Ill. Liberty PAC v. Madigan

904 F.3d 463

ILLINOIS LIBERTY PAC, Political Action Committee registered with the Illinois State Board of Elections, Edgar Bachrach, and Kyle McCarter, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.Lisa MADIGAN, Attorney General of the State of Illinois, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-3585

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued September 27, 2017

Decided September 13, 2018

Jacob H. Huebert, Goldwater Institute, Director, Center for Constitutional Government, Phoenix, AZ, Jeffrey M. Schwab, Attorney, Liberty Justice Center, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs–Appellants.

Mary Ellen Welsh, Attorney, Office of the Attorney General, Civil Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, for Defendants–Appellees.

Paul March Smith, Attorney, Noah B. Lindell, Tara Malloy, Michael P. McAllen, Campaign Legal Center, Washington, DC, Ryan Z. Cortazar, Ami D. Gandhi, Attorney, Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Chicago, IL, for Amici Curiae.

Before Ripple, Sykes, and Hamilton, Circuit Judges.

Sykes, Circuit Judge.

Illinois Liberty PAC, Edgar Bachrach, and Kyle McCarter (collectively, "Liberty PAC") sued Illinois officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that certain campaign contribution limits set by the Illinois Disclosure and Regulation of Campaign Contributions and Expenditures Act ("the Act"), 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 et seq. (2016), violate the First Amendment. Invoking the intermediate-scrutiny framework of Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), Liberty PAC challenges four parts of the Act that it contends are not closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. First, the Act sets lower contribution limits for individuals than for corporations, unions, and other associations. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-8.5(b) – (d). Second, the Act allows political parties to make unlimited contributions to candidates during a general election. Id. Third, a waiver provision lifts the contribution limits for all candidates in a race if one candidate’s self-funding or support from independent expenditure groups exceeds $250,000 in a statewide race or $100,000 in any other election. Id. 5/9-8.5(h). And fourth, certain legislators may form "legislative caucus committees," which, like political party committees, are permitted to make unlimited contributions to candidates during a general election. Id. 5/9-1.8(c).

The district judge dismissed the first three claims at the pleadings stage, reasoning that Supreme Court precedent foreclosed them. The judge then held a bench trial to determine if the Act’s more lenient regulation of legislative caucus committees—classifying them with political party committees—shows that the Act is not closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. The judge ruled for the defendants, finding that legislative caucus committees are sufficiently similar to political party committees to justify their identical treatment under the Act.

We affirm across the board. The Supreme Court’s campaign-finance cases plainly foreclose any argument that the Act’s contribution limits for individual donors are too low or that the limits for other donors are too high. To overcome this impediment, Liberty PAC argues that the Act is fatally underinclusive by favoring certain classes of donors over others. But the Court has repeatedly upheld a similar federal campaign-finance scheme setting lower contribution limits for individuals than for other categories of donors, including political parties. See, e.g. , McConnell v. FEC , 540 U.S. 93, 187–88, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. FEC , 558 U.S. 310, 319, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) ; FEC v. Colo. Republican Federal Campaign Comm. , 533 U.S. 431, 455–56, 121 S.Ct. 2351, 150 L.Ed.2d 461 (2001) ; Buckley , 424 U.S. at 35–36, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court has also said that a waiver provision like the one Illinois has adopted would not be unconstitutional. See Davis v. FEC , 554 U.S. 724, 737, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008). Finally, on the record before us, we see no basis to disturb the judge’s factual findings that legislative caucus committees are sufficiently akin to political party committees to justify Illinois’s decision to treat them alike.

I. Background

Illinois Liberty PAC is a political action committee that makes contributions to Illinois legislative candidates who support free-market principles. Bachrach, an individual donor, contributes to Illinois legislative candidates and political action committees. McCarter is an Illinois state senator. But for Illinois’s regulatory regime governing contribution limits for elections to state offices, Liberty PAC and Bachrach would contribute more to candidates, Bachrach would contribute more to political action committees, and McCarter would solicit and accept larger contributions from donors. Together they filed this § 1983 lawsuit against Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan and members of the Illinois State Board of Elections to challenge certain of the Act’s contribution limits.

