Hughes v. Bouchon Props.

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TRASHAWN HUGHES v. BOUCHON PROPERTIES LLC, ET AL.

Civil Action No. 24-103

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

May 30, 2024

SECTION "A" (5)

ORDER AND REASONS

JAY C ZAINEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

The following motion is before the Court: Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Rule 12(e) Motion for More Definitive Statement (Rec. Doc. 7) filed by the defendants, Lester Bouchon and Bouchon Properties LLC. The plaintiff, Trashawn Hughes, opposes the motion. (Rec Doc. 8). The motion, submitted for consideration on April 10, 2024, is before the Court on the briefs without oral argument. For the reasons that follow the motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

In late 2016, Hughes signed a lease agreement with Keener Properties LLC to rent a unit at 1602 Clearview Parkway in Metairie, Louisiana. (Rec. Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶¶ 7-10). Keener subsequently sold the apartment complex to Bouchon Properties LLC, managed by Lester Bouchon, in May of 2021. (Id. ¶ 11). Hughes claims that shortly after acquiring the apartment complex, Bouchon assured him that the rent would remain unchanged and provided a new mailing address for rental payments. (Id. ¶ 14).

Soon after the ownership change, however, Hughes claims that Bouchon began personally visiting Hughes's apartment to demand rental payments and “made racial remarks [and] sexual innuendos” that made Hughes uncomfortable. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 38). He further alleges that Bouchon harassed him, including by sending him a derogatory message via text message. (Id. ¶ 18). In July of 2023, Bouchon notified Hughes that on August 1, 2023, he would owe the following rental payments: $131.00 for April of 2023, and $950.00 for each of May, June, July, and August of 2023. (Id. ¶ 29). He informed Hughes that this rent-totaling $3,931.00-would be due on August 15, 2023. (Id.). Hughes maintains that he never agreed to a monthly rent of $950. (Id. ¶ 30).

Bouchon evicted Hughes on August 16, 2023; Hughes contends that the eviction was wrongful and made “under false pretenses and forged documents.” (Id. ¶ 35). He argues that Bouchon intentionally sought to “exclude, evict, and displace” him, a disabled African-American male, on the basis of race, color, and/or disability. (Id. ¶ 39). Accordingly, Hughes has brought causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 and Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), among various statelaw causes of action. In response, the defendants argue that Hughes's claims fail to meet the required pleading standard because they lack sufficient factual content to support a plausible claim. Specifically, the defendants argue that the Complaint does not demonstrate intentional exclusion, eviction, or displacement based on race or sufficiently state a cause of action under the FHA.

The Court considers the defendants' motion below.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The central issue in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Complaint states a valid claim for relief. Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008)). To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The Court does not accept as true “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” Id. (quoting Plotkin v. IP Axess, Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005)). Legal conclusions must be supported by factual allegations. Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).

In the context of a motion to dismiss, the district court must accept all factual allegations in the Complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Lovick v. Ritemoney, Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2004)). However, the foregoing tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thread-bare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Any ambiguities in the current controlling substantive law must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. Lewis v. Fresne, 252 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Burchett v. Cargill, Inc., 48 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1995)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. 42 U.S.C. 1982

42 U.S.C. § 1982 provides that “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” 42 U.S.C. § 1982. The statute protects property interests regardless of whether they are owned or leased. The Supreme Court considers a section 1982 claim adequate when an individual is denied the opportunity “to acquire property ... because of color.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S.Ct. 1009,1016 (2020) (quoting Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 78-79 (1917)) (emphasis omitted). Such claims require “an intentional act of racial discrimination by a defendant.” Vaughner v. Pulito, 804 F.2d 873, 877 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Save Our Cemeteries, Inc. v. Archdiocese of New Orleans, Inc., 568 F.2d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1978)). Specifically, a plaintiff “must allege with specificity facts sufficient to show or raise a plausible inference of (1) the defendant's racial animus; (2) intentional discrimination; and (3) that the defendant deprived plaintiff of his rights because of race.” Ennis v. Edwards, No. 02-769, 2003 WL 1560113, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 25, 2003).

Hughes contends that Bouchon's actions violate section 1982. Under the test described in Ennis, Hughes must first demonstrate that there is a plausible inference of Bouchon's racial animus. The Complaint alleges that Bouchon made racial remarks to Hughes (Complaint ¶ 38) and texted him a redacted version of a racial epithet. (Complaint ¶ 18). In this Court's view, taking these facts as true, Hughes has sufficiently pleaded Bouchon's racial animus. He has reason to believe that, although he was late on rental payments, Bouchon specifically took issue with Hughes because of his race. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20, 25-26). Bouchon attempted to evict Hughes twice, ultimately succeeding in September of 2023. He contends that this eviction-a refusal to rent under section 1982-was an act of intentional discrimination and would not have occurred but for the fact that he is African-American. Having reviewed the pleadings, this Court believes that Hughes has demonstrated that race was a relevant factor in his dealings with Bouchon and plausibly alleged that his eviction was a result of racial animus.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is DENIED as to the 42 U.S.C. § 1982 claim.

B. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.

Hughes also alleges that Bouchon's activity violates the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.

He claims that Bouchon's conduct constitutes discrimination, asserting that he denied Hughes the ability to rent because of his race, color, and/or disability. He contends that Bouchon refused to permit or make reasonable modifications, therefore preventing Hughes from obtaining an equal opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling, and that he published a discriminatory advertisement or notice. His FHA allegations spread across three separate provisions of the act: section 3604(a) racial discrimination; section 3604(c) publication of a discriminatory notice or advertisement; and section 3604(f) disability discrimination.

1. Racial Discrimination Under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)

Hughes's first cause of action contends that the defendants violated section 3604(a) when they discriminated against Hughes by refusing to rent to him on the basis of his race or color. (Complaint ¶ 51). Section 3604(a) makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race [or] color.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). Hughes does not contend that the defendants refused to negotiate for the sale or rental of the dwelling; rather, he asserts that he was evicted because of his race, an act which falls under the “otherwise make unavailable or deny” clause. After reviewing the Complaint, the Court finds that Hughes has stated a claim under section 3604(a).

As an initial matter, to survive a 12(b)(6) motion, the eviction must qualify as an exclusion under section 3604. In Cox v. City of Dallas, the Fifth Circuit held open the possibility that actual or constructive eviction could qualify as refusal to rent under section 3604(a). 420 F.3d 734, 742 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing supportive authority from other circuits). The Eastern District has since considered that statement to apply with respect to eviction claims under the FHA by rejecting an argument that section 3604 only applies to pre-rental activity. Treece v. Perrier Condo. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 593 F.Supp.3d 422, 438 (E.D. La. 2022). Therefore, the conduct complained of-the eviction-falls within the scope of section 3604(a) for racially discriminatory acts prohibited by statute. Having determined that the activity qualifies under the FHA, the next issue is whether Hughes has sufficiently stated a claim.

Generally to state a claim for discriminatory activity, a...