I. Standing

I. Standing

In passing RLUIPA, Congress provided that the "standing to assert a claim or defense under the statute shall be governed by the general rules of standing under Article III of the Constitution"¹ and by these rules alone.² In brief, standing involves an evaluation of whether a claimant can have its cause of action addressed in federal court.³ Rules governing the standing doctrine are derived from the first clause of Article III, confining judicial power to "[c]ases" and "[c]ontroversies."⁴ From this provision courts have established a "case or controversy" requirement that prevents court consideration of constitutional issues unless incident to an actual, ongoing case or controversy in law. This requirement ensures that plaintiffs have a legitimate stake in litigation and in doing so restricts courts from unduly interfering with the activities of coequal branches of government. At present, constitutional requirements of standing applicable to every federal court litigant are as follows:

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be "fairly trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision."⁵

As a general rule, the rules of standing preclude one party from litigating the claims of another.⁶ A Maine district court in Cassidy v. City of Brewer⁷ illustrated this point nicely. In this case, Dana Cassidy, a commercial building owner in Brewer, Maine, saw his property rezoned as a convenience business district, which did not allow churches as a permitted use. However, prior to the rezoning, Cassidy had leased part of the building to the Rock Church of Greater Bangor, Inc., to use for religious worship.⁸ As the congregation started to outgrow the space, it submitted a commercial building permit to the city for an expansion in 2012, but was denied because it amounted to an expansion of a nonconforming use. The church subsequently decided to terminate its tenancy and relocate. In turn, Cassidy filed suit under RLUIPA, alleging that the city caused him economic injury by violating the federal rights of a tenant.⁹

The court applied the ordinary third-party standing rules to the claim.¹⁰ While Cassidy successfully identified a personal economic injury, the action did not have any prospect of remediating anyone's religious exercise rights because the church already departed from the controversy and there was not another religious institution lined up to fill the space.¹¹ Thus, even though Cassidy's injury might be remedied, that relief would not address the church's injury.¹² Cassidy, furthermore, could not establish that anything stood in the way of the church filing suit on its own behalf.¹³ Though private landowners may challenge land use regulations under RLUIPA if their property is burdened by regulation, they must still demonstrate that their litigation, under RLUIPA, will advance third-party religious exercise rights and why that third party could not pursue its own rights under RLUIPA.¹⁴

In this vein, courts have repeatedly held that a party "must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties."¹⁵ As explained by the Supreme Court in Singleton v. Wulff.¹⁶

Federal courts must hesitate before resolving a controversy, even one within their constitutional power to resolve, on the basis of the rights of third persons not parties to the litigation. The reasons are two. First, the courts should not adjudicate such rights unnecessarily, and it may be that in fact the holders of those rights either do not wish to assert them, or will be able to enjoy them regardless of whether the in-court litigant is successful or not. Second, third parties themselves usually will be the best proponents of their own rights. The courts depend on effective advocacy, and therefore should prefer to construe legal rights only when the most effective advocates of those rights are before them. The holders of the rights may have a like preference, to the extent they will be bound by the courts' decisions under the doctrine of stare decisis.¹⁷

This rule is not absolute. There are exceptions where the party seeking third-party standing "has a 'close' relationship with the person who possesses the right" and "there is a...