The Act groups political donors into three broad categories: (1) individuals; (2) political committees; and (3) corporations, labor unions, and other associations. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-8.5(b). There are several types of political committees: political party committees, candidate political committees, political action committees, and legislative caucus committees. Id. 5/9-1.8(a). A political party committee is the state, county, or ward committee of a political party. Id. 5/9-1.8(c). Each candidate for public office may have one candidate political committee, which is composed of the candidate himself or the group that accepts contributions on his behalf. Id. 5/9-2(b). A political action committee or "PAC" is a group of people or an organizational association that accepts contributions, makes expenditures, and makes electioneering communications related to a political race exceeding $3,000 in a 12-month period. Id. 5/9-1.8(d). Finally, a legislative caucus committee is "established for the purpose of electing candidates to the General Assembly." Id. 5/9-1.8(c). A legislative caucus committee may be formed by the majority and minority leaders of the Senate and House, or by a group of five state senators or ten state representatives in the same partisan caucus. Id.

The Act sets different base contribution limits depending on the identity of the donor and recipient. An individual may contribute $5,000 to a single candidate in a given election cycle; $10,000 to a political action committee; and $10,000 to a political party committee.¹ § 5/9-8.5(b)–(d). A corporation, labor union, or other association may contribute twice as much as an individual: $10,000 to candidates; $20,000 to political action committees; and $20,000 to political party committees. Id. A political action committee may contribute $50,000 to candidates, other political action committees, and party committees. Id. A political party committee may contribute up to $200,000 for a statewide candidate during a primary election and an unlimited amount during a general election. Id.

The Act has two additional features at issue in this case. First, if a candidate’s self-funding or independent spending in support of the candidate exceeds $250,000 in a statewide race or $100,000 in any other election, then the contribution limits are waived for all candidates in that race. § 5/9-8.5(h). Second, as we've noted, the Act authorizes certain legislative leaders and groups of legislators to create legislative caucus committees. These are powerful political tools: legislative caucus committees are subject to the same generous contribution limits as political parties, but a candidate may not accept contributions from more than one legislative caucus committee in a given election cycle. § 5/9-8.5(b).

Liberty PAC’s original complaint alleged that the Act violates the First Amendment because it is not closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.² The complaint challenged three aspects of the regulatory regime: (1) the provision setting higher contribution limits for corporations, unions, and other associations than for individuals; (2) the provision allowing political parties to make unlimited contributions to candidates in general elections; and (3) the waiver provision eliminating all contribution limits if one candidate’s self-funding or independent spending in support of the candidate exceeds the thresholds mentioned above. The complaint also alleged that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires strict judicial scrutiny of classifications among donors. Soon after filing its complaint, Liberty PAC moved for a preliminary injunction.

In a comprehensive opinion, the judge denied the motion, reasoning that Liberty PAC was unlikely to succeed on any of its claims in light of adverse Supreme Court precedent. Ill. Liberty PAC v. Madigan , 902 F.Supp.2d 1113 (N.D. Ill. 2012). Specifically, the judge explained that the Court has (1) routinely upheld similar gradations of contribution limits for different classes of donors; (2) implied that political parties must be treated more favorably than other groups given the unique relationship between parties and candidates; and (3) endorsed a materially similar waiver provision. Id. at 1118–25. The judge also ruled that Liberty PAC’s argument for strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause was unlikely to succeed because the Court consistently applies intermediate scrutiny to contribution limits. Id. at 1126. We summarily affirmed that order.

In an amended complaint, Liberty PAC reasserted its earlier claims and added a claim challenging the Act’s treatment of legislative caucus committees. Liberty PAC alleged that the legislative caucus committees present an outsized risk of quid pro quo corruption given their special fundraising abilities and their leaders' roles in the policymaking process, yet the...