Ibrhim v. Abdelhoq

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KHOLOUD IBRHIM, Plaintiff, v. ROBBIE MUHAMMAD ABDELHOQ, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:22-cv-01260-DAC

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Western Division

July 24, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

DARRELL A. CLAY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Introduction

This is an action for immigration financial support under 8 U.S.C § 1183a by Plaintiff Kholoud Ibrhim against Defendants Robbie Abdelhoq (her ex-husband) and his parents Muhammad and Chafica Abdelhoq.^[1] Ms. Ibrhim seeks support based on the documents the Abdelhoqs submitted to the federal government when Ms. Ibrhim immigrated to the United States. (ECF #1 at PageID 2). The Abdelhoqs deny they breached their support obligations and raise several affirmative defenses. (ECF #17). All parties consented to my exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (ECF #28).

Before me is Ms. Ibrhim's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings seeking judgment in her favor on all affirmative defenses the Abdelhoqs assert. (ECF #34). For the reasons that follow, I GRANT Ms. Ibrhim's motion.

Background

Ms Ibrhim and Robbie married in 2012. (ECF #1 at PageID 10). Ms Ibrhim is a citizen of Palestine now residing in the United States. (Id. at PageID 4). Robbie is a United States citizen. (Id.). In April 2012, Robbie filed a petition for a family-based immigrant visa so Ms. Ibrhim could become a United States permanent resident. (Id. at PageID 11).

Federal immigration law forbids admission to the United States of any alien who “is likely at any time to become a public charge.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A); see also id. § 1601(2)(A)(5). But an applicant for a family-based immigrant visa can overcome public-charge inadmissibility by having a person execute an affidavit of support to sponsor the immigrant. See 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(a), (b); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(C)(ii). By executing the affidavit, the sponsor agrees to provide support to maintain the sponsored immigrant at an annual income that is not less than 125% of the federal poverty line during the period in which the affidavit is enforceable. 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1)(A). As a part of sponsoring Ms. Ibrhim's immigration to the United States, Robbie executed an affidavit of support promising to financially support her. (ECF #1-1 at PageID 29).

To serve as a sponsor, a person must meet certain minimum income requirements. 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(f)(1). Where a potential sponsor cannot meet those requirements, a “joint sponsor” may execute an additional affidavit of support and accept joint and several liability with the sponsor for the obligations of the affidavit of support. Id. § 1183a(f)(5)(A). Because Robbie did not meet the income requirements to serve as a sponsor by himself, his father Muhammad also executed an affidavit of support as a joint sponsor of Ms. Ibrhim. (ECF #1-2 at PageID 38).

Additionally, a sponsor may rely on the income of a household member if that household member executes a “household-member contract,” agreeing to assist the sponsor with meeting the financial obligations of the affidavit of support. 8 C.F.R. § 213a(c)(2)(i)(C)(1)(2). To that end, Chafica (Muhammad's spouse) also executed a household-member contract, agreeing to support Muhammad's joint-sponsor obligations. (ECF #1-3 at PageID 47).

Discussion

A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) “is granted when no material issue of fact exists and the party making the motion is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Paskvan v. City of Cleveland Civil Serv. Comm'n, 946 F.2d 1233, 1235 (6th Cir. 1991). Ms. Ibrhim does not seek judgment on the pleadings as to her claims, but rather seeks judgment as to the Abdelhoqs' affirmative defenses, or in the alternative, to strike any deficient defenses under Rule 12(f). (ECF #34 at PageID 317). Where a plaintiff seeks judgment on the pleadings as to a defendant's affirmative defenses, courts look to see if the defendant's answer raises issues of fact or an affirmative defense, which, if proved, would defeat plaintiff's recovery. See Qwest Communications Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 208 F.R.D 288, 291 (N.D.Cal. 2002) (plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings can be granted only if all affirmative defenses raised in answer are legally insufficient); Lee v. Robinson, Raegan & Young, PLLC, No. 3:14-CV-0748, 2015 WL 328323, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 26, 2015).

In evaluating a Rule 12(c) motion, all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007). But a court need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. Id. Additionally, the court may consider documents attached to and referenced in the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion without converting the motion into a motion for summary judgment. Barany-Snyder v. Werner, 539 F.3d 327, 333 (6th Cir.2008).

