I.W. v. Lake Forest High Sch. Dist. No. 115 & Ill. State Bd. of Educ.

I.W., a minor, by and through parents A.M.V. and D.W., Plaintiff, v. LAKE FOREST HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 115and ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendants.

No. 17 C 7426

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

February 7, 2019

Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer

MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION

I.W. is a teenage high school student with multiple disabilities that affect her educational, social, and psychological development. She resides with her parents within Lake Forest High School District No. 115 ("the District"). After she spent the 2014-15 school year attending Lake Forest High School, I.W.'s parents removed her from the school and placed her in a private residential high school in Massachusetts. They filed a due process complaint with the Illinois State Board of Education against the District in April 2016, arguing that the District had failed to provide I.W. with the "free appropriate public education" ("FAPE") required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A), and requesting reimbursement for two school years of private school tuition.

An independent hearing officer heard the complaint, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415, and concluded that the school had failed to provide I.W. a FAPE.¹ Defendant Lake Forest High School District No. 115 has not challenged that determination. The Hearing Officer also determined, however, that I.W.'s Parents were not entitled to reimbursement because they had not proven that the private school was an appropriate placement for I.W. (Final Determination and Order("I.H.O. Order") [23-1], at AR 281, 283.). I.W., by and through her parents, filed an appeal of that tuition reimbursement decision with this court. Plaintiffs and Defendant Lake Forest High School District No. 115 now cross-move for summary judgment solely on the issue of reimbursement.²

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard for summary judgment in an IDEA case differs from that of typical motions for summary judgment. M.B. ex rel. Berns v. Hamilton Se. Sch., 668 F.3d 851, 859 (7th Cir. 2011). Under the IDEA, "the district court 'shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.'" Evanston Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 65 v. Michael M., 356 F.3d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)). In cases like this one, where the parties have submitted no additional evidence, "[t]he motion for summary judgment is simply the procedural vehicle for asking the judge to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record." M.B. ex rel. Berns v. Hamilton Southeast Sch., 668 F.3d 851, 860 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (modification in original).

In reviewing the administrative record, the hearing officer's determinations of law are reviewed de novo. M.B., 668 F.3d at 860. See Marshall Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. C.D. ex rel. Brian D., 616 F.3d 632, 636 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that legal issues receive "plenary review"). The hearing officer's findings of fact are owed "due weight." M.B., 668 F.3d at 860. "This review is equivalent to a 'clear-error' or 'substantial-evidence' standard." M.B., 668 F.3d at 860. See Alex R., ex rel. Beth R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 221, 375 F.3d 603, 612(7th Cir. 2004) (noting that, when a district court "relies solely on the administrative record, it owes considerable deference to the hearing officer, and may set aside the administrative order only if it is 'strongly convinced that the order is erroneous'") (quoting School Dist. v. Z.S., 295 F.3d 671, 675 (7th Cir.2002)). At all times, "the party challenging the outcome of the administrative hearing bears the burden of persuasion in the district court." Marshall Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. C.D. ex rel. Brian D., 616 F.3d 632, 636 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Alex R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty Unit Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 603, 611 (7th Cir.2004)).

BACKGROUND

I. I.W.'s Early Life and Elementary School Experience

When she was three years old, I.W. was adopted by her mother and father ("Parents"). Shortly thereafter, she was diagnosed with "mixed receptive-expressive language disorder" and fetal alcohol exposure. (Df.'s Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("Df.'s SOF") [27], at ¶ 8.) At the age of seven, I.W. underwent a private psychological evaluation by Clinical Psychologist Dr. Rebecca Nelson ("2007 Report"). (Id. at ¶ 9; Pl.'s Statement of Facts Pursuant to Rule 56.1 ("Pl.'s SOF") [30], at ¶ 5. See 2007 Report [23-2], at AR 545.³) The Hearing Officer summarized Dr. Nelson's 2007 findings:

Dr. Nelson identified many clinically elevated levels of anxiety, decreased self-esteem, relatively less favorable social skills than peers, significant challenges in language-based problem solving, perceptual reasoning difficulties, and impaired working memory. Dr. Nelson found the Student to have relatively low cognitive ability and to be highly distractible. At that time Dr. Nelson found that the Student did not meet the clinical criteria for Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD").

