Hughes v. White, CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:20-cv-00730

CARL HUGHES, Plaintiff, v. CORRECTIONAL OFFICER C. WHITE, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:20-cv-00730

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA CHARLESTON DIVISION

December 29, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The Court has reviewed the Complaint (Document 1-1), the Defendant West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation's Motion to Dismiss (Document 5), and the Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation's Motion to Dismiss (Document 6). By stipulation filed on December 9, 2020, the parties agreed the Plaintiff would have until December 22, 2020, to respond to the motion to dismiss. No response has been filed. For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that the Defendant's motion should be granted in part and denied in part, as more fully set forth herein.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff originally filed his complaint in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia, on August 12, 2020. The matter was removed to this Court on November 9, 2020. The complaint alleges that while the Plaintiff was an inmate at the Huttonsville Correctional Center, he sustained injury and emotional distress after being beaten by Defendants C. White and T. Hammonds, who were employed by the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (WVDOC).

Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that on or about August 29, 2018, the Plaintiff was serving his last day in segregation as an inmate of WVDOC. The inmate in the cell beside the Plaintiff had an argument with Corporal Postels. Corporal Postels left the area, stating that he would be right back. Instead of Corporal Postels returning, Defendant Correctional Officers C. White and T. Hammonds returned and told the Plaintiff to "cuff-up." The Plaintiff complied. After he was handcuffed, one of the Defendants stated, "You want to disrespect one of my officers, we're going to beat you up." (Compl. at ¶ 7.)

The Plaintiff tried to explain that the Defendants were making a mistake and had the wrong person. The Defendants then attempted to slam the Plaintiff's face into the bar over the pod door. They ran the Plaintiff into the wall, causing his face to hit the wall. The Defendants grabbed the Plaintiff's legs from underneath him and slammed him into the concrete. At that point, Corporal Postels came running out to inform the two officers they had the wrong inmate. The Defendants apologized to the Plaintiff but threatened that if he tried to report the incident, something worse would happen to him. The Plaintiff suffered blurred vision in his left eye, a black eye, cuts, bruises, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation as a result of the incident.

Based on these allegations, the Plaintiff asserts claims for assault and battery, violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and failure to comply with legislative rules and WVDOC policy and procedures. The Plaintiff asserts that he is seeking damages up to an amount commensurate with the amount of insurance coverage applicable to the claims. He states that he is not asserting a claim pursuantto 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the WVDOC, nor is he asserting a claim for punitive damages against the state agency.

The Defendant WVDOC filed its motion to dismiss on November 25, 2020. The Plaintiff has not filed a response. The matter is ripe for review.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint or pleading. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Additionally, allegations "must be simple, concise, and direct." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).

"[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, "a complaint must contain "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, "a complaint [will not] suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancements." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court must "accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). The Court must also "draw[ ] all reasonable factualinferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor." Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999). However, statements of bare legal conclusions "are not entitled to the assumption of truth" and are insufficient to state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Furthermore, the court need not "accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." E. Shore Mkts., v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice . . . [because courts] 'are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

To survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In other words, this "plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to demonstrate more than 'a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.'" Francis, 588 F.3d at 193 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A plaintiff must, using the complaint, "articulate facts, when accepted as true, that 'show' that the plaintiff has stated a claim entitling him to relief." Francis, 588 F.3d at 193 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). "Determining whether a complaint states [on its face] a plausible claim for relief [which can survive a motion to dismiss] will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

DISCUSSION

The Defendant argues that it is entitled to qualified immunity because it has not violated any of the Plaintiff's clearly established rights or acted in a way that was fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive. Moreover, the Defendant argues that all state law negligence claims are barred byqualified immunity, and that violation of departmental policy does not equate with constitutional unreasonableness.

The Defendant also alleges that because it is a state agency it is incapable of committing an assault and/or battery, and therefore cannot be held liable for it. Next, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be dismissed against it but acknowledges that the Plaintiff stated in the complaint that he is not asserting such a claim against the Defendant. Lastly, the Defendant argues that it cannot be held vicariously liable for assault and battery because such intentional acts would be outside the scope of the individual Defendants' employment.

A. Qualified Immunity and Vicarious Liability

To determine whether a state or its agencies are entitled to qualified immunity, the West Virginia Supreme Court has established a two-part test. First, for discretionary government functions, "a reviewing court must determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that such acts or omissions are in violation of clearly established statutory or constitutional rights or laws of which a reasonable person would have known or are otherwise fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive." Syl. pt. 11, W. Va. Reg'l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth. v. A.B., 766 S.E.2d 751, 756 (W. Va. 2014). A state, its agencies, and its officials are entitled to immunity from liability in the absence of such a showing. Id.

If, however, the plaintiff identifies a clearly established right which has been violated by the acts or omissions of the state, its agencies, or its officials or employees, then "the court must determine whether such acts or omissions were within the scope of the public official or employee's duties, authority, and/or employment." Id. at Syl. pt. 12. If the court determines thatthe employee was acting within the scope of his employment or duties, then the state and its agencies may be held vicariously liable for such acts or omissions. Id.

Accordingly, the Court must first determine whether the actions of Defendants White and Hammonds constitute a violation of a clearly established statutory or constitutional right, the law of which a reasonable person would have known or are otherwise fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive. To demonstrate a clearly established right, a plaintiff "must do more than allege that an abstract right has been violated. Instead, the plaintiff must make a particularized showing that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violated that right or that in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness of the action was apparent." W. Va. Reg'l Jail, 766 S.E.2d at 776 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Inmates have a clearly established right to be free from excessive force. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1992) (holding that the use of excessive force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment even if the inmate suffers no serious injury). Inflicting injuries on an inmate for no legitimate reason, as the Plaintiff has alleged, violates a clearly established right.

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