Hunt v. Mueller

TYRONE HUNT (M-28047), Petitioner, v. ROBERT MUELLER, Respondent.

No. 18 C 478

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

August 27, 2020

Hon. Jorge L. Alonso

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Petitioner Tyrone Hunt, a prisoner at the East Moline Correctional Center proceeding pro se, petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 2012 Cook County convictions in Case No. 09 CR 5980. Following a bench trial, Petitioner was found guilty of armed violence, aggravated battery, intimidation, and communication with a witness—all stemming from his shooting of Terrence Bridges to prevent Bridges from testifying at a trial. Respondent has answered the petition, and Petitioner has replied. For the reasons stated herein, this Court denies the § 2254 petition and declines to issue a certificate of appealability.

BACKGROUND

The background facts are taken from the Illinois appellate court's opinion in Petitioner's direct appeal. People v. Hunt, 2014 IL App (1st) 121615-U, ¶¶ 5-6. 2014 WL 2157548 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014); see also Hartsfield v. Dorethy, 949 F.3d 307, 309 n.1 (7th Cir. 2020) ("We take the facts from the Illinois Appellate Court's opinions because they are presumptively correct on habeas review and [Petitioner] has not rebutted this presumption.") (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).

At trial, the State presented evidence showing that defendant shot Bridges in the arm in an attempt to prevent Bridges from testifying at the upcoming trial of Frederick Pigram for the murder of Bridges' brother. Bridges testified that he was shot near the bicep in his right arm and that he was taken to a hospital, where a doctor took an x-ray which confirmed that there was a bullet in his right arm.

Bridges also testified that the bullet was not removed because the doctor said that it was located near a vein and that he might bleed to death if it was removed. Upon inspection of Bridges' arm, the court observed that there was a slightly raised bruise mark on Bridges' upper right bicep. Bridges further testified that the doctor stopped the bleeding, cleaned and bandaged the wound, and gave him a sling and that he did not remain in the hospital for more than an hour. The court found defendant guilty of armed violence, aggravated battery with a firearm, intimidation, and communication with a witness and merged all of his convictions into the conviction on the count of armed violence which alleged that defendant committed the crime of intimidation while armed with a handgun.

The court sentenced defendant to 20 years' imprisonment and determined that he was required to serve at least 85% of the sentence pursuant to section 3-6-3(a)(2)(iii) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(iii) (West 2008)) because Bridges suffered great bodily harm as a result of defendant's criminal conduct. In finding that Bridges suffered great bodily harm, the court stated that a person who is shot by a gun generally suffers great bodily harm when the bullet enters the victim's body and that the evidence in this case showed great bodily harm to Bridges.

Hunt, 2014 IL App (1st) 121615-U, ¶¶ 5-6.

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued: (1) his armed violence conviction was not his most serious offense and the trial court improperly merged the other counts into that one; (2) Bridges' testimony about a doctor's explanation why the bullet could not be removed was inadmissible hearsay and, but for this evidence, the trial court would not have found great bodily harm resulting in Petitioner having to serve 85% of his sentence; and (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the hearsay testimony. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 12, 18.

The state appellate court affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence. Id. at ¶¶ 10-21. The court determined: (1) the armed violence offense carried the greatest penalty and thus was Petitioner's most serious offense; (2) though Bridges' testimony about the hospital doctor's statements was hearsay, its admission did not amount to plain error given Bridges' other testimony about his injury and the trial court's finding that a bullet entering a person's body is generally considered to result in great bodily harm; and (3) Petitioner could not establish ineffectiveassistance of trial counsel since the failure to object to the hearsay testimony resulted in no prejudice given the other evidence supporting the finding of great bodily harm. Id.

Petitioner filed a petition for leave to appeal (PLA) with the Illinois Supreme Court, arguing the trial court improperly merged his convictions and the admission of Bridges' hearsay testimony was plain error. (Dkt. 9-5, pg. 2.) The state supreme court denied the PLA. (Dkt. 9-6.)

Petitioner's First Post-Conviction Petition

Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition in the state trial court. (Dkt. 9-16.) He argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call medical experts or submit medical reports to counter Bridges' testimony about the seriousness of his injury, and for failing to argue that Bridges' testimony alone was insufficient to establish great bodily harm. Id. at 4-8. The trial court denied the petition upon determining that Petitioner's post-conviction ineffective assistance claim was essentially the same as the claim raised on direct appeal and was thus barred by Illinois' res judicata doctrine. (Dkt. 1, pg. 26-42.)

