Hubbard v. Brown

LONNIE W. HUBBARD, Petitioner, v. S. BROWN, Acting Warden, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 5:22-CV-196

United States District Court, N.D. West Virginia, Wheeling

December 28, 2022

ORDER RE-ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

JOHN PRESTON BAILEY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

The above referenced case is before this Court upon Magistrate Judge Mazzone's recommendation that petitioner's Petition for Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [Doc. 1 ] be denied and dismissed without prejudice. For the reasons that follow, this Court will adopt the R&R.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a federal inmate housed at FCI Hazleton and is challenging the legality of his conviction from the Eastern District of Kentucky.^[1] On December 3, 2015, July 21, 2016, and Novembers, 2016, petitioner was charged in a series of indictments with a total of seventy-three (73) counts related to drug distribution while petitioner was a registered pharmacist licensed to practice in Kentucky. During an eight day trial, the United States moved to dismiss two of the counts, and at the end of the trial petitioner was found guilty on all remaining counts. On June 30, 2017, petitioner was sentenced to a term of three-hundred and sixty months imprisonment for one count of conspiracy to distribute and dispense oxycodone and a substance used to manufacture a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; twelve counts of aiding and abetting the distribution of pseudo ephedrine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; one count of distribution of hydrocodone in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); thirty-eight counts of distribution of oxycodone in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); five counts of aiding and abetting the distribution of oxycodone in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; one count of maintaining a drug -involved premise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1); one count of conspiracy to commit money laundry in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h); three counts of engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957; and nine counts of aiding and abetting in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 and 2. Petitioner appealed, but the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari.

On April 2,2021, petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the petition and the Sixth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c), this Court is required to make a de novo review of those portions of the magistrate judge's findings to which objection is made. However, the Court is not required to review, under a de novo or any other standard, the factual or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge as to those portions of the findings or recommendation to which no objections are addressed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). Nor is this Court required to conduct a de novo review when the party makes only “general and conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).

In addition, failure to file timely objections constitutes a waiver of de novo review and the right to appeal this Court's Order. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363, 1366 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91,94 (4th Cir. 1984). Pro se filings must be liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by licensed attorneys, however, courts are not required to create objections where none exist. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1971).

Here, objections to Magistrate Judge Mazzone's R&Rwere due within fourteen (14) days of receipt, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. No objections were filed and this Court entered an order Adopting the R&R. See [Doc. 9]. Petitioner informed this Court that he never received the R&R. See [Doc. 10 & 11 ]. This Court permitted petitioner to file his objections by December 20,2022. See [Doc. 13]. Petitioner filed his objections [Doc. 15] on December 19,2022. Accordingly, this Court will review the portions of the R&R to which objection was filed under a de novo standard of review. The remainder of the R&R will be reviewed for clear error.

III. DISCUSSION

In the petition, petitioner challenges the validity of his conviction under § 841 following the decision in Ruan v. United States, 142 S.Ct. 2370 (2022). Petitioner specifically claims that in light of the Ruan decision, the crimes for which he was convicted are no longer deemed criminal. See [Doc. 1 ]. Petitioner contends that he has met all three prongs of the test set forth in In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 2000). In particular, he contends that he met the second prong of Jones because subsequent to his appeal and first § 2255 motion, the Ruan case was decided and his convictions under § 841 should therefore be reversed. Petitioner also contends that the remaining convictions, for conspiracy, maintaining a drug-involved premise, and money laundering, are all dependent on the convictions under § 841. For relief, petitioner asks this Court to vacate his convictions.

21 U.S.C. § 841 makes it unlawful, “except as authorized, ... for any person to knowingly or intentionally ... to manufacture, distribute, or dispense ... a controlled substance.” In Ruan, the Supreme Court held that “§ 841's ‘knowingly or intentionally' mens rea applies to the ‘except as authorized' clause. This means that once a defendant meets the burden of producing evidence that his or her conduct was ‘authorized,' the Government must prove the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized manner.” Ruan, 142 S.Ct. at 2376.

Generally, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides the exclusive means for a prisoner in federal custody to test the legality of his detention. However, § 2255(e) contains a savings clause, which allows a district court to consider a habeas petition brought by a federal prisoner under § 2241 where § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality” of the detention. 28 U.S.C. § 2255; see also United States v. Poole, 531 F.3d 263,270 (4th Cir. 2008). The fact that relief under § 2255 is procedurally barred does not render the remedy inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of a prisoner's detention. In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 332 (4th Cir. 2000). In the Fourth Circuit, a § 2255 petition is only inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention when:

(1) [A]t the time of conviction, settled law in this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the conviction; (2) subsequent to the prisoner's direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the substantive law changed such that the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is deemed not to be criminal; and (3) the prisoner cannot satisfy the gatekeeping provision of § 2255 because the new rule is not one of constitutional law.

Poole, 531 F.3d at 269 (quoting In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 333-34).

The Fourth Circuit found that the savings clause may apply to certain sentencing challenges. It explained:

[W]e conclude that § 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a sentence when: (1) at the time of sentencing, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the sentence; (2) subsequent to the prisoner's direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the aforementioned settled substantive law changed and was deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review; (3) the prisoner is unable to meet the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255(h)(2) for second or successive motions; and (4) due to this retroactive change, the sentence now presents an error sufficiently grave to be deemed a fundamental defect.

United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 429 (4th Cir. 2018). Because the requirements of the savings clause are jurisdictional, a § 2241 petitioner relying on the § 2255(e) savings clause must meet either the Jones test (if challenging the legality of his conviction) or the Wheeler test (if challenging the legality of his sentence) for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction to evaluate the merits of the petitioner's claims. See Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 423-26.

Here the magistrate judge found that the petition should be dismissed because petitioner cannot meet the tests under Jones or Wheeler. First, the magistrate found that the petitioner could not meet the second prong of the Jones test. In particular, the magistrate found that the crimes for which petitioner was convicted remains criminal offenses and he therefore cannot meet the second element of Jones. [Doc. 6 at 8-9]. The R&R notes that “although courts have not evaluated the application of Ruan to the Jones test, the application of Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019) provides an analogous example.” [Id. at 8]. In Rehaif, the Supreme Court held that the “knowingly” mens rea in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) applied to defendant's knowledge of the fact that he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm. 139 S.Ct. at 2200. However, the R&R notes that “this Court found that Rehaif did not change the substantive law as required by the second element of Jones.” [Id. at 8]. Similarly, in Ruan, the Supreme...