Hughes v. State

ANTHONY THOMAS HUGHES v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 325

No. 331

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2017

November 7, 2019

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - APPEALS - ILLEGAL SENTENCE - SCOPE OF REVIEW

Appellant's application for leave to appeal challenging the post-conviction court's choice of remedies to correct an illegal sentence does not prevent an appellate court from reviewing the post-conviction court's underlying factual determination that the sentence was illegal and its decision to grant appellant partial relief.

Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-131(a), appellate courts may review any issues raised in or decided by lower courts. As such, the post-conviction court's finding that the sentence imposed for one count in a five-count plea agreement did not conform to the agreement was subject to review when appellant challenged whether the remedy afforded by the post-conviction court to correct the illegality was appropriate. When there is a challenge to the choice of remedies afforded to correct an illegal sentence, an appellate court may review both the remedy and the underlying determination of the illegality of the sentence.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - POST-CONVICTION - ILLEGAL SENTENCE - REMEDY - BENEFIT OF THE BARGAIN

A post-conviction challenge to the legality of only a single sentence for one count of a multi-count plea agreement does not require a court to strike the entire plea agreement in order to correct the illegality. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345(a), a court "may correct an illegal sentence at any time." The post-conviction court determined that the sentence challenged by appellant exceeded the sentencing cap imposed by the plea agreement and struck only the sentence and conviction of the non-conforming count, rather than striking the entire plea agreement, as appellant sought.

On appeal this Court held that the post-conviction court's decision to strike the sentence and conviction for only the non-conforming count of the plea agreement corrected the illegality and restored appellant to the benefit of his bargain of the plea agreement, while preserving the finality of the unchallenged and legal sentences on the four remaining counts of the plea. The resolution of the illegality in appellants favor was legally correct and was an equitable and reasonable remedy.

Circuit Court for Carroll County

Case No. 06-K-03-029949

REPORTED

Berger, Friedman, Sharer, J. Frederick (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Sharer, J.

PREFACE

In 2003, Anthony Thomas Hughes, appellant, was charged in the Circuit Court for Carroll County, in a 25-count indictment relating to violent offenses involving four victims.¹ He entered a plea of not guilty and proceeded to trial on an agreed statement of facts, resulting in conviction on all counts. On direct appeal, this Court reversed and ordered a new trial.² On November 14, 2005, prior to the ordered new trial, Hughes entered into a plea agreement, the details of which we shall recount, infra. It is that agreement, and the trial court's implementation of it, that has given rise to this appeal.

In 2012, Hughes filed, pro se, a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, contending that he did not agree to what he characterized as a 75-year sentence. The motion was summarily denied, and Hughes noted an appeal, which, consequently, mirrored his motion and was not treated or acted on as an appeal. On February 10, 2016, Hughes, through counsel, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, again challenging the legality of the sentence based on an alleged breach of the plea agreement by the State and the trial court. Following a hearing, the court granted relief in part by vacating the conviction and sentence only as to Count 7 - the count that did not appear to conform to the terms of the plea agreement.

Dissatisfied with the post-conviction court's grant of only partial relief, Hughes invoked the jurisdiction of this Court in two respects: he filed a notice of appeal³ based on the court's denial of his initial Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, and an application for leave to appeal⁴ based on the court's consideration of his petition for post-conviction relief. We granted the application for leave to appeal and consolidated it with the direct appeal.

On appeal, Hughes asks this Court to determine whether the post-conviction court erred by not allowing him to elect his remedy in response to the breach of the plea agreement, and by vacating the conviction and sentence as to Count 7 only, rather than vacating the entire plea agreement.⁵

Finding that the sentence imposed on Count 7 was illegal and agreeing with the post-conviction court's choice of remedy, we shall affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Because Hughes presents only procedural questions, we need not set forth an extensive factual recitation in support of the underlying convictions. Therefore, we provideonly a brief narration of the relevant background. See Teixeira v. State, 213 Md. App. 664, 666 (2013); Washington v. State, 190 Md. App. 168, 171 (2010). For context, we refer to the State's brief for a summary of the events of December 31, 2002.

