Hubble v. Bi-State Dev. Agency of Ill.-Mo. Metro. Dist.

938 N.E.2d 483

238 Ill.2d 262

345 Ill.Dec. 44

Brian T. HUBBLE, Appellee,

v.BI-STATE DEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF the ILLINOIS-MISSOURI METROPOLITAN DISTRICT, d/b/a Metro and Bi-State, a/k/a Bi-State Development Agency, Appellant.

No. 109137.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 23, 2010.

Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, of Chicago (Joshua G. vincent, Terese A. Drew, Christine Olson McTigue, of counsel), for appellant.

Bruce N. Cook, Cook, Ysursa, Bartholomew, Brauer & Shevlin, Ltd., of Belleville, for appellee.

[345 Ill.Dec. 47, 238 Ill.2d 264]

OPINION

Justice FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Plaintiff, Brian Hubble, brought a personal injury action in the circuit court of St. Clair County against defendant, Bi-State Development Agency of the Illinois-Missouri Metropolitan District, doing business as Metro or Bi-State, also known as Bi-State Development Agency (hereafter Bi-State or Metro). Bi-State moved to dismiss the action, asserting that plaintiff filed his complaint outside of the applicable statute of limitations (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2006)). The circuit court denied Bi-State's motion to dismiss, but certified for interlocutory appeal a question of law asking whether Bi-State is a "local public entity" as defined by the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act or Act) and thereby subject to its one-year statute of limitations (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 2006)). A divided

[345 Ill.Dec. 48, 938 N.E.2d 487]

panel of the appellate court answered the certified question in the negative. 393 Ill.App.3d 1016, 333 Ill.Dec. 543, 915 N.E.2d 64 (2009).

The case is now before this court on a certificate of importance granted by the appellate court (Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 4(c); 155 Ill.2d R. 316). We reverse the judgment of the appellate court and the order of the circuit court, and remand the cause to the circuit court with directions to dismiss plaintiff's complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 13, 2005, a Metro bus owned and operated by Bi-State collided with plaintiff's automobile at the intersection of Illinois Highway 159 and F Street in Belleville. On March 1, 2007, plaintiff filed a complaint against Bi-State alleging that the Metro bus driver was negligent and that Bi-State was vicariously liable based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.¹ Illinois has a two-year general statute of limitations for personal injury actions ( 735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 2006)), and plaintiff filed his complaint within that period.

Bi-State moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2006)). In its supporting memorandum, Bi-State explained that it is a body corporate and politic created by a congressionally approved interstate compact between Illinois and Missouri (hereafter Compact). The Compact also created the Bi-State Metropolitan District, which consists of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, and the Missouri counties of St. Louis, St. Charles, and Jefferson, and the Illinois counties of Madison, St. Clair, and Monroe (hereafter District). 45 ILCS 100/0.01 et seq. (West 2006); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 70.370 (West 2004); Pub.L. No. 81-743, 64 Stat. 568. The two states authorized Bi-State, among other activities, to own and operate buses and passenger transportationfacilities. Pursuant to the Compact, Bi-State provides public mass transportation throughout the District. 45 ILCS 110/0.01 et seq. (West 2006); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 70.373 (West 2004); Pub.L. No. 86-303, § 2, 73 Stat. 582. Bi-State contended that it is a "local public entity" under the Tort Immunity Act, which provides for a one-year statute of limitations. 745 ILCS 10/8-101(a) (West 2006). Bi-State argued that plaintiff's complaint was time-barred under section 8-101 of the Act because plaintiff filed his complaint over one year after the injury.

The circuit court rejected Bi-State's contention and denied Bi-State's motion to dismiss. Bi-State filed a motion for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill.2d R. 308).² The circuit court denied Bi-State's motion. On October 26, 2007, this court entered a supervisory order directing the circuit court to grant Bi-State's motion for an interlocutory appeal and to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal. Complying with this court's order, the circuit court stayed the proceedings and certified the following question of law for interlocutory appeal: "Whether Bi-State Development Agency is a local public entity as defined by the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act [citation] and is therefore subject to

[345 Ill.Dec. 49, 938 N.E.2d 488]

the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the Act." 393 Ill.App.3d at 1017, 333 Ill.Dec. 543, 915 N.E.2d 64.

