Hussey v. Berryhill

LANETTE C. HUSSEY, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Deputy Commissioner of Operations, Social Security Administration, Defendant.

Case No. 4:17-CV-2507-SPM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

March 20, 2019

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) for judicial review of the final decision of Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner") denying the application of Plaintiff Lanette C. Hussey ("Plaintiff") for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq. (the "Act"). The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 8). Because I find the decision denying benefits was supported by substantial evidence, I will affirm the Commissioner's denial of Plaintiff's application.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In July 2013, Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI, alleging that she had been unable to work since January 1, 1993, due to bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder. (Tr. 226, 230, 262). She later amended her onset date to December 31, 2007. (Tr. 228). Her application was initially denied. (Tr. 153, 157). On February 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Request for Hearing by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) (Tr. 162). On August 12, 2015, the ALJ held a hearing on Plaintiff's claim. (Tr. 96-128). On May 25, 2016, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Tr. 61-84). On August 7, 2017, the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's decision. (Tr. 1-4). Plaintiff has exhausted all administrative remedies, and the decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At the hearing before the ALJ in August 2015, Plaintiff testified that she last worked in 2007, and she was dismissed from that job because she had a hard time focusing on her duties and because she was going through depression and bipolar episodes that caused her not to show up to work. (Tr. 103). She also testified that anxiety affects her ability to do things, because she finds everything overwhelming. (Tr. 105). She testified that she does not do chores, cook, or grocery shop, and that she mostly watches television and sleeps. (Tr. 107). She had a bad fall in 2013, from which she has pain in her shoulders and hips and problems lifting and walking. (Tr. 108-10). In May 2014, she had a stroke. (Tr. 112). Since then, she has had problems including a lack of coordination, difficulty writing, difficulty dialing numbers on a phone, and memory issues. (Tr. 113-16). She can read. (Tr. 115). She also has a history of drug abuse and alcohol abuse. (Tr. 116).

With respect to the medical and vocational records, the Court accepts the facts as presented in the parties' statements of facts. The Court will cite to specific records as necessary in the analysis below.

III. STANDARD FOR DETERMINING DISABILITY UNDER THE ACT

To be eligible for benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must prove he or she is disabled. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); Baker v. Sec'y of Health& Human Servs., 955 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 1992). The Social Security Act defines as disabled a person who is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A); 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also Hurd v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2010). The impairment must be "of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A); 1382c(a)(3)(B).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner engages in a five-step evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); see also McCoy v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 605, 611 (8th Cir. 2011) (discussing the five-step process). At Step One, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant is currently engaging in "substantial gainful activity"; if so, then he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. At Step Two, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a severe impairment, which is "any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities"; if the claimant does not have a severe impairment, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 404.1520(c), 416.920(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(c); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. At Step Three, the Commissioner evaluates whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the "listings"). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. If the claimant has such an impairment, the Commissioner will find the claimantdisabled; if not, the Commissioner proceeds with the rest of the five-step process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611.

Prior to Step Four, the Commissioner must assess the claimant's "residual functional capacity" ("RFC"), which is "the most a claimant can do despite [his or her] limitations." Moore v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 520, 523 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e), 416.945(a)(1). At Step Four, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant can return to his past relevant work, by comparing the claimant's RFC with the physical and mental demands of the claimant's past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1520(f), 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(f); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. If the claimant can perform his past relevant work, he is not disabled; if the claimant cannot, the analysis proceeds to the next step. Id. At Step Five, the Commissioner considers the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience to determine whether the claimant can make an adjustment to other work in the national economy; if the claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, the claimant will be found disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g), 404.1560(c)(2), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g), 416.960(c)(2); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611.

Through Step Four, the burden remains with the claimant to prove that he is disabled. Moore, 572 F.3d at 523. At Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that, given the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience, there are a significant number of other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Id.; Brock v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1062, 1064 (8th Cir. 2012); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c)(2), 416.960(c)(2).

IV. THE ALJ'S DECISION

Applying the foregoing five-step analysis, the ALJ here found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 31, 2007, the alleged onset date; thatPlaintiff had the severe impairments of status post right, middle cerebral artery infarction secondary to heroin and cocaine in May 2014; status post multiple rib fractures, a pelvic fracture, and a splenic injury in August 2013; a history of bipolar disorder, mainly depression and anxiety; and substance abuse disorder. (Tr. 66). He found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 67-69). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following RFC:

[Plaintiff] has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.067(b) that includes being to sitting [sic] for eight hours in an eight-hour workday; walking for three hours in an eight-hour workday; standing for four hours in an eight-hour workday; the frequent use [of] her right foot for foot control operations and the occasional use of her left foot for foot control operations; no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasional climbing of ramps or stairs; occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; occasional use of the left arm/hand (her dominant hand) for reaching, handling, and fine finger manipulation; avoiding all exposure to the operational control of moving machinery and unprotected heights; simple, routine, repetitive tasks in an environment free of fast-paced production requirements; and work involving only simple work-related decision with few, if any, work place changes.

(Tr. 69). At Step Four, the ALJ found Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work as a general inspector. (Tr. 76). However, at Step Five, relying on evidence obtained from a vocational expert, the ALJ found that there were other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, including representative occupations such as (1) school bus monitor (Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") No. 372.667-042), 16,000 jobs nationally; (2) counter clerk (DOT No. 249.366-010), 18,000 jobs nationally; and (3) office clerk (DOT No. 205.367-030), 38,500 jobs nationally. (Tr. 76-77)

V. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's decision on two grounds: (1) that the ALJ erred in analyzing whether Plaintiff's intellectual impairment met or equaled Listing 12.05(C); and (2) that the ALJerred in failing to elicit evidence that...