Huddleston v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation

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BRIAN HUDDLESTON, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 4:20-cv-447

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division

August 15, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMOS L. MAZZANT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Corrected Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #112). Having considered the motion and the relevant pleadings, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Corrected Motion for Summary Judgment should be DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This Memorandum Opinion and Order arises in the context of Freedom of Information Act litigation between Plaintiff Brian Huddleston and Defendants Federal Bureau of Investigation (the “FBI”) and the United States Department of Justice (the “DOJ”). The Court will not belabor the case's background here because it has already been discussed in detail in the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order from September 29, 2022 (the “2022 Order”) (Dkt. #70) and the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order from November 28, 2023 (the “2023 Order”) (Dkt #107).

On September 29, 2022, the Court entered the 2022 Order finding that “the FBI conducted a legally adequate search using ‘methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested' in Huddleston's FOIA requests” (Dkt. #70 at p. 26).

On April 8, 2023, Huddleston filed the present motion for (partial) summary judgment (Dkt. #112). This motion requests for the Court to allow Huddleston to conduct discovery and order the FBI to conduct additional searches for records from additional sources and additional categories of records (Dkt #112). On May 1, 2023, the FBI filed its response (Dkt #118). On August 25, 2023, Huddleston filed his reply (Dkt #133). On September 1, 2023, the FBI filed its sur-reply (Dkt. #135).

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Summary judgment is proper under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A dispute about a material fact is genuine when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. The trial court “must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment.” Casey Enters., Inc. v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1981).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of its motion and identifying “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the movant bears the burden of proof on a claim or defense for which it is moving for summary judgment, it must come forward with evidence that establishes “beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or defense.” Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986). Where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof, the movant may discharge the burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmovant's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; Byers v. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2000). Once the movant has carried its burden, the nonmovant must “respond to the motion for summary judgment by setting forth particular facts indicating there is a genuine issue for trial.” Byers, 209 F.3d at 424 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49). A nonmovant must present affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. Mere denials of material facts, unsworn allegations, or arguments and assertions in briefs or legal memoranda will not suffice to carry this burden. Rather, the Court requires “significant probative evidence” from the nonmovant to dismiss a request for summary judgment. In re Mun. Bond Reporting Antitrust Litig., 672 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Ferguson v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 584 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1978)). The Court must consider all of the evidence but “refrain from making any credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.”

ANALYSIS

The Court addresses Huddleston's motion in four sections. First, the Court considers whether Huddleston's frequent usage of news articles as summary judgment evidence is appropriate. Second, the Court considers whether Huddleston may challenge the adequacy of the FBI's search by engaging in mere speculation that not yet uncovered documents may exist. Third, the Court considers whether Huddleston may challenge the adequacy of the FBI's search on the grounds that other documents possibly responsive to his request may exist. Fourth, the Court considers whether discovery is appropriate in this case.

As an initial matter, the Court will not address Huddleston's argument that the Court should compel the FBI to search its digital evidence files, specifically Seth Rich's laptop(s). Both the FBI and Huddleston agree that this issue has already been fully briefed in different motions (Dkt. #118 at pp. 2-3; Dkt. #133 at p. 4). The Court already ruled on this issue in the 2023 Order (Dkt. #107).

Additionally, the Court does not address the FBI's argument that Huddleston has attempted to amend his FOIA request via emails to the FBI's counsel during FOIA litigation (Dkt. #118 at pp. 3, 5, 7, 11).^[1] In each instance where the FBI makes such an argument regarding Huddleston's summary judgment arguments, the Court resolves Huddleston's arguments on different grounds.

“An agency fulfills its obligations under FOIA if it can demonstrate beyond material doubt that its search was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Valencia-Lucena v. U.S. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The agency bears the burden of demonstrating that its search was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents. Highland Cap. Mgmt., LP v. I.R.S., 408 F.Supp.3d 789, 801 (N.D. Tex. 2019); Gahagan v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 147 F.Supp.3d 613, 620 (E.D. La. 2015). If the record “leaves substantial doubt as to the sufficiency of the search, summary judgment for the agency is not proper.” Valencia-Lucena, 180 F.3d at 32.

The fact that an agency failed to locate a large volume of records does not, by itself, compel a finding that the agency's search was inadequate. See Batton v. Evers, 598 F.3d 169, 176 (5th Cir. 2010) (explaining that while a claimant may assert that other documents exist that were not located in the agency's search, a court “must decide only whether the search was adequate”); Negley v. F.B.I., 589 Fed.Appx. 726, 731 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding claimant's allegation that agency's search failed to locate potentially 500,000 documents did not alone demonstrate inadequacy). That is, unless the claimant can demonstrate that the agency failed to follow up on a clear lead identifying a particular type of record or location where responsive documents may be located. Negley, 589 Fed.Appx. at 731 (citing Campbell v. D.O.J., 164 F.3d 20, 27, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).

Further, “[m]ere speculation that as yet uncovered documents may exist does not undermine the finding that the agency conducted a reasonable search for them.” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. S.E.C., 926 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.D.C. 1991).

I. Whether News Articles Constitute Admissible Summary Judgment Evidence

Huddleston supports several of his arguments with news articles as summary judgement evidence (Dkt. #112 at pp. 3, 5; Dkt. #133 at pp. 8-9, 11-12). Huddleston's usage of news articles as summary judgment evidence is not appropriate because the articles constitute inadmissible hearsay.

The FBI repeatedly objects to Huddleston's usage of news articles as improper summary judgment evidence (Dkt. #118 at pp. 3-6, 10; Dkt. #135 at p. 1). Specifically, the FBI claims that these articles are “(1) inadmissible hearsay; (2) not capable of being properly authenticated by a person with personal knowledge; (3) contain conclusions and speculations that are not proper summary judgment evidence; and/or (4) are otherwise irrelevant, unreliable and untrustworthy” (Dkt. #118 at pp. 3-6, 10).

In response, Huddleston claims that “FOIA cases are unique . . . and a FOIA plaintiff may rely on newspaper articles to establish facts relevant to a motion for summary judgment” (Dkt. #133 at p. 2). Huddleston cites to various cases to support this proposition (Dkt. #133 at pp. 2-3).

Huddleston's news articles are inadmissible hearsay as statements “the declarant[s] do[] not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing” and that are “offer[ed] in[to] evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” FED. R. EVID. 801(c); Roberts v City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 295 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The plaintiffs provide only newspaper articles- classic, inadmissible hearsay.”). A FOIA plaintiff cannot rely on inadmissible evidence to establish facts relevant to a motion for summary judgment. The only authority Huddleston cites that supports his argument is a dissent in an opinion that is not binding on the Court. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Stud. v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 331 F.3d 918, 947 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Tatel, J., dissenting). However, the Court is bound by the Federal Rules of...