Hughes v. State

901 So.2d 837

James Michael HUGHES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC02-2247.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 28, 2005.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender and P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Bureau Chief, Criminal Appeals and Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.

CANTERO, J.

In this case, we consider whether a decision of the United States Supreme Court applies to defendants whose convictions already were final when that case was decided. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." In Hughes v. State, 826 So.2d 1070 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), the district court certified as a question of great public importance whether the rule announced in Apprendi applies retroactively.¹ We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. As explained below, we hold that Apprendi does not apply retroactively.

I. FACTS

Sections 921.001(5) and 921.0014(2), Florida Statutes (1997), (part of the 1994 sentencing guidelines) require that, when the recommended sentence computed on the sentencing scoresheet exceeds the maximum sentence provided in section 775.082, Florida Statutes (1997), the guidelines sentence must be imposed.² In this case, a jury convicted the petitioner of battery by a jail detainee on a jail detainee. The crime constituted a third-degree felony, for which the maximum sentence under section 775.082 is 60 months' imprisonment. 826 So.2d at 1071-72; see § 784.082, Fla. Stat. (1997) (providing that the offense is a third-degree felony). The petitioner's sentencing guidelines scoresheet, however, assessed forty points for severe victim injury and four points for a legal status violation. The scoresheet required a sentence of 80.4 months, which is longer than the statutory maximum. Consistent with section 921.001(5), the trial court imposed the longer sentence.

After the petitioner's conviction and sentence became final, he filed a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) (used to correct an illegal sentence), contending that the points assessed on his scoresheet for severe victim injury and a legal status violation caused his sentence to exceed the statutory maximum, in violation of Apprendi. The trial court denied relief, and the district court affirmed. Hughes, 826 So.2d at 1074-75. The First District Court of Appeal held, among other things, that Apprendi does not apply retroactively. Id. Since then, each of the district courts has agreed. See Burrows v. State, 890 So.2d 286, 287 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Enoch v. State, 873 So.2d 443 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Figarola v. State, 841 So.2d 576, 577 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003),notice invoking discretionary review filed, No. SC03-586 (Fla. Apr. 7, 2003); Brown v. State, 829 So.2d 286, 287 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002),cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1196, 123 S.Ct. 1263, 154 L.Ed.2d 1033 (2003).³

II. COMPREHENDING APPRENDI

The defendant in Apprendi was charged with possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, which under New Jersey law carried a maximum sentence of ten years' imprisonment. 530 U.S. at 468-70, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The trial court found that the defendant committed the offense while motivated by racial bias and therefore imposed an enhanced eighteen-year sentence under the state's "hate crime" statute. The issue was "whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual determination authorizing an increase in the maximum prison sentence for an offense from 10 to 20 years be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 469, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The Supreme Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348.

III. THE WITT RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS

When the United States Supreme Court or this Court renders a decision favorable to criminal defendants, the question becomes: who may benefit from the decision? We have held that such decisions apply in all cases to convictions that are not yet final—that is convictions for which an appellate court mandate has not yet issued. Smith v. State, 598 So.2d 1063, 1066 (Fla.1992) (holding that "any decision of this Court announcing a new rule of law, or merely applying an established rule of law to a new or different factual situation, must be given retrospective application by the courts of this state in every case pending on direct review or not yet final"), limited by Wuornos v. State, 644 So.2d 1000, 1007 n. 4 (Fla.1994) (reading Smith "to mean that new points of law established by this Court shall be deemed retrospective with respect to all non-final cases unless this Court says otherwise"), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1069, 115 S.Ct. 1705, 131 L.Ed.2d 566 (1995); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (holding "that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final").

Once a conviction is final, however, the State acquires an interest in the finality of the convictions. As we have previously stated,

[t]he importance of finality in any justice system, including the criminal justice system, cannot be understated. It has long been recognized that, for several reasons, litigation must, at some point, come to an end. In terms of the availability of judicial resources, cases must eventually become final simply to allow effective appellate review of other cases. There is no evidence that subsequent collateral review is generally better than contemporaneous appellate review for ensuring that a conviction or sentence is just. Moreover, an absence of finality casts a cloud of tentativeness over the criminal justice system, benefitting neither the person convicted nor society as a whole.

Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922, 925 (Fla.1980); see also United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 n. 11, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 60 L.Ed.2d 805 (1979) (noting that "[i]nroads on the concept of finality tend to undermine confidence in the integrity of our procedures"). Therefore, the issue is whether such cases can be applied to defendants whose convictions already were final when the decision was rendered.

We analyze whether a change in decisional law should be applied retroactively under the framework outlined in Witt. There, we held that a change of law would not be deemed retroactive "unless the change: (a) emanates from this Court or the United States Supreme Court, (b) is constitutional in nature, and (c) constitutes a development of fundamental significance." Id. at 931. In this case, it is clear, and the parties agree, that the first two prongs are met. Accordingly, the question is whether Apprendi constitutes a "development of fundamental significance." In Witt, we stated that most major constitutional changes fall within one of two categories: changes "which place beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties" and those "which are of sufficient magnitude to necessitate retroactive application as ascertained by the three-fold test of Stovall and Linkletter." 387 So.2d at 929.⁴ The holding in Apprendi does not fall within the first category. Therefore, the still narrower question is whether it is of sufficient magnitude as to require retroactive application. To decide that issue, we must consider the three factors of the Stovall/Linkletter test: (a) the purpose to be served by the new rule; (b) the extent of reliance on the old rule; and (c) the effect of retroactive application of the rule on the administration of justice. Witt, 387 So.2d at 926. In Witt we described those decisional changes that do not meet this standard, and we are guided by this principle now:

In contrast to these jurisprudential upheavals are evolutionary refinements in the criminal law, affording new or different standards for the admissibility of evidence, for procedural fairness, for proportionality review of capital cases, and for other like matters. Emergent rights in these categories, or the retraction of former rights of this genre, do not compel an abridgement of the finality of judgments. To allow them that impact would, we are convinced, destroy the stability of the law, render punishments uncertain and therefore ineffectual, and burden the judicial machinery of our state, fiscally and intellectually, beyond any tolerable limit.

Id. at 929-30 (emphasis added). We address each of the Stovall/Linkletter factors in turn.

A. The Purpose To Be Served by the New Rule

The first factor we must consider under the Stovall/Linkletter test is the purpose to be served by the new rule. Witt, 387 So.2d at 926. To reiterate, the holding in Apprendi is that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 490,120 S.Ct. 2348. The decision in Apprendi was intended to guard against erosion of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to jury trial, by requiring that a jury decide the facts supporting a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum. See530 U.S. at 483,120 S.Ct. 2348. That rule is procedural, as is clear from the Supreme Court's statement that its concern was with the adequacy of New Jersey's criminal procedure. 530 U.S. at 475,120 S.Ct. 2348 ("The substantive basis for New Jersey's...