Hudson v. Middle Flint Behavioral Healthcare

NICOLA C. HUDSON, Plaintiff, v. MIDDLE FLINT BEHAVIORAL HEALTHCARE, TODD THOMPSON and DIANNE THOMASON, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:12-CV-284 (MTT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA MACON DIVISION

SO ORDERED: January 23, 2013

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Middle Flint Behavioral Healthcare's Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.¹ For the reasons stated below, the Motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

This is an employment discrimination case. The Plaintiff, an African-American female, filed this lawsuit July 18, 2012, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., alleging wrongful termination, retaliation, and hostile work environment claims based on her race. (Doc. 1). The allegations stem from her employment at Middle Flint Behavioral Healthcare (Middle Flint), a community service board providing low cost mental health and substance abuse treatment in and around Americus.

Todd Thompson, Middle Flint's Human Resources director, hired the Plaintiff February 16, 2012, as a "Clerk I," a potentially temporary front desk position within the human resources department. (Thompson Aff., Doc. 13-1, ¶¶ 3-5; Doc. 13-1 at 9). In accepting the position, the Plaintiff signed paperwork authorizing a background investigation of her criminal, motor vehicle, and employment history, and acknowledged that information learned from the investigation could be used to fire her. (Thompson Aff., Doc. 13-1, ¶ 7; Doc. 13-1 at 11). The Plaintiff subsequently met with Dianne Thomason, a "Clerk I" who also served as Training Coordinator and was charged with orienting new hires and ensuring they had paperwork proving they met certain job requirements. (Thomason Aff., Doc. 13-2, ¶¶ 2-4; Thompson Aff., Doc. 13-1, ¶ 6; Doc. 13-2 at 6). The exact dates of these meetings are not clear.

During this orientation, the Plaintiff presented a First Aid/CPR card indicating she had completed First Aid and CPR training at Magnolia Manor Nursing Home. (Thomason Aff., Doc. 13-2, ¶ 4; Doc. 13-2 at 8). She told Thomason she had previously applied for a job as a nanny, and her prospective employer had arranged for her to obtain CPR training at Magnolia Manor. (Thomason Aff., Doc. 13-2, ¶ 5). Thomason, an Americus native whose relatives had resided at Magnolia Manor, did not believe the nursing home offered CPR training to anyone other than its employees. (Thomason Aff., Doc. 13-2, ¶ 5). Thomason contacted Magnolia Manor and discovered the Plaintiff had actually been an employee there. (Thomason Aff., Doc. 13-2, ¶ 6). However, the Plaintiff had not listed Magnolia Manor as a previous employer on her Middle Flint job application. (Thomason Aff., Doc. 13-2, ¶ 6; Doc. 13-2 at 10-13).

Thomason reported this discrepancy to Beth Ragan, Middle Flint's CEO. (Thomason Aff., Doc. 13-2, ¶ 7). Ragan then instructed Thompson to speak with the Plaintiff about her employment history, which he did on March 22, 2012. (Thompson Aff., Doc. 13-1, ¶ 8). The Plaintiff admitted to Thompson that she had worked at Magnolia Manor, but said she did not list it on her Middle Flint job application because Magnolia Manor had fired her and told her not to use the nursing home as a reference. (Thompson Aff., Doc. 13-1, ¶ 8). After this discussion, Thompson reviewed Middle Flint's policy and determined that falsifying information on a job application subjects employees to termination. Two other Middle Flint employees, including a white male, had been fired for this reason during Thompson's tenure. (Thompson Aff., Doc. 13-1, ¶ 9). The next day, March 23, Thompson met with the Plaintiff and fired her. According to Thompson, after he informed the Plaintiff she was terminated, the Plaintiff told him Magnolia Manor had fired her for a "bad reason" and she had filed an EEOC complaint against the nursing home. Thompson says he was unaware of the Magnolia Manor EEOC investigation prior to firing the Plaintiff, and that it had no bearing on his decision. (Thompson Aff., Doc. 13-1, ¶ 10). He further says that the Plaintiff's race played no factor in her termination. (Thompson Aff., Doc. 13-1, ¶ 12). After the Plaintiff was fired, Thompson hired an African-American female to replace her. When that woman later resigned, she too was replaced with an African-American female. (Thompson Aff., Doc. 13-1, ¶ 11).

The Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, has presented "evidence" in the form of her own version of events as alleged in the Complaint (Doc. 1) and a one-pageResponse² (Doc. 14) to Middle Flint's Motion.³ In those filings, the Plaintiff states Thomason "intimidated and belittled" her on a daily basis, attempted to sabotage her work, and refused to relieve her to take needed bathroom breaks. (Doc. 1 at 4). She says she reported Thomason's behavior to Thompson on March 20, 2012, and was told "to give him some time to work on [Thomason]." (Doc. 1 at 5). On March 23, the Plaintiff says she again went to Thompson, this time to complain that Thomason had stolen some of her work product. Thompson took no action, she says. She made this complaint the day she was fired, but she does not discuss the firing itself. (Doc. 1 at 5-6). The Plaintiff simply states that she was "wrongfully terminated," and based on the fact that Thomason and Thompson are both white, and that she was the only African-American clerk working at that time in the Human Resources department, she concludes their behavior and her termination were racially motivated.

Thompson and Thomason reject the notion that the Plaintiff's race played a factor in any of their actions. (Thompson Aff., Doc. 13-1, ¶ 12; Thomason Aff., Doc. 13-2, ¶ 10). Thomason claims she never said or did anything to the Plaintiff that was race related. (Thomason Aff., Doc. 13-2, ¶ 10). Similarly, Thompson asserts that the Plaintiffnever complained to him that Thomason was behaving in a way that could be perceived as racially motivated. (Thompson Aff., Doc. 13-1, ¶ 13). He also adds that in the two years he has worked at Middle Flint, he has not received complaints from any other African-American employees about Thomason, nor has he observed Thomason engage in any racially insensitive behavior. (Thompson Aff., Doc. 13-1, ¶¶ 14-15).

As for the Plaintiff, the only factual evidence presented by Middle Flint that she disputes is Thompson's knowledge of the Magnolia Manor EEOC investigation. (Doc. 14). She claims she made Thompson aware of the Magnolia Manor EEOC investigation prior to her termination, and that his knowledge of the investigation is the reason he fired her. (Doc. 14).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

A court must grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is not genuine unless, based on the evidence presented, "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 281 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The movant must cite "to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

The burden then shifts to the non-moving party, who must rebut the movant's showing "by producing...relevant and admissible evidence beyond the pleadings." Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1315 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The non-moving party does not satisfy her burden "if the rebuttal evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative of a disputed fact." Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)). Further, where a party fails to address another party's assertion of fact as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), the Court may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). However, "credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge. ... The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [her] favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

B. McDonnell Douglas Framework

A Title VII plaintiff may prove her case directly or circumstantially. Here, there is no direct evidence of discrimination, so the Plaintiff must rely on circumstantial evidence. The framework for analyzing circumstantial evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination is provided in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Pursuant to McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the test for which differs slightly for each claim. If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production, but not the burden of persuasion, shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981). This burden of production means the employer "need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons," but must produce evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. Kragor v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals America, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2012 WL 6618360 at *2 (11th Cir.) (emphasis added).

A plaintiff then has the opportunity to show that the employer's stated reason is in fact pretext for discrimination.⁴ "The plaintiff can show pretext 'either directly bypersuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by...