Ickenroth v. Parkway Sch. Dist. C-2

612 S.W.3d 247

Vanessa ICKENROTH, Appellant,

v.PARKWAY SCHOOL DISTRICT C-2, Respondent.

No. ED 108820

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION FOUR.

Filed: November 17, 2020

FOR APPELLANT: Charles R. Dickman, Charlie Dickman Law, LLC, 4427 Osage Beach Parkway, Suite A900, Osage Beach, Missouri 65065, Sarah H. Hale, Marglous Law Firm, 7711 Bonhomme Avenue, Suite 300, Clayton, Missouri 63105.

FOR RESPONDENT: Margaret A. Hesse, Mandi D. Moutray, Tueth, Keeney, Cooper, Mohan & Jackstadt, P.C., 34 North Meramec Avenue, Suite 600, St. Louis, Missouri 63105.

Philip M. Hess, Judge

Introduction

Vanessa Ickenroth ("Ickenroth") appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Parkway School District C-2 ("the District") on her claim of age discrimination under the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Section 213.010, RSMo (2014)¹ et seq. She argues the District was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether her age was a contributing factor in the District's alleged harassment of her. She also argues the trial court erred by assessing costs against her because it did not find her claim was without foundation. The evidence before us raises no genuine issues of material fact and Ickenroth has failed to adduce sufficient evidence allowing a jury to find all essential elements of her age discrimination claim. However, we find the trial court erred by assessing costs against Ickenroth without finding her claim was without foundation. The trial court's judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and modified under Rule 84.14.²

Factual Background³

The District hired Ickenroth as a school bus driver in 1998. As a school bus driver, Ickenroth provided transportation services to school-aged resident students in the District. During the 2014-2015 school year, Ickenroth was fifty-nine years old. In November 2014, a school bus route with "a reputation for rowdy students" became available. The District allowed school bus drivers to request changes in their routes mid-year in order of seniority. Ickenroth requested, and was selected for, transfer to the newly-available route. After she transferred routes, Ickenroth experienced many instances of student misbehavior. Several students refused to remain sitting on the school bus and threatened and harassed Ickenroth while she was driving. The students used "disparaging words" that Ickenroth believed "indicated they considered [her] race as a catalyst for the[ir] behavior and threats."

Ickenroth filed multiple safety violation reports between November 2014 and February 2015 with the District to report the student misbehavior. Although the District responded to each safety violation report Ickenroth filed, Ickenroth believed her route remained dangerous. In December 2014, an Assistant Principal boarded the school bus and told the students to "calm down." Ickenroth requested to see footage from the video camera installed on the school bus on several occasions, but she was always told by her supervisor the footage was unavailable. In early March 2015, the District removed several misbehaving students from Ickenroth's route. Ickenroth's supervisor told her to "offer the kids an olive branch." Ickenroth believed her supervisor's statement was based on an "ageist stereotype" that suggests she "was simply unable to handle the children because of her age."

Ickenroth believed the District ignored her reports of student misbehavior to force her to quit so the District could replace her with a younger driver it could pay less, since the District paid school bus drivers based on their years of experience and the number of years they worked for the District. Ickenroth recalled the Director of Transportation once asked school bus drivers if they had any ideas for ways the Transportation Department could save money, although she could not recall if the Director of Transportation made this inquiry during the 2014-2015 school year. The Director of Transportation for the District never indicated the District wanted to remove or replace older school bus drivers to cut transportation costs. Compared to the 2013-2014 school year, the District increased its spending budget for the Transportation Department for the 2014-2015 school year. The Transportation Department was not fully staffed and actively recruiting additional school bus drivers during the 2014-2015 school year.

Ickenroth can identify no employees in the Transportation Department that she believes were treated better than her because of their age. No one at the District ever made a comment or statement regarding Ickenroth's age. Other than filing this lawsuit, Ickenroth never told the District she was being harassed because of her age at work.

