Hurley v. Lifsey

310 So.3d 1030

Stephen HURLEY, Appellant,

v.J. Stanford LIFSEY, Appellee.

Case No. 2D19-1438

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed August 14, 2020

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Paul L. Huey, Judge.

David A. Maney of Maney, Damsker & Jones, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.

J. Stanford Lifsey, pro se.

CASANUEVA, Judge.

Stephen Hurley appeals an order dismissing his amended complaint with prejudice. We conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the amended complaint at this stage of the proceeding, and we therefore reverse.

J. Stanford Lifsey began providing legal services to Mr. Hurley on December 8, 2004, and he eventually represented Mr. Hurley in a civil matter in which final summary judgment was entered on July 20, 2012. Mr. Lifsey's representation of Mr. Hurley came to an end, and Mr. Hurley thereafter sued Mr. Lifsey and alleged three causes of action: count one alleges a claim of fraud on the court; count two alleges a claim of fraud; and count three alleges a claim for legal malpractice. Mr. Hurley filed his original complaint on March 31, 2016, and the trial court entered an order dismissing the complaint without prejudice on December 22, 2016. Thereafter, Mr. Hurley filed his amended complaint on December 28, 2016. The amended complaint was dismissed with prejudice on March 12, 2019. The dismissal was not because of a pleading deficiency; instead, the trial court ruled that the cause of action was legally barred pursuant to Silvestrone v. Edell, 721 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1998).¹

In Silvestrone, the Florida Supreme Court set forth a bright line rule in determining when the statute of limitations begins to run on a legal malpractice claim arising out of litigation that has proceeded to final judgment. Id. at 1175-76.

[W]hen a malpractice action is predicated on errors or omissions committed in the course of litigation, and that litigation proceeds to judgment, the statute of limitations does not commence to run until the litigation is concluded by final judgment. To be specific, we hold that the statute of limitations does not commence to run until the final judgment becomes final.

Id. at 1175.

In 2009, our Florida Supreme Court elaborated upon the Silvestrone rationale. "The statute of limitations requires that a legal malpractice action on a litigation-related claim be brought within two years after the cause of action is or should have been discovered ...." Larson & Larson, P.A. v. TSE Indus., Inc., 22 So. 3d 36, 41 (Fla. 2009) (citing § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002) ). The court stated, "we drew the line of accrual at the time final judgment was final." Id. (citing Silvestrone, 721 So. 2d at 1176 ).

In the present case, the first two causes of action in Mr. Hurley's amended complaint involve allegations of fraud. The statute of limitations for an action based on fraud is four years. § 95.11(3)(j), Fla. Stat. (2015). Even assuming that the statute of limitations began to run when final summary judgment was entered in the prior litigation, July 20, 2012, the statute of limitations would not have expired as to the two fraud claims until July 20, 2016. Because Mr. Hurley filed his original complaint on March 31, 2016, it is not barred by the statute of limitations, and the trial court erred in dismissing those claims. See Palm Beach Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Doe, 210 So. 3d 41, 47 (Fla. 2017) ("[A]mendments asserting new claims can relate back to the original pleading as long as they arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the claims within the original.").

We also conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing Mr. Hurley's legal malpractice claim. "A motion to dismiss a complaint based on the expiration of the statute of limitations should be granted only in extraordinary circumstances in which the facts pleaded in the complaint conclusively establish that the statute of limitations bars the action as a matter of law." Ervans v. City of Venice, 169 So. 3d 267, 268 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (citing Wishnatzki v. Coffman Constr., Inc., 884 So. 2d 282, 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) ). Here, the trial court addressed Mr. Lifsey's motion to dismiss at a status conference. No answer had yet been filed admitting any pleading allegation, no factual stipulation was provided to the trial court, and no discovery had taken place.

The trial court was required to look at only the complaint to evaluate the facts at this early stage of the lawsuit. "A motion to dismiss is not a substitute for a motion for summary judgment, and in ruling on a motion to dismiss a complaint the trial court is confined to consideration of the allegations found within the four corners of the complaint." Baycon Indus., Inc. v. Shea, 714 So. 2d 1094, 1095 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (citing Thompson v. Martin, 530 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) ); see also Ervans, 169 So. 3d at 268. "The motion [to dismiss] does not provide authority to the trial court to look beyond the complaint to consider the sufficiency of the...