Hunt v. State

42 N.E.3d 587 (Table)

Michael HUNT, Appellant–Petitioner

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Respondent.

No. 35A04–1412–PC–555.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Nov. 30, 2015.

Michael Hunt, Carlisle, IN, Appellant Pro Se.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Jodi Kathryn Stein, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

BRADFORD, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] In March of 2012, Appellant–Petitioner Michael Hunt pled guilty to one count of Class B felony robbery and to being a habitual offender. The trial court accepted Hunt's guilty pleas and sentenced him to an aggregate thirty-year sentence. On October 16, 2012, Hunt filed a petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”), in which he alleged that he suffered ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The post-conviction court subsequently denied Hunt's petition. Hunt appealed this determination.

[2] On appeal, Hunt again contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He also contends that the post-conviction court erred in ruling on his PCR petition without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, we conclude that Hunt has failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Also, because the record demonstrates that the post-conviction court ordered the parties to submit their evidence via affidavit pursuant to Indiana Post–Conviction Rule 1(9)(b) (“Post–Conviction Rule 1(9)(b) ”) and based its ruling on said evidence, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hunt's PCR petition without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] The factual basis supporting Hunt's guilty pleas instructs us to the underlying facts leading to this post-conviction appeal:

On or about December 27, 2011, I drove to Pilgrims Rest Cemetery, located in Huntington County, Indiana. When I arrived I removed my bike out of the back of the vehicle I was driving and rode to the First Farmers Bank and Trust, also located in Huntington County, Indiana. Once I arrived, I entered the bank wearing latex gloves, a ski mask, a black wig with a baseball cap, a blue jacket with the hood up and a bullet proof vest. I was also carrying a loaded Para .45 caliber semi automatic gun, a device that I made to look like a bomb and a black bag.

I walked up to the counter, placed the “bomb” and the black bag on the counter, and while pointing the gun at the tellers I instructed them to place $30,000 in $100.00 and $50.00 bills into the bag. I told the tellers that if they didn't give me the money, I would blow up the bank. The tellers emptied all the drawers into the black bag and handed it back to me and I left the bank on my bike. I rode back to the Cemetery and as I was getting into my vehicle I could see the police cars with their lights and sirens activated, but I continued getting into the vehicle anyway and attempted to get away. After driving a short distance I wrecked my vehicle and tried to flee on foot but I was apprehended by police and taken into custody.

Appellant's App. pp. 75–76.

[4] As a result of Hunt's actions, Appellee–Respondent the State of Indiana (the “State”) charged Hunt with Class B felony robbery, Class D felony unlawful use of body armor, and Class D felony resisting law enforcement. The State also alleged that Hunt was a habitual offender. Hunt subsequently pled guilty to Class B felony robbery. He also admitted that he is a habitual offender. In admitting to his status as a habitual offender, Hunt stated the following:

Prior to December 27, 2011, I had accumulated two prior unrelated felony convictions. I was convicted of Robbery, a class B felony, in Marion County, Indiana, under cause number 81–285A, and I was convicted of Robbery, a class C felony, in Tippecanoe County, Indiana, under cause number 79D02–9602–CF–00012.

Appellant's App. p. 76. In exchange for Hunt's guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and to cap the executed portion of Hunt's sentence at thirty years. During the guilty plea hearing, Hunt affirmed that the factual bases for both the Class B felony robbery charge and the habitual offender allegation were true and correct.

[5] Prior to sentencing, Hunt moved to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that the plea agreement failed to specify whether his sentences were to run concurrently or consecutively. The State maintained that Hunt's counsel understood and it was a “feign on misunderstanding” by Hunt for him to assert that he did not understand that the habitual offender constituted a sentence enhancement, not a separate sentence. Tr. p. 33. After taking the motion under advisement, the trial court denied Hunt's motion.

[6] At sentencing, the trial court again informed Hunt that his habitual offender enhancement did not constitute a separate sentence, but rather was an enhancement to the sentence imposed by virtue of Hunt's Class B felony robbery conviction. Finding Hunt's criminal history, which included numerous prior felony convictions, to be an aggravating factor, the trial court sentenced Hunt to a fifteen-year term of imprisonment. The trial court then enhanced this sentence by fifteen years by virtue of Hunt's status as a habitual offender, for an aggregate thirty-year sentence.

[7] On October 16, 2012, Hunt filed a pro-se PCR petition. Hunt filed an amended pro-se PCR petition on May 22, 2014. The State subsequently filed a motion for partial summary judgment, which was granted by the post-conviction court on July 11, 2014. With respect to the remaining portions of Hunt's PCR petition, the post-conviction court ordered the parties to submit evidence by affidavit. Following the submission of evidence, the post-conviction court issued an order denying Hunt's PCR petition on October 31, 2014. This appeal follows.

Discussion and Decision¹

[8] Post-conviction procedures do not afford the petitioner with a super-appeal. Williams v. State, 706 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Ind.1999). Instead, they create a narrow remedy for subsequent collateral challenges to convictions, challenges which must be based on grounds enumerated in the post-conviction rules. Id. A petitioner who has been denied post-conviction relief appeals from a negative judgment and as a result, faces a rigorous standard of review on appeal. Dewitt v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 169 (Ind.2001) ; Colliar v. State, 715 N.E.2d 940, 942 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied.

[9] Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature. Stevens v.. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 745 (Ind.2002). Therefore, in order to prevail, a petitioner must establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post–Conviction Rule 1(5) ; Stevens, 770 N .E.2d at 745. When appealing from the denial of a PCR petition, a petitioner must convince this court that the evidence, taken as a whole, “leads unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court.” Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 745. “It is only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion, and the post-conviction court has reached the opposite conclusion, that its decision will be disturbed as contrary to law.” Godby v. State, 809 N.E.2d 480, 482 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. The post-conviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind.2004). We therefore accept the post-conviction court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous but give no deference to its conclusions of law. Id.

[10] Hunt contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his PCR petition, claiming that the record demonstrates that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Hunt also claims that the post-conviction court erred in ruling on his PCR petition without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. We will discuss each claim in turn.

I. Whether Hunt Suffered Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

[11] The right to effective counsel is rooted in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 331 (Ind.2006). “ ‘The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results.’ “ Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) ). “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper function of the adversarial process that the trial court cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.

[12] A successful claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy two components. Reed v. State, 866 N.E.2d 767, 769 (Ind.2007). Under the first prong, the petitioner must establish that counsel's performance was deficient by demonstrating that counsel's representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, committing errors so serious that the defendant did not have the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. We recognize that even the finest, most experienced criminal defense attorneys may not agree on the ideal strategy or most effective way to represent a client, and therefore, under this prong, we will assume that counsel performed adequately and defer to counsel's strategic and tactical decisions. Smith v. State, 765 N.E.2d 578, 585 (Ind.2002). Isolated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective. Id.

[13] Under the second prong, the petitioner must show that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice. Reed, 866 N.E.2d at 769. Again, a petitioner may show prejudice by demonstrating that there is “a reasonable probability (i.e. a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id...