Idaho State Appellate Pub. Defender v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court

540 P.3d 311

In re: Verified Petition for a Writ of Mandamus

IDAHO STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER, Petitioner,

v.FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, County of Ada; Honorable Cheri C. Copsey, District Judge, Respondents,andAda County Prosecuting Attorney, Intervenor-Respondent.

Docket No. 50987

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, September 2023 Term.

Opinion filed: December 18, 2023

Eric R. Lehtinen, Interim State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for Petitioner. Eric Don Fredericksen argued.

Smith & Malek, PLLC, Boise, for Respondents. Kolby K. Reddish argued.

Jan M. Bennetts, Ada County Prosecuting Attorney, Boise, for Intervenor-Respondent. Jill Longhurst argued.

MOELLER, Justice.

The Idaho State Appellate Public Defender has filed a direct action with this Court seeking to invoke our original jurisdiction so that a writ of mandamus may issue against the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho and Cheri C. Copsey, Senior District Judge. Judge Copsey is the presiding judge in Abdullah v. State , No. CV-01-22-9520 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Ada County 2022), a post-conviction proceeding in Ada County. When Eric Don Fredericksen, the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender¹ (the "SAPD"), concluded that a conflict of interest precluded him from continuing to represent Azad Abdullah ("Abdullah"), he attempted to furnish a new attorney for Abdullah from the Federal Defender's Office in Pennsylvania. The new attorney, Eric Montroy, had been previously appointed to represent Abdullah in his habeas corpus proceeding in federal court. Judge Copsey refused to appoint Montroy, maintaining that he also had a conflict of interest, and stated that she would not appoint an out-of-state attorney. She then removed the SAPD from the case and appointed a new attorney of her own choosing.

Relying on Idaho Code section 19-5906, the SAPD asserts that the Idaho Code "unambiguously vests the SAPD with the duty and authority to arrange for counsel for indigent clients" due to a conflict of interest or for any other reason. The SAPD asks this Court to issue a writ of mandamus to Judge Copsey and the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho to remedy what it views as an infringement of his statutory grant of authority. Additionally, he asks us to issue a writ of mandamus to the Fourth Judicial District for the removal of Judge Copsey as the presiding judge over Abdullah's postconviction action. The Fourth Judicial District and Judge Copsey ("Respondents") oppose the petition. The Ada County Prosecutor ("the ACP") moved to intervene in this action, which was conditionally granted by this Court. The ACP opposes the petition for writ of mandamus, arguing that the SAPD does not have standing to bring this action and that Judge Copsey should remain as the presiding judge in the post-conviction proceeding before the district court.

For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the SAPD (1) has properly invoked our original jurisdiction under the Idaho Constitution, and (2) is entitled to the extraordinary relief he is seeking.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This original action asks us to determine the scope of the SAPD's authority under Idaho law to furnish substitute counsel for indigent defendants when a conflict of interest occurs. It arises out of the Office of the SAPD's representation of Abdullah² in his state post-conviction proceeding and the presiding district judge's view that a potential conflict of interest may arise with the substitute counsel the SAPD attempted to provide.

When the SAPD acknowledged his office's conflict of interest in the continued representation of Abdullah, he furnished the name of Eric Montroy, to replace his office in the case. Montroy is an experienced federal public defender from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, who is already representing Abdullah in a parallel federal habeas corpus action in Idaho. When Montroy's name was first mentioned as substitute counsel at a status conference in September 2022, the district court sua sponte raised concerns about having the same attorney or firm represent Abdullah in the state post-conviction proceeding as is currently representing him in the federal habeas corpus proceeding. Specifically, the district court noted:

I just will tell everyone, I decided to have a conference because I read [the SAPD's] filing where he was indicating that he wanted to bring in the federal public defender. I have some concerns about that. I'm not the first judge, I'm sure, that you've heard that from.

Can – so I don't know what the State's position is. So I'll let the State tell me what their position is. But I'm putting it out there for all of you that I have some concerns about appointing [Eric Montroy and the Federal Community Defender for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania] to represent him in the state court action.