Ickenroth's compensation, benefits, and hours of work were not reduced and her job duties did not change during or after the time she experienced student misbehavior on her route during the 2014-2015 school year. Ickenroth received every raise owed to her each year following the 2014-2015 school year. Ickenroth received a positive performance evaluation for the 2014-2015 school year. Ickenroth continued driving the route for the remainder of the 2014-2015 school year, although one "leg" of the route was removed. Ickenroth requested, and was selected for, the same route the next school year. Had Ickenroth resigned as a school bus driver during the 2014-2015 school year, the District could have replaced her with another school bus driver who had "a) no prior experience driving a school bus; b) less experience than [Ickenroth] driving a school bus; c) the same experience as [Ickenroth] driving a school bus; or d) more experience than [Ickenroth] driving a school bus."

Ickenroth continued her employment as a school bus driver with the District until her resignation effective January 31, 2020. Ickenroth maintains she would have continued working for the District until she reached seventy years old but for the District's alleged discrimination against her during the 2014-2015 school year.

Procedural Background

Ickenroth filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights ("MCHR") against the District on June 5, 2015, alleging the District discriminated against her because of her "race, color, and age." On March 29, 2016, the MCHR issued Ickenroth a "notice of right to sue" letter under section 213.111 of the MHRA. On May 17, 2019, Ickenroth filed her First Amended Petition against the District, alleging the District engaged in unlawful age discrimination against her by "allow[ing] serious student misconduct and a dangerous workplace to persist unabated for several months on [her] school bus, despite [her] persistent pleas for help" in violation of section 213.055 of the MHRA.⁴ She alleged the District ignored her "repeated reports of student misbehavior and bus safety concerns ... [in an] attempt to force [her] to quit so [the District] could replace [her] with a younger, less experienced driver, thereby further saving transportation costs." On December 19, 2019, the District moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.

This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

Our review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment "is essentially de novo. " ITT Comm. Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp. , 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). We review "the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered." Id. Any facts set forth in support of a moving party's motion for summary judgment are considered true unless contradicted by the non-moving party's response to the summary judgment motion. Id. We grant the non-moving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record. Id. After reviewing the evidence in this manner, we will only affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment if (1) there is no genuine dispute as to the material facts on which the movant is relying for summary judgment; and (2) based on those undisputed facts, the Movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 381 ; see also Harpagon MO, LLC v. Bosch , 370 S.W.3d 579, 582 (Mo. banc 2012).

Where, as here, the movant is a defending party, summary judgment can be established by showing: (1) undisputed facts that negate any one of the plaintiff's required proof elements; (2) the plaintiff, after an adequate period of discovery, has not produced and will not be able to produce evidence sufficient to allow the trier of fact to find the existence of one or more of the plaintiff's proof elements; or (3) there is no genuine dispute as to the existence of the facts necessary to prove the movant's properly pleaded affirmative defense. ITT Comm. Fin. Corp. , 854 S.W.2d at 381 ; see also Childress Painting & Assoc., Inc. v. John Q. Hammons Hotels Two, L.P. , 106 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003).

"[I]n considering summary judgment on an MHRA claim, the Court ‘must determine whether the record shows two plausible, but contradictory, accounts of the essential facts and the "genuine issue" in the case is real, not merely argumentative, imaginary, or frivolous.’ " Kerr v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo. , 512 S.W.3d 798, 805 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (quoting Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights , 231 S.W.3d 814, 820 (Mo. banc 2007) ). "Summary judgment should not be granted unless evidence could not support any reasonable inference for the non-movant." Id.

Discussion

Point I: Age Discrimination Claim

Ickenroth challenges the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the District on her claim of age discrimination under the MHRA. The MHRA prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual regarding "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... age...." § 213.055.1(1)(a). In her first point, Ickenroth argues the trial court erred by granting summary judgment for the District on her age discrimination claim because genuine issues of material fact...