The Abdelhoqs' joint answer raised nine affirmative defenses: (1) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (2) the earlier divorce judgment precludes this claim, (3) statutory non-compliance, (4) failure to mitigate damages, (5) lack of condition precedent or condition subsequent, (6) lack of consideration, (7) laches, (8) unjust enrichment, and (9) performance of duties. (ECF #17 at PageID 203-04). Ms. Ibrhim argues she is entitled to judgment in her favor on all affirmative defenses for four reasons: (i) defenses 1, 2, 5, 6, and 8 do not meet the required pleading standard; (ii) defenses 1 and 3 are wrong; (iii) federal law bars sponsors from raising common-law defenses to contracts such as defenses 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 in actions to enforce an affidavit of support; and (iv) defense 9 is a denial of liability, not an affirmative defense. (See ECF #34 at PageID 316).

I. The failure-to-state-a-claim defense fails because the Court previously held Ms. Ibrhim has made out a federal cause of action.

The Abdelhoqs' first affirmative defense is that Ibrhim “has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” (ECF #17 at PageID 203). But before the parties consented to my jurisdiction, the previously assigned District Judge already decided the issue of whether Ms. Ibrhim has stated a cognizable cause of action. In his June 6, 2023 order addressing subject-matter jurisdiction, Judge Zouhary held “that Section 1183a ‘creates a federal cause of action so that ‘the sponsored alien, the Federal Government, [or] any State' may enforce a support Affidavit against a sponsor. This federal cause of action gives the sponsored immigrant enforcement rights that he would not necessarily have under contract law.'” Ibrhim v. Abdelhoq, 676 F.Supp.3d 575, 579 (N.D. Ohio 2023) (citations omitted). To plead such an action, Ms. Ibrhim must allege she was the beneficiary of an executed affidavit of support (or household-member contract) and the sponsor failed to maintain her income at not less than 125% of the federal poverty line for her household size. See Mao v. Bright, 645 F.Supp.3d 805, 813 (S.D. Ohio 2022) (articulating the elements of the claim in the context of a preliminary injunction). Ms. Ibrhim has alleged each of these elements in her complaint and attached to the complaint the affidavits of support and the household-member contract executed by the Abdelhoqs. (ECF #1 at PageID 22-25; ECF #1-1, ECF #1-2, ECF #1-3).

Consequently, Ms. Ibrhim has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Abdelhoqs' first affirmative defense asserting that no such claim has been stated.

II. The defenses of failure to mitigate damages, lack of condition precedent or condition subsequent, lack of consideration, laches, and unjust enrichment are barred in this case.

Second, Ms. Ibrhim argues that common-law defenses to a contract are not available to a defendant in an action to enforce an affidavit of support. (ECF #34 at PageID 321). Specifically, Ms. Ibrhim argues the Abdelhoqs' affirmative defenses of failure to mitigate damages, lack of a condition precedent or condition subsequent, lack of consideration, laches, and unjust enrichment are unavailable to sponsors. (Id. at PageID 325-26).

While such an action alleges a breach of a contract, three different circuit courts have held that traditional common-law contract defenses are largely unavailable in the context of an alleged breach of an affidavit of support. See Belevich v. Thomas, 17 F.4th 1048, 1050-51 (11th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 2754 (2022); Erler v. Erler, 824 F.3d 1173, 1177-80 (9th Cir. 2016); Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418, 422-23 (7th Cir. 2012), as amended (July 27, 2012). In those cases the courts each held common-law defenses are unavailable where those defenses undermine the purpose of the federal statute by rendering it more likely for a sponsored immigrant to be a public charge or by encouraging sponsors to enter affidavits of support incautiously. See Belevich, 17 F.4th at 105254; Erler, 824 F.3d at 1179; Liu, 686 F.3d at 421-23. Although the Sixth Circuit has not addressed whether traditional common-law defenses to a contract are available in actions to enforce an affidavit of support, at least one other district court in this circuit has applied those cases to bar such defenses. Mao, 645 F.Supp.3d at 810-11 (applying the rationale in Erler and Liu to reject a sponsor's argument that a sponsored immigrant's waiver of spousal support in a divorce action bars enforcement of an affidavit of support). I see no reason to depart from this body of law in evaluating...