Huber v. Galveston Cnty.

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ENRIQUE COURTNEY HUBER, Plaintiff. v. GALVESTON COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:21-cv-00089

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Galveston Division

April 16, 2024

OPINION AND ORDER

ANDREW M. EDISON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Enrique Courtney Huber (“Huber”) originally sued Galveston County, Galveston County Sheriff Deputy Toan-Khoa Huu Tran (“Tran”), and Galveston County Sheriff Henry Trochesset (“Trochesset”) (collectively “Defendants”) in Texas state court for civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.^[1] After this case was removed to federal court, Huber filed an amended complaint. See Dkt 13. Huber asserts constitutional claims against Defendants for (1) excessive force; (2) condition of confinement; (3) inadequate medical care; and (4) failure to train or supervise. As an alternative to his constitutional claims Huber asserts a negligence cause of action against Galveston County. Tran and Trochesset are sued in their individual capacities. Defendants have moved for summary judgment. See Dkt. 40. Having reviewed the briefing, the record, and the applicable law, I DENY IN PART and GRANT IN PART Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

BACKGROUND

On June 11, 2018, law enforcement arrested Huber for criminal trespass at the South Shore Harbor Resort in League City Texas. After spending some time at the League City Jail, Huber was transported to the Galveston County Jail. What occurred at the Galveston County Jail is hotly disputed.

Defendants claim that Huber, who is not a United States citizen and has bipolar disorder, was “combative and uncooperative.” Dkt. 40 at 7. For his part, Huber asserts that, upon his arrival at the Galveston County Jail, jail staff did not perform a proper medical intake on him. He says he needed that initial medical intake to obtain medication for bipolar disorder. Defendants counter by arguing that the summary judgment evidence conclusively establishes that Galveston County Jail staff performed seven medical evaluations or wellness checks on Huber while he was at the jail. Two additional evaluation attempts on Huber were unsuccessful due to Huber's unwillingness to cooperate.

Huber claims that after he informed Galveston County Jail staff that he had thoughts of suicide, they punitively placed him in solitary confinement. Once there, Huber claims, he “was forced to strip naked and placed in a cold cell with no windows”; “[t]he cell contained no sink, toilet, or bed”; and “[t]he cell lights were on 24 hours per day each day, making it impossible for [him] to sleep.” Dkt. 13 at 7. Huber alleges “[h]e was given a small blanket that was not large enough to cover up his entire body in a fetal position; thus, he could not escape the constant light or seek warmth in the ice cold room.” Id. Huber further claims he “was required to use a small hole in the middle of the cell on the floor to urinate, vomit, and defecate.” Id. He avers that he did not have access to a sink, toilet, toilet paper, shower, or phone. Huber says that after he “suffered for days in solitary confinement,” jail staff placed him in another cell block. Id.

Huber alleges that in his new cell, Tran, accompanied by an “unknown amount of jailers,” entered the cell and used “a hand-held rigid plastic riot shield . . . to slam Mr. Huber to the concrete floor.” Id. at 8. Tran then allegedly handcuffed Huber and slammed his head on the floor again. Huber claims that jail staff sent him back to solitary confinement after this incident without providing him with medical treatment.

On June 22, 2018, Huber was convicted of criminal mischief, released from Galveston County Jail, and turned over to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security on an immigration detainer. Huber claims that while he “was in a cell getting ready to be transferred out of Galveston County Jail, Tran hit him [from] behind” and then struck him in the face with a blunt object. Id. at 9. This attack, Huber alleges, left him unconscious.^[2]

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact issue is material “if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” Wyatt v. Hunt Plywood Co., 297 F.3d 405, 409 (5th Cir. 2002). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

“To satisfy its burden, the party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record, and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports their claim.” Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). At this stage, I “consider all of the evidence in the record, but [I] do not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Austin v. Will-Burt Co., 361 F.3d 862, 866 (5th Cir. 2004). I “view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Treme v. St. John the Baptist Par. Council, 93 F.4th 792, 796 (5th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 provides a remedy against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by the Constitution.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992) (quotation omitted). “To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted).

C. Qualified Immunity

Tran and Trochesset claim they are entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity shields a government official from liability based on his performance of discretionary functions.” Mote v. Walthall, 902 F.3d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). “Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions. When properly applied, it protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quotation omitted).

“A good-faith assertion of qualified immunity alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof, shifting it to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not available.” King v. Handorf, 821 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2016) (quotations omitted). The plaintiff “must rebut the defense by establishing a genuine fact dispute as to whether the official's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law.” Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). “To negate a defense of qualified immunity and avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff need not present absolute proof, but must offer more than mere allegations.” King, 821 F.3d at 654 (quotation omitted).

“There are two aspects to qualified immunity: whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional right and whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established' at the time of the alleged violation.” Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 204 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)).

D. MONELL Liability

In Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), “the Supreme Court held that Congress intended § 1983 to apply to local government entities as well as to persons.” Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 452 (5th Cir. 1994). The Fifth Circuit has defined the contours of Monell liability:

Under the decisions of the Supreme Court and this court, municipal liability under section 1983 requires proof of three elements: a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose moving force is the policy or custom. Monell and later decisions reject municipal liability predicated on respondeat superior, because the text of section 1983 will not bear such a reading. Consequently, the unconstitutional conduct must be directly attributable to the municipality through some sort of official action or imprimatur; isolated unconstitutional actions by municipal employees will almost never trigger liability. The three attribution principles identified here-a policymaker, an official policy, and the moving force of the policy-are necessary to distinguish individual violations perpetrated by local government employees from those that can be fairly identified as actions of the government itself. Mistakes in analyzing section 1983 municipal liability cases frequently begin with a failure to separate the three attribution principles and to consider each in light of relevant case law.

Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (cleaned up).

Official policy exists in two forms. “First, a plaintiff may point to a policy statement formally announced by an official policymaker.” Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls 614 F.3d 161, 168 (5th Cir. 2010). Second, an official policy may “arise in the form of a widespread practice that is ‘so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.'” Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579). “A customary policy consists of actions that have occurred for so long and with such frequency that the course of conduct demonstrates the governing body's knowledge and acceptance of the disputed conduct.” Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 169. “Consistent with the commonly understood meaning of custom, proof of random acts or isolated incidents is not sufficient to show the existence...