Iglesias v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons

CRISTINA NICHOLE IGLESIAS also known as CHRISTIAN NOEL IGLESIAS, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, MICHAEL CARVAJAL, CHRIS BINA, IAN CONNORS, DAN SPROUL, JEFFERY ALLEN, ALIX MCLEAREN, THOMAS SCARANTINO, and DONALD LEWIS, Defendants.

No. 19-CV-415-NJR

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois

October 15, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Compel Expedited Discovery (Doc. 146)^[1] filed by Plaintiff Cristina Nichole Iglesias. Before the preliminary injunction hearing set on October 19, 2021, Iglesias seeks the following:

(1) the agendas, minutes, and records from all Transgender Executive Council (“TEC”) and Transgender Critical Care Team (“TCCT”) meetings where Ms Iglesias was discussed that have not already been produced (2) all documents about Ms. Iglesias considered by members of the TEC and TCCT;

(3) all medical and mental-health records for Ms. Iglesias that have not already been produced for the period of 2019 to present, including unit-staff-only filings; and

(4) all communications about Ms. Iglesias sent to or from the TEC, TCCT, and/or Dr. Elizabeth Stahl since May 2021.

Defendants do not argue this information is irrelevant to the pending motion for preliminary injunction, which asks the Court to order Defendants to:

(1) Provide Plaintiff the medically necessary health care she needs, including (1) permanent hair removal, and (2) gender confirmation surgery;

(2) House Plaintiff at an institution consistent with her gender identity;

(3) Protect Plaintiff from the known and serious risks of harm she continues to face while housed in a men's prison.

(Doc. 93, p. 20). Instead, Defendants argue that “Plaintiff's belated informal request for discovery is unduly burdensome and fails to explain why it is necessary for purposes of the upcoming preliminary injunction hearing.” (Doc. 147, p. 3). Defendants continue noting that “[d]espite repeatedly telling the Court that she did not want discovery beyond Dr. Leukefeld's deposition Plaintiff now seeks to compel broad discovery just weeks before the evidentiary hearing.” (Id. .).

Besides Defendants' belated argument, Defendants argue that “Plaintiff has made only an informal email request for documents, she is not even legally entitled to move to compel at this time.” (Id. at p. 4). Next, Defendants point to Iglesias's “burden of explaining what expedited discovery is necessary and why, as well as ensuring that her request is narrowly tailored such that the discovery can reasonably be completed in the shortened timeframe.” (Id. at p. 5). Defendants then argue that Iglesias has done neither (Id.).

Legal Standard

“A party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f), except in a proceeding exempted from initial disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), or when authorized by these rules, by stipulation, or by court order.” Fed.R.Civ.P 26(d) (emphasis added). Indeed, district courts have “broad discretion in discovery matters.” Packman v. Chicago Trib. Co., 267 F.3d 628, 646 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Kalis v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 231 F.3d 1049, 1056 (7th Cir. 2000)).

When a Rule 26(f) conference has not happened, district courts within the Seventh Circuit “evaluate a motion for expedited discovery ‘on the entirety of the record to date and the reasonableness of the request in light of all the surrounding circumstances.'” Ibarra v. City of Chicago, 816 F.Supp.2d 541, 554 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. O'Connor, 194 F.R.D. 618, 624 (N.D. Ill. 2000)). “Factors relevant to this analysis may include ‘(1) whether a preliminary injunction is pending; (2) the breadth of the discovery requests; (3) the purpose for requesting the expedited discovery; (4) the burden on the defendants to comply with the requests; and (5) how far in advance of the typical discovery process the request was made.'” Ortho Pediatrics Corp. v. Wishbone Med., Inc., 2020 WL 9671301, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 15, 2020) (quoting Ibarra, 816 F.Supp.2d at 554).

“A party seeking leave to conduct expedited discovery bears the burden of making a prima facie case for such early discovery.” Ortho Pediatrics Corp., 2020 WL 9671301, at *1 (citing Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Doe, 283 F.R.D. 409, 410 (N.D. Ill. 2012)). “Courts must also protect defendants from unfair expedited discovery.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 194 F.R.D. at 623. Thus, district courts in the Seventh Circuit require “the movant [to] establish ‘good cause.'” Roche Diagnostics Corp. v. Binson's Hosp. Supplies, Inc., 2017 WL 11573559, at *1 (S.D. Ind. May 11, 2017) (citing Hard Drive Prods., Inc., 283 F.R.D. at 410). “Good cause can be found when the need for expedited discovery, in consideration with the administration of justice, outweighs the prejudice to the responding party.” Id.; see also 8A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane, & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2046.1 (3d ed. 1998) (“it is implicit that some showing of good cause should be made to justify” an expediting discovery order).

