Hwang v. Arita

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND TO REMAND REMAINING CLAIMS TO STATE COURT

ANNIE T. CHRISTOFF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court by order of reference^[1] are two motions to dismiss. Defendant Saint Francis Hospital (“Saint Francis”) filed its motion on December 17, 2020. (ECF No. 6.) Pro se Plaintiff Kyu Hwan Hwang filed his response on April 27, 2016. (ECF No. 16.) Saint Francis replied on May 5, 2021. (ECF No. 17.) Defendant City of Memphis^[2] filed its motion on May

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31, 2021. (ECF No. 25.) Hwang did not file a response, and the time to do so has passed. For the following reasons, it is recommended that both motions to dismiss be granted. It is further recommended that the remaining claims against Jerry Quezada Arita, the only remaining Defendant, be remanded to the Circuit Court of Tennessee for the Thirtieth Judicial District at Memphis, where the case was filed prior to its removal to this Court.

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT

The following findings of fact are based on the allegations in Hwang's complaint. (ECF No. 1-3.) On October 1, 2020, Hwang filed his lawsuit in state court, alleging four causes of action: negligence against Defendant Jerry Quezada Arita; violation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (“EMTALA”) against Saint Francis; police misconduct and/or negligence against the Memphis Police Department; and tampering with governmental records against the City of Memphis Fire Department. (Id. at 8-10.)

Hwang's claims arise from a car accident on October 15, 2019, in Memphis, Tennessee. He alleges that he was stopped in his vehicle on Airways Boulevard and East Parkway South that night when he was struck from behind by a vehicle driven by Arita. (Id. at 4-5, 12.) Hwang alleges that the police report from the accident, which charged Arita with three moving violations, was inaccurate in two respects. First, it misidentified the precise location of the crash. (Id. at 5.) Second, it identified him as Chinese when he is actually Korean. (Id.)

Hwang alleges that an unnamed Memphis police officer urged him to sign a police document, presumably the police report from the accident. (Id. at 6.) Hwang also alleges that the police officer failed to properly check Hwang's insurance document, leading the officer to believe that Hwang did not have it with him at the time of the accident. (Id.) Hwang does not allege that he was cited for driving without insurance, but instead suggests that the police

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officer's actions influenced Hwang's behavior later at the Saint Francis emergency room, where he was taken after the accident. (Id. at 5-6.) While his contentions are not entirely clear, Hwang alleges that the police officer's conduct led to Hwang's inability to sign a contract at Saint Francis, which he believes was one of the reasons Saint Francis did not treat him. (Id. at 6.)

Hwang also alleges that Saint Francis improperly explained several things to him, ignored his reports of pain in his neck, and eventually “dumped” him out of the emergency room and denied him re-entry. (Id. at 5-6.) Hwang apparently slept in the hospital parking lot after being discharged before contacting his spouse and leaving the premises at 9:00 or 10:00 a.m. the next day. (Id. at 6.)

As for the Memphis Fire Department, Hwang alleges that its records reflect that Hwang told someone on the scene of the accident that he wanted to be sent to the Saint Francis emergency room. (Id. at 7.) Hwang asserts that he could not have offered such a directive, as he had recently immigrated from South Korea, had never seen or heard of Saint Francis, and had never been in an emergency room in his life. (Id.) Hwang also appears to allege some sort of collusion between the fire department and Saint Francis and, perhaps correspondingly, implies that Saint Francis is a monopoly, which allows it to provide substandard medical care. (Id.)

Ultimately, Hwang asserts his damages stem from the following wrongs: Arita's negligent operation of his vehicle (id. at 8-9); Saint Francis's EMTALA violations, which include that “they dumped [him] out of the hospital before he was stabilized” and failed to get his “informed consent” (id. at 9-10); unspecified police misconduct, with recovery based upon the general damages remedies provision found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-39-102 (id. at 10); and allegations that the Memphis Fire Department violated Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-16-504, a criminal code provision governing the destruction of and tampering with records (id.).

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Hwang specifically alleges that he is entitled to punitive damages based on the fire department's conduct (id.) and generally alleges that he is entitled to punitive damages against all Defendants (id. at 11). He states a general claim for $175, 030, 000 in damages and later requests $750, 000 in compensatory damages. On December 17, 2020, Saint Francis removed the case to this Court, invoking the Court's federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).

PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. Standard of Review for Failure to State a Claim

To determine whether Hwang's complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the Court applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The court “construes the complaint in a light most favorable to [the] plaintiff” and “accepts all factual allegations as true” to determine whether they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 2012). Pleadings provide facial plausibility when they present “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. However, “pleadings that . . . are no more than conclusions[] are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a

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claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice' of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds' on which the claim rests.”).

“[A] pleading filed pro se is to be liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than a pleading filed by counsel.” Kondaur Capital Corp. v. Smith, 802 Fed.Appx. 938, 945 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)); see also Vandiver v. Vasbinder, 416 Fed.Appx. 560, 562 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding the less stringent standard applies to pro se complaints, “however inartfully pleaded”). Nevertheless, pro se litigants “are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Wright v. Penguin Random House, 783 Fed.Appx. 578, 581 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Fox v. Mich. State Police Dep't, 173 Fed.Appx. 372, 376 (6th Cir. 2006)); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[A] court cannot ‘create a claim which a plaintiff has not spelled out in his pleading.'”) (quoting Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 Fed.Appx. 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should pursue.”).

II. Hwang's Claims Against Saint Francis

Saint Francis asserts that Hwang has failed to state a claim under EMTALA because he “failed to make any factual allegations that he had an emergency medical condition or that Saint Francis had actual knowledge of an emergency medical condition and then failed to stabilize

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Plaintiff.” (ECF No. 6, at 7.) It further argues that the claim “is more properly characterized as a health care liability claim, not an EMTALA claim.” (Id. at 6.)

In his response, Hwang does not address Saint Francis's arguments regarding the EMTALA allegations. Instead, he “alleges that the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was based on UNCONSTITUTIONAL statu[t]e.” (ECF No. 16, at 2.) In the memorandum accompanying his response, Hwang references “demand letters” and “written notice of the potential claim.” (ECF No. 16-1, at 2.) But Hwang's response does not cite any statute, nor does it explain what would render the unnamed statute unconstitutional. It appears that Hwang might be addressing Saint Francis's assertion in its motion to dismiss that his claim is actually a health care liability claim. In its reply, Saint Francis interprets Hwang's response as an assault on the constitutionality...