A divided panel of the appellate court answered the certified question in the negative, concluding that the legislature did not intend to include Bi-State within the meaning of the term "local public entity" as defined in the Tort Immunity Act. 393 Ill.App.3d at 1023, 333 Ill.Dec. 543, 915 N.E.2d 64. JusticeSpomer disagreed with the court on all material points. 393 Ill.App.3d at 1033, 333 Ill.Dec. 543, 915 N.E.2d 64 (Spomer, J., dissenting).

The appellate court granted Bi-State's application for a certificate of importance. See Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 4(c). We will refer to additional pertinent background in the context of our analysis of the issues.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Preliminary Matters

At the outset, we note what is actually before this court and our standard of review. First, the certificate of importance states that the appellate court "grants a certificate of importance concerning the following question of law for review by the Illinois Supreme Court," and then states the certified question that was presented to the appellate court. However, under Supreme Court Rule 316 (155 Ill.2d R. 316), the whole case comes before the supreme court and not only a particular issue. O'Casek v. Children's Home & Aid Society, 229 Ill.2d 421, 436, 323 Ill.Dec. 2, 892 N.E.2d 994 (2008), quoting People v. Crawford Distributing Co., 78 Ill.2d 70, 73, 34 Ill.Dec. 296, 397 N.E.2d 1362 (1979).

Second, Bi-State moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2006)). A section 2-619 motion to dismiss admits the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's claim, but asserts affirmative matter that defeats the claim. King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp., 215 Ill.2d 1, 12, 293 Ill.Dec. 657, 828 N.E.2d 1155 (2005). Among such affirmative matter is that "the action was not commenced within the time limited by law." 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2006). When ruling on a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, the circuit court must interpret all pleadings and supporting documents in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. On appeal, review is de novo. Orlak v. Loyola University Health System, 228 Ill.2d 1, 7, 319 Ill.Dec. 319, 885 N.E.2d 999 (2007); Borowiec v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 209 Ill.2d 376, 383, 283 Ill.Dec. 669, 808 N.E.2d 957 (2004).

B. "Local Public Entity"

Turning to the merits, a divided panel of the appellate court concluded that plaintiff's complaint was not time-barred pursuant to the Tort Immunity Act. Based on canons of statutory construction, the appellate court determined that Bi-State was not a local public entity within the purview of the Act. We disagree. As we will explain, Bi-State is a "local public entity" within the purview of the Tort Immunity Act, notwithstanding Bi-State's status as an interstate compact entity, and so the one-year statute of limitations provided by section 8-101(a) of the Act (745 ILCS 10/8-101(a) (West 2006)) applies to civil actions against Bi-State. Plaintiff's complaint is therefore time-barred.

We conduct our analysis within a familiar analytical framework. The primary goal of construing the meaning of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. The most reliable indicator of such intent is the statutory language, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. A statute is

[345 Ill.Dec. 50, 938 N.E.2d 489]

viewed as a whole. Therefore, words and phrases must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute and must not be construed in isolation. County of Du Page v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, 231 Ill.2d 593, 603-04, 326 Ill.Dec. 848, 900 N.E.2d 1095 (2008); People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill.2d 264, 279-80, 271 Ill.Dec. 881, 786 N.E.2d 139 (2003). Accordingly, in determining legislative intent, a court may properly consider not only the language of the statute, but also the purpose and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied and the goals to be achieved, and the consequences that would result from construing the statute one way or the other. County of Du Page, 231 Ill.2d at 604, 326 Ill.Dec. 848, 900 N.E.2d 1095; Cryns, 203 Ill.2d at 280, 271 Ill.Dec. 881, 786 N.E.2d 139. Further, the canons of statutory construction apply to interstate compacts. 1A N. Singer & J. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 32:5, at 723 (7th ed.2009); F. Zimmerman & M. Wendell, The Law and Use of Interstate Compacts 1 (1976) (same); see, e.g.,S & M Investment Co. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 911 F.2d 324, 326-27 (9th Cir.1990).³

Section 1-206 of the Tort Immunity Act defines a "local public entity" as follows:

" 'Local public entity' includes a county, township, municipality, municipal corporation, school district, school board, educational service region, regional board of school trustees, trustees of schools of townships, treasurers of schools of townships, community college district, community college board, forest preserve district, park district, fire protection district, sanitary district, museum district, emergency telephone system board, and all other local governmental bodies. 'Local public entity' also

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