Hurley v. Riverview Med. Ctr.

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MARIANNE HURLEY, Plaintiff, v. RIVERVIEW MEDICAL CENTER et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 21-2860 (GC) (RLS)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

June 30, 2023

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Georgette Castner, United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants Riverview Medical Center (“Riverview”) and Hackensack Meridian Health, Inc.'s (“HMH”) (collectively, “Defendants”) motion for summary judgment seeking the dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff Marianne Hurley's (“Plaintiff') Amended Complaint (ECF No. 8). (ECF No. 33.) Plaintiff opposed the motion (ECF No. 41), and Defendants replied (ECF No. 42). After careful consideration of the parties' submissions the Court decides Defendants' motion without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons outlined below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The Court recites only the uncontested facts necessary to contextualize the present motion.^[1] In June 1999, Plaintiff began working for Riverview^[2] in an administrative support role within the Emergency Department (“ED”). (DSUMF ¶¶ 1; PRDSUMF ¶¶ 1, 6; Pl.'s Statement of Material and Disputed Facts (“PSMDF”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 41-1; Defs.' Response to Pl.'s Statement of Material and Disputed Facts (“DRPSMDF”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 42-9.) Her job responsibilities included administrative and office responsibilities assisting both the ED Director and ED Nurse Manager. (See PSMDF ¶ 1; DRPSMDF ¶ 1.)

At all times during her employment, Plaintiff was an at-will employee who was paid hourly. (DSUMF ¶ 7; PRDSUMF ¶ 7.) Her usual scheduled hours were Monday through Friday, 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. (DSUMF ¶ 8; PSMDF ¶ 63.) Over the years, Plaintiff had several direct supervisors. (PSMDF ¶ 3; DRPSMDF ¶ 3.) Most recently, Plaintiff was supervised by Tammy Harden (“Harden”), an ED Nurse Manager. (PSMDF ¶ 4; DRPSMDF ¶ 4.) In the Riverview management structure, Harden reported directly to Denise Swan (“Swan”), the Senior Manager of the ED. (PSMDF ¶ 5; DRPSMDF ¶ 5.) Swan in turn reported to Rebecca Graboso (“Graboso”), the Vice President of Nursing. (Id.)

In July 2019, Plaintiff began experiencing medical symptoms such as extreme fatigue, facial rashes, sporadic fevers, and joint pain. (PSMDF ¶ 15; DRPSMDF ¶ 15.) As these symptoms worsened, she applied for, and was granted, continuous leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) through Riverview's independent third-party administrator, The Hartford (“Hartford”). (DSUMF ¶¶ 13, 14; PRDSUMF ¶¶ 13, 14; PSMDF ¶ 14; DRPSMDF ¶ 14.) In November 2019, Plaintiffs FMLA leave concluded, and she returned to work. (DSUMF ¶ 16; PRDSUMF ¶ 16.)^[3]

In March 2020, Plaintiff missed additional time from work and was hospitalized for what doctors believed was lupus. (PSMDF ¶¶ 16-19; DRPSMDF ¶¶ 16-19.) Plaintiff did not immediately request FMLA leave. (PSMDF ¶¶ 16-22; DRPSMDF ¶¶ 16-22.) In October 2020, however, Plaintiff contacted Hartford to apply for intermittent FMLA-leave after officially being diagnosed with lupus. (PSMDF ¶¶ 21-22; DRPSMDF ¶¶ 21-22; see also PSMDF ¶ 18; DRPSMDF ¶ 18 (disputing details of Plaintiff s communications about her illness, but not disputing that Plaintiff was seeking treatment for lupus).) Hartford approved Plaintiffs proposed FMLA leave for the days of October 22, October 23, October 27, November 5, November 20, and December 3, 2020. (PSMDF ¶ 25; DRPSMDF ¶ 25.)

Around the time that Plaintiff requested intermittent FMLA-leave, Riverview was taking certain precautions related to the pandemic. (DSUMF ¶ 23; PRDSUMF ¶ 23; PSMDF ¶ 29; DRPSMDF ¶ 29.) Specifically, Riverview assigned all available employees, including Plaintiff, to assist with fit-testing employees for respirators and state-mandated screening procedures.^[4] (DSUMF ¶ 23; PRDSUMF ¶ 23.) In response, Plaintiff expressed discomfort regarding Covid-19 exposure. (DSUMF ¶ 24; see PRDSUMF ¶ 24.) Plaintiff communicated her discomfort to Harden and requested to be excused from duties that might exposure her to Covid-19. (See PSMDF ¶ 31; DRPSMDF ¶ 31.)

