Hudson v. Spencer

180 F.Supp.3d 70

Mac S. Hudson, Faradan Ibn Salahuddin, Edgar Rock, Raymond Colon, Abdul J. Lopez, Ralph Brown, Evans Mahon And Umar Salahuddin, Plaintiffs,

v.Luis S. Spencer, Christopher Mitchell, Bruce Gelb, Karen Dinardo, Christine Larkins, Loi Russo, Jaileen Hopkins and Dale Bissonnette, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 11-12173-NMG

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Signed September 25, 2015

Mac S. Hudson, Concord, MA, pro se

Faradan Ibn Salahuddin, Concord, MA, pro se

Edgar Rock, Concord, MA, pro se

Raymond Colon, Concord, MA, pro se

Abdul J. Lopez, Revere, MA, pro se

Ralph Brown, Concord, MA, pro se

Evans Mahon, Lynn, MA, pro se

Umar Salahuddin, Concord, MA, pro se

Joan T. Kennedy, Boston, MA, for Defendants

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

GORTON, J.

This is a pro se prisoner case in which inmates at MCI-Concord claim that they have been denied the right to observe tenets of the Nation of Islam (“NOI”) while incarcerated. Defendants are all employees of MCI-Concord or the Massachusetts Department of Correction (“the DOC”).

Pending before the Court are defendants' motion for summary judgment and plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, both motions will be allowed, in part, and denied, in part.

I. Background

Plaintiffs allege that defendants have violated 1) plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, including the right to equal protection, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 2) the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) under 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq., 3) the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, 4) Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 127, section 88, 5) Articles I and XII of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and 6) Title 103 of the Code of Massachusetts Regulations, section 471.

They request 1) the appointment of a full-time NOI chaplain, 2) daily access to space for worship, 3) separate NOI fasting and feast sessions during religious ceremonies, 4) an ability to wear religious attire such as bow ties and lapel pins, 5) an ability to engage in “spiritual drilling” and 6) compensatory and punitive damages.

Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit in December, 2011 and filed an amended complaint in March, 2014. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in July, 2015 and plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment the following month.

II. Motions for summary judgment

A. Legal standard

The role of summary judgment is “to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir.1991) (quoting Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir.1990) ). The burden is on the moving party to show, through the pleadings, discovery and affidavits, “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law ....” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists where the evidence with respect to the material fact in dispute “is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

If the moving party satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine, triable issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The Court must view the entire record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and make all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. O'Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 907 (1st Cir.1993). Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the record in the non-moving party's favor, the Court determines that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

B. Overview of the parties' arguments

The parties assert that they are each entitled to summary judgment. Defendants argue that: 1) sovereign immunity bars § 1983 claims against them in their official capacities, 2) plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts in their § 1983 claims against defendants in their personal capacities, 3) qualified immunity bars § 1983 claims for monetary damages, 4) plaintiffs cannot establish a RLUIPA claim on any asserted ground, 5) plaintiffs cannot establish a First Amendment claim, 6) plaintiffs do not allege sufficient facts in their equal protection claim, 7) the PLRA bars recovery for damages where there are no physical injuries, 8) agency regulations do not provide a private cause of action, 9) plaintiffs have “unclean hands” and 10) the state law claims are moot with respect to plaintiffs Mahon and Lopez.

Plaintiffs contend that: 1) they have established that defendants' conduct violates RLUIPA, the First Amendment and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 2) agency regulations do not prohibit inmates from leading prayer services, 3) their assertions of unequal treatment establish an equal protection claim, 4) they do not have unclean hands and 5) qualified immunity does not bar their RLUIPA or § 1983 claims.

C. Mootness

Mootness is a constitutional issue that a court should ordinarily resolve before reaching the merits. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Mass. v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 52 (1st Cir.2013). The mootness doctrine requires that “an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of the review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” Id. The First Circuit Court of Appeals has identified the following instances of cases becoming moot:

1) when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome;

2) when the court cannot give any effectual relief to the potentially prevailing party; and

3) if events have transpired to render a court opinion merely advisory.

KG Urban Enters., LLC v. Patrick, 969 F.Supp.2d 52, 56 (D.Mass.2013) (citing Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d at 52–53 ).

Defendants contend that the claims raised by plaintiffs Lopez and Mahon are moot because the plaintiffs are no longer incarcerated at MCI-Concord. Plaintiffs have presented no arguments or evidence to the contrary. The Court agrees with defendants that plaintiffs Lopez and Mahon no longer have legally cognizable interests and that their claims are now moot. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the claims to the extent that they are raised by plaintiffs Lopez and Mahon.

D. Federal claims and defenses

1. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1

RLUIPA “protects institutionalized persons who are unable freely to attend to their religious needs.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005). The statute provides more protection than the First Amendment does for an inmate's free exercise rights. Kuperman v. Wrenn, 645 F.3d 69, 79 (1st Cir.2011). Section 3 of RLUIPA provides:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution ... even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1. Courts applying the RLUIPA standard should give

due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.

Cutter, 544 U.S. at 723, 125 S.Ct. 2113.

a. Immunity

Defendants contend that state immunity bars plaintiffs from recovering monetary damages under RLUIPA. Plaintiffs argue that Congress intended to abrogate state immunity in RLUIPA cases by 1) enacting the statute under its Spending Clause powers and conditioning state receipt of federal funds on abrogation and 2) expressly defining the term “government” in § 2000cc-5 to include the state and state officials, indicating that RLUIPA allows for recovery against the state and its officials.

The Court finds that state immunity limits plaintiffs to injunctive relief only under RLUIPA. First, state immunity bars RLUIPA claims against the state for monetary damages because the statute does not reflect the unequivocal intent of Congress to require states to waive their immunity to suits for damages. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 1660, 179 L.Ed.2d 700 (2011). As a result, plaintiffs cannot bring claims against state officials in their official capacities for monetary damages because those suits are treated as suits against the state. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Second, although the First Circuit Court of Appeals has declined to rule on whether plaintiffs can bring RLUIPA claims against state officials in their personal capacities for damages, another session in this court has held that they cannot. Cryer v. Spencer, 934 F.Supp.2d 323, 333–34 (D.Mass.2013).

Accordingly, the Court will allow defendants' motion for summary judgment and deny plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment on the RLUIPA claim to the extent that plaintiffs seek monetary damages against defendants in their official or personal capacities. The remaining questions, discussed below, concern whether summary judgment is warranted to the extent that plaintiffs seek injunctive relief on their RLUIPA claim.

b. Legal standard

The First Circuit Court of Appeals (“the First Circuit”) evaluates RLUIPA claims under a burden-shifting standard with four elements. Spratt v. Rhode Island Dep't of Corr., 482 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir.2007).

The plaintiff first must show that there is a burden on the...