Petitioner appealed, and an attorney was appointed for the appeal. The attorney filed a motion to withdraw from representation. (Dkt. 9-8); see also Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (an attorney may seek withdrawal from appointment in a post-conviction appeal upon demonstrating that the appeal lacks merit). According to the attorney's Finley brief, state post-conviction review was procedurally barred based on one or multiple grounds: Illinois' res judicata doctrine (as determined by the post-conviction trial court); Illinois' forfeiture rule (because Petitioner could have raised his post-conviction claim on direct appeal but didn't); and/or the failure to support the claim with affidavits or other evidence pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/122-2. (Dkt. 9-8, pg. 12-14.) Petitioner responded to the Finley brief; however, he challenged none of the procedural grounds addressed therein. (Dkt. 9-9.) Instead, he argued only that his post-conviction appellate attorney sought to withdraw without investigating Petitioner's claims. Id.

The state appellate court agreed with the attorney's contentions; granted his motion to withdraw; and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Petitioner's post-conviction petition. (Dkt. 9-7.) Petitioner filed a PLA, again arguing that the attorney's Finley motion was improper, and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in his post-conviction appeal and at trial. (Dkt. 9-10.) The Illinois Supreme Court denied the PLA. (Dkt. 9-11.)

Petitioner's Successive Post-Conviction Petition

Petitioner sought to file a successive post-conviction petition, asserting: (1) his 20-year sentence was disproportionate to sentences for similar offenses; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Bridges' hearsay testimony or introduce medical evidence addressing the insignificance of Bridges' injury; and (3) the grand jury that indicted Petitioner was assembled in a discriminatory manner. (Dkt. 9-17.) The trial court denied Petitioner's request to file a successive petition. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f).

Petitioner appealed; counsel was again appointed for the appeal; and the attorney, like the previous post-conviction appellate counsel, filed a Finley motion to withdraw, stating the appeal lacked arguable merit. (Dkt. 9-13.) The state appellate court agreed, granted the motion to withdraw, and affirmed the trial court's denial of Petitioner's request to file a successive post-conviction petition. (Dkt. 9-12.) Petitioner filed a PLA, which the Illinois Supreme Court denied. (Dkt. 9-14 and 9-15.) Having completed his state court proceedings, Petitioner filed his § 2254 petition currently before this Court.

PETITIONER'S 28 U.S.C. § 2254 PETITION

Petitioner's § 2254 petition asserts four claims:

(1) the trial court erroneously allowed Bridges' hearsay testimony about his doctor's statements describing the gunshot injury;

(2) the trial court erred when it considered Petitioner's armed violence conviction as the most serious offense of the four conviction counts;(3) Petitioner's trial attorney was ineffective for not introducing medical evidence to counter Bridges' testimony about the severity of his injury; and

(4) post-conviction counsel in the original post-conviction appeal was ineffective for failing to argue Claim Three.

(Dkt. 1, pg. 5-8.) Respondent contends that all four claims are either not cognizable for federal habeas review and/or procedurally defaulted. (Dkt. 8.) Respondent is correct with respect to Claims One, Two, and Four. Claim Three, though not procedurally defaulted, is without merit.

Claim One

Petitioner's first claim is the same one he raised on direct appeal. He argues "[t]he trial court erred in admitting inadmissible hearsay testimony from Terrence Bridges regarding the information doctors gave to Bridges about his injury." (Dkt. 1, pg. 5.) The state appellate court, reviewing the claim for plain error because no objection was made at trial, determined that Bridges' testimony about the doctor's statements was hearsay, but its admission was not plain error. According to the state appellate court, the trial evidence establishing great bodily harm was not so closely balanced such that exclusion of the hearsay testimony would have resulted in a different sentence (that Petitioner had to serve 85% of it). Hunt, 2014 IL App (1st) 121615-U, ¶ 12.

Both determinations by the state appellate court—that hearsay testimony was improperly admitted, and that it did not constitute plain error—relied solely on state law. Id. at ¶¶ 13-14 (citing Ill. R. Evid. 801(c)...