. Factual Background⁵

Defendant Kennebec County⁶ is ultimately overseen by three elected countycommissioners, Patsy Crockett, Nancy Rines, and George Jabar, each of whom is named as a Defendant in this case in both their individual and official capacities. The County Commissioners promulgate and amend the Kennebec County Administrative Regulations, which serve as the internal policies for the county. The day-to-day administration of Kennebec County is handled by County Administrator Bob Devlin and Human Resources Manager Terry York, both of whom are likewise named as individual Defendants in this case.

Defendant Kennebec County Sheriff's Office operates as a department within the county government run by an elected Sheriff. From January 2007 until September 2015, Defendant Randall Liberty was the Kennebec County Sheriff. Upon Liberty's departure, Defendant Ryan Reardon was promoted to the position of interim sheriff. Prior to that promotion, Reardon, who began working for Kennebec County in January 2007, spent approximately two years as chief deputy and approximately two years as the assistant corrections administrator.

Within the Sheriff's Office, there is a Corrections Division that operates the county jail, also known as the Kennebec County Correctional Facility ("KCCF"). Various KCCF employees make up the remainder of the individually named Defendants in this case, including:

• Marsha Alexander, who began working for Kennebec County in 1998, and worked as the assistant corrections administrator from May 2006 until August 2011, and then the jail administrator from August 2011 until March 2017.

• Laura Briggs, who began working for Kennebec County in September 2003 and was promoted to a corporal in February of 2012, then to a sergeant in November 2013, then a staff sergeant in August 2015, and a lieutenant in October 2016. Briggs left her employment with Kennebec County on January 6, 2017.

• Calista Campbell, who began working for Kennebec County as a clerical specialist in November 2010. Campbell was promoted to staff sergeant in February 2013 and then again promoted to assistant corrections administrator in January 2014.

• Jessica Quinn, who was hired as a clerical specialist at KCCF in July

...