(I.H.O. Order [23-1], at AR 267.) Dr. Nelson made several recommendations based on her findings, including "an IEP [Individualized Education Program⁴] or 504 plan[,] . . . a multitude of suggested accommodations and modifications," such as preferential seating and breaking down lengthier assignments, and "speech and language and social skills services." (Df.'s SOF [27] at ¶ 9. See Pl.'s SOF [30], at ¶¶ 5-6; 2007 Report [23-2], at AR 566-570 (listing all of Dr. Nelson's educational recommendations).)

At the end of I.W.'s fourth-grade year, clinical neuropsychologist Dr. Jo-Anne Hoeppner and psychoeducational diagnostician Dr. Dorit Raviv conducted second private psychological evaluation ("2010 Report"). (2010 Report [23-2], at AR 319.) By that time, I.W.'s child psychologist, Dr. Bloomberg, had diagnosed her with ADHD (inattentive subtype), and she was taking ADHD medication. (Pl.'s SOF [30], at ¶ 9; 2010 Report [23-2], at AR 326, 327.) The 2010 Report found that I.W. "demonstrated solidly average verbal and nonverbal reasoning as well as processing speed. This represents a significant improvement relative to the previous evaluation three years ago." (2010 Report [23-2], at AR 326.) The evaluators also found, however, that she had "some difficulties on working memory tasks that have a sequencing component," that her "deficits [were] still apparent in her weak vocabulary, difficulty with auditory sequencing and following directions," and that she had some trouble with math. (Id.) This Report again recommended, among other things, adding executive functioning goals to her IEP, providing her with a host of reading strategies, giving her repeated instructions accompanied by visuals, providing extra vocabulary support, and continuing speech and language services. (Id. at AR327-29.) The Hearing Officer found three recommendations from the Report to be particularly "noteworthy":

First, it was suggested that Language Arts instruction and speech and language therapy be coordinated for the Student. Second, assistive technology for written expression was recommended. Third, a multi-sensory sequential explicit math program that included, for example, visuals, manipulatives and practical examples was suggested.

(I.H.O. Order [23-1], at AR 267.)

Several other professionals began working with I.W. during her elementary school years. Ellen Kroft Apley ("Kroft"), an educational therapist, began working with I.W. before first grade, in July 2006. (Pl.'s SOF [30], at ¶ 7.) Speech and language pathologist Mara Lane has worked with I.W. since 2008, when she was in third grade. Dr. Bloomberg, the child psychiatrist mentioned above, also began working with I.W. while she was in third grade. (Id. at ¶ 9; Df.'s SOF [27], at ¶ 16.) Each of these individuals has continued to be involved with I.W. through the time of this case's filing.

At some point prior to the eighth grade, I.W. appears to have been placed on an IEP, as recommended by the 2007 Report. (See Document List [23-1], at AR 128 (noting the existence of a 2010 IEP).) A detailed discussion of I.W.'s past IEP's is not necessary to the resolution of the tuition reimbursement issue in this case.⁵ Some background on her early education is helpful,however. In 2011, I.W. was attending fifth grade at Deerpath School in Lake Forest. In the middle of that year, she was moved to a therapeutic day program called the Cove School, at least in part due her experiencing "significant anxiety and stress" at Deerpath.⁶ (Evaluation of IEP Data 1/5/2011 [23-3], at AR 753. See also Hearing Transcript [25-3], at 46:12-15 (Mother)⁷ (testifying that in December of fifth grade, I.W. was "out of her mind" and "would not go back to school" at Deerpath).) Near the end of seventh grade, I.W. moved back to Deerpath,⁸ where she remained through eighth grade. (Id.)

The administrative record contains two IEP documents from I.W.'s eighth grade year—the year before she entered Lake Forest High School. The first is an IEP conference document from early in I.W.'s eighth grade year, in September 2013. (IEP Conference Summary Report 9/23/2013 [23-3], at AR 740; Df.'s Cross-Response to Pl.'s SOF [32], at ¶ 12.) The Hearing Officer noted that "there are no participants' signatures" for that conference, "so it is unclear whether a meeting was even held." (I.H.O. Order [23-1], at AR 268, 276.) Another IEP conference was documented in February 2014. (IEP Conference Summary Report 2/7/14 [23-2], at AR 527.) That document lists the names of participants, but again contains no signatures (id. at 268), and I.W.'s mother testified that she did not attend that meeting. (Hearing Transcript [23-6], at 362:20-23 (Mother).) The Hearing Officer concluded...