On that evening, Hughes broke into the home of his ex-wife, Ellen Redifer, in Westminster, Carroll County. Redifer, her daughter, Arianna Hughes and Arianna's boyfriend, Sean Malay, fled from the house, and were pursued by Hughes. Hughes caught Redifer and struck her multiple times in the head, neck and upper chest with a large framing hammer. Malay attempted to intervene but was threatened with the hammer. Redifer's neighbor, John Glover, responded and pulled Hughes away from Redifer, and he too was struck with the hammer. Hughes and Glover grappled, and Hughes cut Glover in the back of the head with a box cutter knife. At that point Hughes ran from the scene but returned and attempted to run down all of them with his car. Hughes then fled to a relative's house in West Virginia, where he was later arrested. Redifer survived the critical injuries sustained in the attack.

PROCEEDINGS BELOW

On July 21, 2003, Hughes pleaded not guilty on an agreed statement of facts proffered by the State, after which the court found him guilty on all counts. The court imposed a sentence of life plus 45 years' imprisonment. Hughes appealed, arguing that he had not knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. This Court agreed, reversed his convictions, and ordered a new trial. See Hughes v. State, No. 2771, Sept. Term, 2003 (filed May 6, 2005).

On the day that Hughes appeared for a motions hearing preliminary to his new trial, a binding plea agreement was negotiated.⁶ Hughes agreed to plead guilty to five counts: Count 1 - attempted first-degree murder of Redifer; Count 7 - first-degree assault of the neighbor, John Glover; Count 11 - first-degree burglary; and to Counts 14 and 15 - second-degree assault of Arianna Hughes and Sean Malay, respectively. In exchange for the guilty plea the State agreed to ask for a sentence of 75 years' incarceration with all but 45 years suspended for the attempted murder count (Count 1). The remaining four counts (Counts 7, 11, 14 and 15) were to carry either suspended or concurrent sentences.

Following recitation of the agreement, the court advised Hughes of his rights pursuant to Md. Rule 4-242, including an extensive voir dire to establish his competency to enter into the plea agreement. Thereafter, the court accepted the plea agreement, binding to its terms, and the State gave a factual proffer to support the charges. The court found Hughes guilty of the five counts and ordered a pre-sentence investigation. As agreed, the State then entered a nol pros of the remaining counts of the indictment.

At sentencing, the State requested, pursuant to the binding plea agreement: as to Count 1 (attempted murder) 75 years' incarceration with all but 45 years suspended; as to Count 7 (first-degree assault), 25 years consecutive to Count 1, but suspended; and concurrent term-of-years sentences for the three remaining charges, all of which the courtimposed.⁷ As agreed at the plea hearing, the State had nol prossed the remaining counts that were not included in the plea agreement. Appellant did not object to the sentences as requested or imposed and confirmed on the record that he understood the sentences imposed and that he had no questions about them.

Soon thereafter, Hughes moved to modify his sentence, and requested that the motion be held sub curia. The motion was denied without a hearing. On September 5, 2012, Hughes filed a pro se Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, contending that he never consented to a 75-year sentence. That motion was also summarily denied.

Hughes next filed an "Application for Leave to Appeal Denied [sic] the Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence." Other than the caption, the document was essentially a handwritten copy of his original typed motion. The Clerk's office noted on a "Case Frequency Report" that, "This motion has already been denied See order dated 9.24.12." Because of that, the filing was not treated as Hughes' appeal of the court's denial of his Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, and no further action was taken by the court. The State had also filed a formulaic response to appellant's handwritten filing, incorporating its response to the original motion.

On February 10, 2016, Hughes, now represented by counsel, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, again challenging the legality of the sentence.⁸ He argued that the State and court violated the plea agreement when a 25-year consecutive sentence for Count 7 was requested and imposed, which exceeded the terms of the plea agreement, thereby rendering the sentence illegal. As to relief, he proclaimed his entitlement to either vacate the entire plea agreement, or to have it specifically enforced by making the Count 7 sentence a concurrent suspended sentence of 25 years, rather than consecutive.

Following a hearing, the post-conviction court issued an order granting relief in part by vacating...