After the State addressed potential financial concerns relating to how payment would be structured, the district court clarified the nature of its concerns:

[Judge Copsey]: Mr. Fredrickson, I have bigger concerns than that. ... Not only am I concerned about the financial issue and who is paying who, my big concern is Mr. Abdullah has a statutory right to post-conviction counsel, unlike your traditional post-conviction case. He also, therefore, even though he doesn't have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but once he has a statutory right, he has a Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free.

I think my reputation probably proceeds me, but I'm very concerned about conflict. And in addition to what I believe has to happen, which is that the federal public defender would have to have the permission of the presiding judge, I'm more concerned about the fact that in the federal habeas case one of the things they're going to be doing would be to review what exactly happened in the state case. And I see it as a direct conflict of interest. It seems to me they would be presented with sort of a dilemma: What do we pursue in state court? How is that potentially going to affect what happens in federal court? And I think the purpose behind the original Rule 44.3 –

[The State]: Two.

[Judge Copsey]: – .2, I think the whole purpose behind it is to make sure that those people in the death penalty case are represented by counsel who can bring – have the complete ability to bring any case they want. So allay my fears.

The SAPD responded, recognizing that "[t]he SAPD definitely has a conflict." However, the SAPD also explained the difficulty in finding substitute representation for Abdullah: "The struggle we have with Mr. Abdullah's case is it seems like anybody who has ever done capital representation in the state of Idaho has touched this case at one point or another."

After a colloquy about previous attorneys who were no longer available to represent Abdullah, the district court returned to its concern over having the same lawyer represent Abdullah in both the state and federal proceedings. The SAPD explained that, in his view, it was not a conflict of interest for the Federal Community Defender for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (the "FCD") to represent Abdullah in both cases. This explanation did not alleviate the district court's concerns as it continued its discussion with the SAPD:

But there is [a conflict of interest] because everything they do here is going to be under the microscope in the federal case. And so you can't have -- they're going to be faced with a real ethical dilemma. Not suggesting that they -- that it would affect them, but at least the appearance is there, either affect how they represent him in the state case or affect how they represent him in the federal case. In the death penalty case, I don't intend to go down that path.

So in my view, unless you can show me that the presiding judge -- first place, that would be your first problem -- approves the representation, unless you can show me that, we're definitely not going there. But you're also going to have to show me how we can avoid the conflict of interest.

And since -- and I'm not as concerned about the timing, frankly, because we now -- the 42 days has been met. You raised it. I'm not -- to me, it sounds pretty much like this is a legal issue. You have to address the legal issue before you even get to any additional issues. The State has filed their motion. So I just don't see this.

And I'll just make the observation that I'm aware that these same issues are being currently presented in a number of cases. I know of the Robin Row case. I presume this is going to be argued in more than just the Robin Row case and presented. So it's mostly -- I think the initial issue is a legal issue.

The SAPD then asked to continue the stay of proceedings until the SAPD could arrange for different counsel for Abdullah. Additionally, the SAPD asked that the FCD be allowed to make any filings necessary to address the purported conflict of interest and expressed concerns about the propriety of the Office of the SAPD making any filings given its present conflict. The district court interjected and informed the SAPD that it would not let the FCD "in at this point." Focusing on the conflict between the federal and state post-conviction proceedings, the court reiterated its concerns, making clear that: "[u]nless somebody can convince me there is no conflict, they're not going to get appointed." At this point, the SAPD explained that this placed his office in a difficult position: "Your Honor, the dilemma I would have is our office can't make those filings because we have a clear conflict of interest."

The discussion then turned to procedure. The SAPD inquired whether the district court could take up the issue of whether there is a conflict with the new attorney. The district court explained that it "assume[d] the SAPD would screen people for conflicts[,]" and reiterated its position that it was "not allowing the [FCD] to come in unless you can show me there is no conflict, and I don't think you can do that." At an impasse, the court...