In emails dated October 20, 2020, Swan communicated with various managers as to whether Plaintiff needed to obtain an accommodation through Human Resources (“HR”) in order to be excused from her job duties related to Covid-19.^[5] (PSMDF ¶¶ 35-39; DRPSMDF ¶¶ 35-39.) Management concluded that if Plaintiff had “a medical reason [that prevented her from being] deployed for several hours a week, then she need[ed] to go to HR and request an accommodation.” (PSMDF ¶ 36; DRPSMDF ¶ 36.) Plaintiff never contacted HR regarding an accommodation for any Covid-19-related assignments. (DSUMF ¶ 28; PRDSUMF ¶ 28.) Regardless, Plaintiff never took anyone's temperature at the door, nor did Plaintiff engage in any fit-testing. (DSUMF ¶¶ 31, 32; PRDSUMF ¶¶ 31, 32.) Plaintiff was not disciplined for failing to perform these duties. (DSUMF ¶¶ 28, 32; PRDSUMF ¶¶ 28, 32.)

Separately, in the fall of 2020, HR for Riverview conducted an investigation regarding Plaintiffs time and attendance. (See DSUMF ¶¶ 20,22,40; PRDSUMF ¶¶ 20, 22, 40.) Defendants' investigation concluded with a finding that Plaintiff was receiving pay for hours she did not work. (DSUMF ¶¶ 20, 44, 50.) Plaintiff had a duty to review her paystubs and report any payment errors under company policy, and at no time during her employment with Riverview did Plaintiff report any overpayments by Riverview for unearned compensation. (DSUMF ¶¶ 42-43; PRDSUMF ¶¶ 42-43.)

On November 23, 2020, after analyzing data pertaining to Plaintiffs hours, HR met with Plaintiff regarding allegations of improperly recorded time, known as “theft of time.”^[6] (See DSUMF ¶¶ 20, 45, 48; PRDSUMF ¶¶ 20, 45, 48; PSMDF ¶ 91; DRPSMDF ¶ 91.) After speaking with Plaintiff, Mary Mueller (“Mueller”), the HR investigator for Plaintiffs case, issued a Level II disciplinary notice under HMH guidelines. (DSUMF ¶¶ 44, 46; PRDSUMF ¶ 46.) Thereafter, Plaintiff was suspended pending a final investigatory review, and she was instructed to gather any evidence she may have for presentation at her forthcoming disciplinary review meeting. (DSUMF ¶ 49; PRDSUMF ¶ 49.) Plaintiff did not submit any evidence that she was in fact working during the times in question or that she properly reported her absences. (DSUMF ¶ 50; PRDSUMF ¶ 50.) Furthermore, at her disciplinary review meeting, Plaintiff offered no witnesses and no documentary evidence to contradict HR's investigative findings that Plaintiff engaged in theft of time. (DSUMF ¶ 51; PRDSUMF ¶ 51.)

On November 30, 2020, following her disciplinary review hearing, Plaintiffs suspension was upheld, and she was terminated for gross misconduct. (DSUMF ¶ 52; PRDSUMF ¶ 52.) On December 3, 2020, Plaintiff was mailed a formal termination notice. (PSMDF ¶ 98; DRPSMDF ¶ 98.) Plaintiff never appealed her termination pursuant to HMH's internal dispute resolution policy. (DSUMF ¶¶ 56, 58; PRDSUMF ¶¶ 56, 58; Mueller Certification ¶ 16, ECF No. 33-42.)

B. Procedural Background

On February 18, 2021, Plaintiff filed her original Complaint in this Court. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) On May 5, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, which is the operative Complaint in this matter. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 8.) Plaintiffs Amended Complaint brings three groups of claims against Defendants: 1) Violations of the FMLA; 2) Violations of the New Jersey Law against Discrimination (the “NJLAD”); and 3) Violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”). (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 65-80.) These three groups are comprised of ten distinct counts: (1) FMLA-interference; (2) FMLA-retaliation; (3) disability discrimination under the ADA; (4) disability discrimination under the NJLAD; (5) retaliation under the ADA; (6) retaliation under the NJLAD; (7) failure to accommodate under the ADA; (8) failure to accommodate under the NJLAD; (9) hostile work environment under the ADA; and (10) hostile work environment under the NJLAD. (Id.) Defendants move for summary judgment on all counts. (Defs.' Moving Br. 1, ECF No. 33-1.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Kreschollek v. S. Stevedoring Co., 223 F.3d 202, 204 (3d Cir. 2000). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Boyle v. County of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no genuine dispute of material fact remains. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). “[W]ith respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof... the burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Id. at 325.

Once the moving party has met that threshold burden, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The opposing party must present actual evidence that creates a genuine dispute as to a material fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (setting forth types of evidence on which nonmoving party must rely to support its assertion that genuine disputes of material fact exist). “[U]nsupported allegations in ... pleadings are...