Iannarelli v. Young, 28151

904 N.W.2d 82

Michael A. IANNARELLI, Petitioner and Appellant,

v.Darin YOUNG, Warden of the South Dakota State Penitentiary, Respondent and Appellee.

28151

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS ON AUGUST 28, 2017

OPINION FILED November 8, 2017

Rehearing Denied December 22, 2017

DONALD M. McCARTY, BENJAMIN KLEINJAN, Helsper, McCarty & Rasmussen, PC, Brookings, South Dakota, Attorneys for petitioner and appellant.

MARTY J. JACKLEY, Attorney General, JOHN M. STROHMAN, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for respondent and appellee.

WILBUR, Retired Justice

[¶1.] Habeas petitioner asserts denial of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We affirm.

Background

[¶2.] On February 16, 2007, Michael Iannarelli murdered his disabled wife and raped his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter. Afterwards, he made a pot of coffee and called 911. Iannarelli told law enforcement that he had killed his wife. The State charged Iannarelli with first-degree murder and second-degree rape. The State indicated that it intended to seek the death penalty.

[¶3.] The circuit court appointed Attorney Roger Ellyson to represent Iannarelli. Attorney Ellyson had practiced law for over thirty years, including twenty years as a prosecutor. Attorney Ellyson informed Iannarelli of his rights and had him sign a document titled, "STATEMENT OF RIGHTS." That document provided, in part, that if Iannarelli were to plead guilty he would waive certain rights, including "the right to not be compelled to incriminate yourself."

[¶4.] Attorney Ellyson later testified that he explored the plausibility of an insanity defense. He moved the court to appoint an expert witness to conduct a psychiatric examination. The court granted the motion, and Attorney Ellyson hired Dr. Stephen Manlove, a forensic psychiatrist. Attorney Ellyson believed Dr. Manlove could identify mitigating factors if the insanity defense seemed unlikely. He asked Dr. Manlove to give an expert opinion on whether "Iannarelli was insane (as that term is defined by statute) at the time the alleged offenses (murder and rape) were committed" and whether Iannarelli "suffered from mental illness at the time the alleged offenses were committed."

[¶5.] After Dr. Manlove issued his report, Attorney Ellyson realized that it would not support an insanity defense but would support a plea of guilty but mentally ill. In the report, Dr. Manlove had opined with reasonable medical certainty that Iannarelli suffered from a major depressive disorder that impaired his judgment at the time of the offense. Attorney Ellyson also believed that Dr. Manlove's report contained mitigating evidence. He advised Iannarelli that an insanity defense would be unlikely and discussed a plea of guilty but mentally ill. Iannarelli has an IQ in the 99th percentile, and at all times Attorney Ellyson believed Iannarelli understood what was being told to him.

[¶6.] Ultimately, Iannarelli agreed to plead guilty but mentally ill to first-degree manslaughter and to second-degree rape in exchange for the State amending the charge and not seeking the death penalty. Iannarelli entered into a written plea agreement, which contained a section titled, "WAIVER OF RIGHTS." In that waiver, Iannarelli indicated that he "fully understand[s] that by entry of the pleas of guilty BUT MENTALLY ILL herein, he will have waived ... his right to remain silent[.]" The parties submitted the plea agreement to the circuit court. Iannarelli also submitted an affidavit and report from Dr. Manlove in lieu of a factual basis to establish his plea of guilty but mentally ill.

[¶7.] On October 11, 2007, the court held a plea hearing. At the hearing, Iannarelli indicated his intent to plead guilty but mentally ill. The court took a recess and reconvened for a hearing on Iannarelli's mental health. The State and Iannarelli stipulated to the submission of Dr. Manlove's report as evidence of Iannarelli's mental health. The court reviewed the report and found that Iannarelli was mentally ill at the time of the offenses as defined in SDCL 22–1–2(24). The court also found a factual basis for each plea and concluded that Iannarelli's guilty but mentally ill pleas were voluntary, intelligent, and knowing. The court accepted Iannarelli's plea of guilty but mentally ill to first-degree manslaughter and second-degree rape.

[¶8.] The court ordered Iannarelli to participate in a presentence investigation. The court indicated that as part of that presentence investigation and in consultation with the court services officer, it would request a psychological evaluation to assist in sentencing. In response to a question by the State, the court agreed that the psychological evaluation would include a psychosexual evaluation.

