Hummel v. JH Cornelia, LLC

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JOHN HUMMEL III, Plaintiff, v. JH CORNELIA, LLC, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 22-2332

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

April 25, 2023

MEMORANDUM

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff John Hummel, III, brings this action against JH Cornelia d/b/a Chick-fil-a Willow Grove (hereinafter, “Cornelia”), the owner and operator of Cornelia, Eric Stephens, and an employee of Cornelia, Shakuur Phillips (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint contains five counts: (1) Count I asserts a state law claim for assault and battery; (2) Count II asserts a hostile work environment claim under Title VII; (3) Count III asserts a retaliation claim under Title VII; (4) Count IV asserts a state law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim; and (5) Count V asserts a negligent hiring/supervision claim.

Before the Court are Defendants Stephens' and Cornelia's motion to dismiss as well as Defendant Phillips' motion to dismiss and strike.^[1]For the reasons set forth below, Defendant Phillips' motion to dismiss will be granted and his motion to strike will be granted in part and denied in part. Defendants Stephens' and Cornelia's motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.

II. BACKGROUND^[2]

Plaintiff's claims arise from an alleged unwanted male-on-male sexual encounter with Phillips which occurred on the top floor of a parking garage adjacent to the premises of Cornelia that was oftentimes used for employee parking. See Second Am. Compl. ¶ 25, ECF No. 34. Plaintiff and Phillips were co-workers, employed by a Chick-Fil-A franchise owned by Cornelia and managed by Stephens. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 13. Plaintiff alleges that, prior to the sexual assault, the workplace maintained by Cornelia and Stephens was marred by consistent, repeated and pervasive sexually inappropriate speech, touch, innuendo, and horseplay. Id. at ¶ 26.

On the date of the unwanted sexual encounter, Plaintiff was allegedly with Phillips because Phillips had offered to provide Plaintiff with information that Phillips told Plaintiff he needed to know and understand to help Plaintiff prepare for a potential job interview on the corporate level and advance Plaintiff's career.^[3]Id. at ¶¶ 30-31. Phillips then made repeated attempts to touch Plaintiff's penis and remove his penis from his pants. Id. at ¶ 32. Plaintiff resisted Phillips' touching, including by telling Phillips to “stop” and “chill.” Id. at ¶ 33. Phillips persisted over Plaintiff's objections, removing Plaintiff's penis from his pants and performing oral sex on Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 34-35.

After the alleged encounter, Plaintiff reported the sexual encounter to the Abington Township Police, and the Police Department then contacted Plaintiff's employer--Cornelia. Id. at ¶ 38. Phillips was fired sometime thereafter but was later permitted to return to work. Id. at ¶ 44.

In the days following the event, Plaintiff allegedly expressed anxiety to his employers about returning to the parking lot for employment duties for fear that he would be approached by Phillips and because returning to the parking lot triggered painful memories. Id. at ¶ 39. Despite his communications, Plaintiff was directed to work in the parking lot. Id. at ¶ 40. When he refused, Plaintiff was allegedly verbally berated, written up, and had his hours significantly reduced. Id. at ¶ 41. For example, one of Plaintiff's supervisors told Plaintiff that he should consider himself “lucky” that he still had a job at Cornelia after the complained of event with Phillips. Id. at ¶ 42.

Three weeks after the event, Plaintiff resigned.^[4]Id. at ¶ 43. Plaintiff continues to suffer significant stress and emotional trauma as a result of the alleged encounter. Id. at ¶ 45. Plaintiff alleges that despite Plaintiff's complaints against Phillips, Stephens and Cornelia failed to remedy Phillips' behavior or permanently terminate his employment. Id. at ¶ 48.

Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered loss of income, future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, and humiliation due to Defendants' willful, discriminatory conduct that created a hostile work environment. Id. at ¶¶ 52-54. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages against all Defendants, jointly and severally. Id. at ¶ 53.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss

A party may move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When considering such a motion, the Court must “accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” DeBenedictis v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 492 F.3d 209, 215 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1989)).

To withstand a motion to dismiss, the complaint's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. Although a plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences from the facts alleged, a plaintiff's legal conclusions are not entitled to deference, and the Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).

The pleadings must contain sufficient factual allegations so as to state a facially plausible claim for relief. See, e.g., Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court limits its inquiry to the facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments, matters of public record, and undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents. See Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).

B. Motion to Strike

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits a court to “strike from a pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). “[S]triking a portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy,” and Rule 12(f) motions “are viewed with disfavor by the federal courts and are infrequently granted.” 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1380 (3d ed. 2021). To succeed on a motion to strike, a movant must show that “the allegations being challenged are so unrelated to the plaintiff's claims as to be unworthy of any consideration” and that “their presence in the pleading throughout the proceeding will be prejudicial to the moving party.” Id.

IV. DEFENDANT PHILLIPS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE

A. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim (Count IV)

A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) requires a claimant to show that (1) the conduct is extreme and outrageous; (2) the conduct is intentional or reckless; (3) the conduct caused emotional distress; and (4) the distress is severe. Arnold v. City of Philadelphia, 151 F.Supp.3d 568, 579 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (citing Williams v. Guzzardi, 875 F.2d 46, 50-51 (3d Cir. 1989) and Chuy v. Phila. Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1273 (3d Cir. 1979)); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46. Additionally, a plaintiff “must suffer some type of resulting physical harm due to the defendant's outrageous conduct.” Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 231 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Swisher v. Pitz, 868 A.2d 1228, 1230 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)).

“[I]t is extremely rare to find conduct in the employment context that will rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to provide a basis for recovery for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 1988). And, “as a general rule, sexual harassment alone does not rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to make out a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745, 754 (Pa. 1998) (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1487 (3d Cir. 1990)).

Plaintiff seemingly relies solely upon Plaintiff's one alleged sexual encounter with Phillips to establish his emotional infliction of emotional distress claim. While Plaintiff pleads that the sexual conduct on this one occasion was “unwanted” and “unconsented,” Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that Phillips' behavior was “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 371 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (cmt)). Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged that Phillips, who is alleged to have had actual and apparent supervisory authority, Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10-11, took any retaliatory actions against Plaintiff after the encounter. Cf. Carter-Herman v. City of Philadelphia, No. 95-cv-4030, 1995 WL 764574, *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 1995) (“[W]here the allegations involve severe sexual harassment combined with retaliation, a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress cannot be dismissed at the pleading stage.” (citations omitted)).

As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated, “[i]t has not been enough...