Idlibi v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Health

1

AMMAR IDLIBI, Plaintiff, v. CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH et al., Defendants.

No. 3:23-cv-353 (JAM)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

March 4, 2024

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

Jeffrey Alker Meyer United States District Judge.

Ammar Idlibi is a dentist. He has filed a pro se complaint against the Connecticut Department of Public Health (the “Department”), the Connecticut State Dental Commission (the “Commission”), and five individual defendants: Steven Reiss, Deborah Dodenhof Anatoliy Ravin, David Tilles, and Olinda Morales. He claims they violated his rights stemming from professional discipline proceedings. Because Idlibi does not allege plausible grounds for relief, I will grant the defendants' motion to dismiss.

Background

I take the facts as stated in Idlibi's amended complaint and corresponding exhibits as true for the purposes of this ruling. Idlibi is a Connecticut licensed board-certified pediatric dentist.^[1]In April 2016, he saw a three-year-old patient for treatment related to cavities.^[2] Idlibi placed stainless steel crowns on eight of the patient's teeth.^[3] The patient's mother filed a complaint against Idlibi with the Department.^[4]

The Department filed a statement of charges with the Commission alleging that Idlibi's license was subject to disciplinary action pursuant to Connecticut General Statute § 20-114(a) for failing to meet the standard of care in six ways.^[5] The Commission appointed Reiss, Dodenhoff, and Ravin as a panel to convene a hearing in January 2018.^[6] Tilles and Morales, both Department attorneys, participated in the disciplinary proceeding; Tilles prosecuted the charges, and Morales provided the panel with legal counsel.^[7] During the course of the hearing, the Department and Idlibi provided argument, presented evidence, and conducted cross-examination.^[8]

The Commission panel drafted a proposed final decision, which the Commission reviewed prior to issuing a memorandum of decision in September 2018, finding that the Department had proven five of the charges.^[9] The Commission issued a reprimand, placed Idlibi's license on probation for three years, and ordered him to pay a civil penalty of $10,000, to complete coursework, and to engage a practice supervisor.^[10]

Idlibi appealed the decision to the Connecticut Superior Court.^[11] After a remand for clarification, the Commission revised its earlier finding to conclude that the Department had proven three of the charges, and then the state court dismissed the appeal.^[12]

In February 2019, while the appeal was pending in state court, the Department filed a statement of charges and moved for summary suspension of Idlibi's license for failure to comply with the Commission's September 2018 order.^[13] The Commission granted the suspension but ultimately lifted it in April 2019 in response to Idlibi's motion.^[14]

After holding a hearing, the Commission issued another memorandum of decision in September 2019, finding that Idlibi had failed to comply with its September 2018 order.^[15] As a result, the Commission issued a reprimand and ordered the probation period to begin to run from April 2019.^[16] Idlibi again appealed to the Connecticut Superior Court, which dismissed the petition.^[17]

Following the Commission's issuance of a final decision, the Connecticut Superior Court issued another decision in 2020 dismissing Idlibi's appeal. This decision in turn was affirmed by the Connecticut Appellate Court, and the Connecticut Supreme Court denied certification. See Idlibi v. Conn. State Dental Comm'n, 2020 WL 6712454 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2020), aff'd, 212 Conn.App. 501, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 904 (2022).

In particular, the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed the determination that Idlibi had failed to obtain the mother's consent before installing eight crowns on the teeth of a three-year-old child, and it affirmed the discipline imposed. See Idlibi, 212 Conn.App. at 524-28. It likewise affirmed the Commission's determination that Idlibi had failed to chart caries and decalcifications in violation of the standard of care. Id. at 528-30.

Idlibi argued to the Connecticut Appellate Court that the proceedings before the Commission had not been fundamentally fair. But the Appellate Court declined to review the claim, because Idlibi failed to preserve any constitutional challenge. Id. at 531. The Appellate Court noted as well that Idlibi had argued “in conclusory fashion that his constitutional right to fundamental fairness was violated” but that “his claim, essentially, is another challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding that he deviated from the standard of care” and that he “failed to explain what part of the proceedings allegedly constituted a violation of any constitutional right,” so that “the claim is inadequately briefed and we decline to review it.” Ibid.

On March 21, 2023, Idlibi filed this federal lawsuit against the Department, the Commission, and the five individual defendants in their official and individual capacities.^[18] His amended complaint includes numerous federal and state law claims. He primarily alleges pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the defendants violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.^[19] He further alleges that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to violate his right to equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). In addition, he alleges federal statutory violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), as well as violations of Titles V, VI, and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Lastly he alleges several state law claims for malicious prosecution, negligence, recklessness, conspiracy, abuse of process, tortious interference with business expectancies, fraudulent concealment, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.^[20] The defendants have moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).^[21]

Discussion

The standard that governs a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) is well established. A complaint may not survive unless it alleges facts that taken as true give rise to plausible grounds to sustain the Court's jurisdiction and a plaintiff's claims for relief. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Hernandez v. United States 939 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2019); Kim v. Kimm, 884 F.3d 98, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2018); Lapaglia v. Transamerica Cas. Ins. Co., 155 F.Supp.3d 153, 155 (D. Conn. 2016).^[22]

This “plausibility” requirement is “not akin to a probability requirement,” but it “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court may also consider any documents attached as exhibits to, incorporated by reference in, or integral to the complaint. See Sierra Club v. Con-Strux, LLC, 911 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2018).

If the plaintiff is a pro se litigant, the allegations of the complaint must be read liberally to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. See Meadows v. United Servs., Inc., 963 F.3d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Still, even a pro se complaint may not survive dismissal if its factual allegations do not establish at least plausible grounds for a grant of relief. Ibid.

Eleventh Amendment immunity

The defendants argue that Idlibi's claims are barred in part by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment and related principles of state sovereign immunity generally divest the federal courts of authority over lawsuits by private citizens against the States, state government entities, and state government officials in their official capacities. See generally Lewis v. Clarke, 581 U.S. 155, 160-62 (2017); T.W. v. N.Y. State Bd. of L. Examiners, 996 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2021). “The Eleventh Amendment, however, is not without exception.” Leftridge v. Jud. Branch, 2023 WL 4304792, at *6 (D. Conn. 2023). “Congress may abrogate a state's immunity by statute, a state may waive its immunity, or a state official may be sued in his or her official capacity under the Ex Parte Young doctrine.” We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Conn. Off. of Early Childhood Dev., 579 F.Supp.3d 290, 300 (D. Conn. 2022) (citing In re Deposit Ins. Agency, 482 F.3d 612, 617 (2d Cir. 2007)), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 76 F.4th 130 (2d Cir. 2023); see also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

Congress has not abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims arising under sections 1981, 1983, or 1985. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340-45 (1979) (§ 1983); Bamba v. Fenton, 758 Fed.Appx. 8, 12 (2d Cir. 2018) (§ 1981); Chris H. v. New York, 740 Fed.Appx. 740, 741 (2d Cir. 2018) (§ 1985). Nor has Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity under the ADEA. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66-67 (2000). On the other hand, Congress has abrogated the State's immunity with respect to claims arising under Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Centro de Periodismo Investigative, Inc., 598 U.S. 339, 350 (2023) (Title VII); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001) (Title VI). Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar Idlibi's Title VI and Title VII claims.^[23]

As for Idlibi's claims against the five individual defendants the Ex parte Young exception-which permits claims for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief to proceed against state officials in their official capacity-does not apply here. To decide if the Ex parte Young exception applies, courts “conduct a ‘straightforward inquiry' into whether the complaint (1) ‘alleges an ongoing violation of federal law' and (2) ‘seeks relief properly...