[¶9.] Dr. Bradley Woldt, a clinical psychologist, evaluated Iannarelli. Dr. Woldt went through an informed-consent form with Iannarelli prior to the evaluation. Dr. Woldt later testified that Iannarelli indicated that he understood the form. Dr. Woldt conducted a mental-health assessment and psychosexual examination. Following the evaluation, Dr. Woldt issued a written opinion on Iannarelli's diagnosis and likelihood of rehabilitation. He also included a risk assessment. Dr. Woldt agreed with Dr. Manlove that Iannarelli suffered from a major depressive disorder and was likely experiencing a major depressive episode at the time of the offense but disagreed that it was to the level of "severe with psychotic features," as Dr. Manlove had opined. In Dr. Woldt's opinion, Iannarelli posed a high risk to the community, and rehabilitation efforts would be lengthy and difficult. Dr. Woldt's report was made part of the presentence investigation report.

[¶10.] On December 21, 2007, the circuit court held a sentencing hearing. The State referred to Dr. Woldt's report as support for imposition of the maximum possible sentences for Iannarelli's crimes. Attorney Ellyson relied on Dr. Manlove's report and argued for sentences less than the maximum. After hearing arguments from counsel and one victim-impact statement, the court imposed a 130–year sentence for first-degree manslaughter and a 45–year sentence for second-degree rape.

[¶11.] The court relied on the record evidence, including Dr. Manlove's and Dr. Woldt's reports. The court found Iannarelli's lack of previous criminal history and his mental illness to be mitigating factors.

The court then noted the extremely violent nature of the crimes. In regard to Iannarelli's future risk to the public, the court referred to Dr. Woldt's opinion that Iannarelli is "a high risk to the public." The court also considered Iannarelli's prospects for rehabilitation. It referred to Iannarelli's diagnoses from Dr. Woldt and Dr. Manlove, as well as the other record evidence. In particular, the court noted that "Dr. Woldt expresses the opinion that your prognosis is not good. You are likely not to be amenable to treatment. And prognosis is questionable at best. He also expresses the opinion that your rehabilitation will be lengthy and difficult. All of that, of course, would indicate to the [c]ourt that a substantial sentence is warranted here."

[¶12.] Iannarelli appealed his sentences, which we affirmed in State v. Iannarelli, 2008 S.D. 121, 759 N.W.2d 122. On October 23, 2013, Iannarelli petitioned the circuit court for habeas relief. The habeas court appointed counsel and held a hearing on April 29, 2016. Iannarelli argued that Attorney Ellyson had deprived him of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by failing to challenge the use of Iannarelli's unwarned and compelled statements to Dr. Woldt and because the sentencing court used those statements to impose its sentence. Iannarelli also asserted that he was denied effective assistance of counsel and due process when Attorney Ellyson failed to seek provisional institutionalization under SDCL 23A–27–42.

[¶13.] Following the hearing, the habeas court issued a memorandum decision. It held that Iannarelli failed to prove that Attorney Ellyson's legal representation was deficient. It noted that Attorney Ellyson had advised Iannarelli of his constitutional and statutory rights during the pre-trial and plea-agreement phases. The habeas court declined "to act as a Monday morning quarterback and second-guess Mr. Ellyson's every decision through the application of a ‘super lawyer’ standard."

[¶14.] The habeas court also declined to strictly follow a case from Idaho, which held that counsel's failure to inform defendant of his right to remain silent during a psychosexual examination constituted prejudicial error. See Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833, 839 (2006). Instead, the habeas court examined the circumstances to determine whether Iannarelli established serious prejudice such that any error by Attorney Ellyson deprived Iannarelli of fair proceedings. In regard to the reports issued by Dr. Manlove and Dr. Woldt, the habeas court determined that "there has been no showing that either of these reports, regardless of their propriety, created a serious prejudice against" Iannarelli. In the habeas court's view, any objection by Attorney Ellyson to Dr. Woldt's report would have failed because a sentencing court may consider a broad range of evidence. The habeas court further highlighted that Iannarelli put his mental health at issue as "a strategy necessary to secure the court's acceptance of a guilty but mentally ill plea." The habeas court concluded, therefore, that even if Attorney Ellyson should have advised Iannarelli of his right to remain silent, Iannarelli failed to establish prejudice.

[¶15.] On Iannarelli's claim that he was entitled to provisional institutionalization under SDCL 23A–27–42, the habeas court disagreed, relying on SDCL 23A–27–38. Under SDCL 23A–27–38, Iannarelli had the right to receive mental health treatment (i.e., treatment in an institution) if his symptoms of mental illness warranted treatment....