Discussion

I. Pending Preliminary Injunction

District courts in the Seventh Circuit are split on whether a pending preliminary injunction alone entitles a party to expedited discovery. See Roche Diagnostics Corp. v. Med. Automation Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 130098, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 14, 2011) (“[a] pending request for a preliminary injunction is a typical ground that satisfies a good cause standard”); but see Campaignzero, Inc. v. Staywoke Inc., 2020 WL 7123066, at *2 (N.D. Ill.Dec. 4, 2020) (“[a preliminary injunction] alone, however, does not entitle a party to expedited discovery”).

The advisory committee's note to the 1993 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 explains that “discovery can begin earlier . . . [and] will be appropriate in some cases, such as those involving requests for a preliminary injunction . . . . Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 (emphasis added). Rule 26 has been amended five times after the 1993 amendments. Still, the advisory committee's notes to the 2000, 2006, 2007, 2010, and 2015 amendments fail to refute that expedited discovery is appropriate in cases involving preliminary injunctions.

Defendants not only fail to address the possibility that a pending preliminary injunction alone entitles a party to expedited discovery, but also Defendants appear to brush aside the fact that Rule 26 allows a party to seek discovery when authorized by court order. See Doc. 147, p. 4 (“[e]ven if true, that is beside the point”). Defendants would rather the Court focus on the fact that “Plaintiff has had the opportunity twice to seek expedited discovery and made the strategic decision to seek only the deposition of Dr. Leukefeld.” (Id.).^[2]

Additionally, under Local Rule 26.1(a), “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 shall control the initial stages of disclosure and discovery in all civil cases with the exception of the categories of proceedings specified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(B).” Local Rule 26.1 continues noting that “[t]hese categories are construed to include the following . . . [and] [lists] prisoner civil rights cases.”

Defendants argue “Local Rule 26.1(a) is not an absolute exemption from routine discovery events such as the Rule 26(f) meeting of counsel, even in prisoner civil rights cases.” (Doc. 147, p. 4). Defendants continue pointing to the last sentence of Local Rule 26.1(a):

The judicial officer to whom the case is assigned for trial may order an initial conference, a final pretrial conference, or a settlement conference in a case falling in one of the excluded categories if the judicial officer determines that the complexity of the case or some unusual factor warrants more extensive pretrial case management than is usually necessary for that type of case.

Defendants then “respectfully submit, particularly where plaintiff is represented by counsel, that this case falls squarely within that exception to Local Rule 26.1(a).” (Doc. 147, p. 4). The Court does not understand Defendants' characterization of Local Rule 26.1(a). Rather than trying to decipher Defendants' characterization, the Court finds that a pending preliminary injunction weighs in Iglesias's favor especially when considering the advisory committee's notes to the amendments to Rule 26, the fact that Rule 26(d) allows a party to seek discovery when authorized by court order, and Local Rule 26.1(a).

II. Breadth of the Discovery Requests

Iglesias argues that her requests are neither belated nor informal because “[o]n December 29, 2020, Ms. Iglesias's counsel served Defendants with Plaintiff's First Set of Requests for Production pursuant to Rule 34.” (Doc. 151, p. 1). More importantly, Iglesias explains that the records she “now seeks are a narrow subset of those requested in December 2020.” (Id. at p. 2).

The requests from December 2020, included:

(1) All medical records relating to or discussing Plaintiff, whether or not those records are contained in Plaintiff's medical records file.

(2) All mental health records relating to or discussing Plaintiff, whether or not those records are contained in Plaintiff's medical records file.

(3) All grievances, appeals of grievances, letters, complaints, or other communications from, or on behalf of, Plaintiff, as well as responses to those grievances, letters, complaints, or other communications.

(4) All communications involving medical professionals or medical personnel, including but not limited to emails, letters, tickets, and notes, relating to or discussing Plaintiff.

(Id. at pp. 1-2). Iglesias narrowly tailored her original request based on the needs of...