Illinois v. CSL Plasma, Inc.

635 F.Supp.3d 645

State of ILLINOIS, Plaintiff, v. CSL PLASMA, INC. and CSL Behring, LLC, Defendants.

Case No. 20-CV-3535

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

Signed October 18, 2022

Elizabeth A.F. Morris, Gretchen Elizabeth Helfrich, Judith Nisenbaum Levitan, Rebekah Idel Marie Newman, Neil Kelley, Kathryn Hunt Muse, Office of the Attorney General, Public Interest Division, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Jennifer L. Colvin, Eric Arthur Berg, Zachary Adam Pestine, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARY M. ROWLAND, United States District Judge

Plaintiff State of Illinois sues Defendants CSL Plasma, Inc. and CSL Behring, LLC, operators of blood plasma collection centers, for discriminating against people with disabilities in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA). Both statutes prohibit disability-based discrimination in "places of public accommodation," including in any "service establishments." Plaintiff moves now for partial summary judgment on the discrete legal issue of whether Defendants' blood plasma collection centers constitute such "service establishments." [76]; [77]. For the reasons explained below, this Court grants Plaintiff's motion and concludes that Defendants' collection centers qualify as "service establishments," and thus "places of public accommodation" under both Acts.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The substantive law controls which facts are material. Id. After a "properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party 'must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

The Court "consider[s] all of the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and [ ] draw[s] all reasonable inferences from that evidence in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Logan v. City of Chicago, 4 F.4th 529, 536 (7th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). The Court "must refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing evidence." Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 467 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505). In ruling on summary judgment, the Court gives the non-moving party "the benefit of reasonable inferences from the evidence, but not speculative inferences in [its] favor." White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). "The controlling question is whether a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence submitted in support of and opposition to the motion for summary judgment." Id.

BACKGROUND

This Court takes the following facts from Plaintiff's statement of facts [80], Defendants' response to Plaintiff's statement of facts [87], Defendant's statement of additional facts [88], and Plaintiff's response to Defendant's statement of additional facts [92].

I. Parties

Plaintiff State of Illinois is a sovereign state of the United States of America. [80] ¶ 1. Its Attorney General Kwame Raoul brings this suit pursuant to the IHRA. Id. Defendant CSL Plasma, Inc. is an international corporation that collects source plasma from donors for use in pharmaceutical products. Id. ¶ 2. CSL Plasma is wholly owned by Defendant CSL Behring, LLC. Id. ¶3. CSL Plasma provides source plasma collected from donors to its parent CSL Behring, which then manufactures the source plasma into plasma-derived medicinal products. Id. ¶ 4. CSL Behring then sells the resulting plasma-derived medicinal products in countries around the world for profit. Id. ¶ 7.

II. Source Plasma Collection

Source plasma is human plasma collected via a process called "apheresis," where a donor gives whole blood, a collector separates the plasma from other blood components, and the remaining blood components transfuse back into the donor. Id. ¶ 8. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) heavily regulates collection of source plasma for use in plasma-derived medicinal products. Id. ¶ 9. Source plasma can only be legally obtained through apheresis, and source plasma collection can only legally occur in a properly equipped and regulated facility like CSL Plasma's collection centers. Id. ¶¶ 10-11.

CSL Plasma operates more than three hundred donation centers in the United States and around the world. Id. ¶ 13. CSL Plasma currently operates fourteen donation centers in Illinois and anticipates opening another three centers in the near future. Id. ¶ 14. These donation centers sit within strip malls and other areas of commercial activity. Id. ¶ 15. A potential donor can arrive at one of CSL Plasma's donation centers with or without an appointment. Id. ¶ 19; [87] ¶ 19. A potential donor need not pay to attempt to donate or to donate their plasma. [80] ¶ 20. A potential donor also need not provide proof of insurance or a special membership. Id. ¶ 21. Donors may donate twice in any seven day period as long as one day elapses between their donations. [87] ¶ 29.

Not all members of the public are eligible to donate plasma at CSL Plasma. [88] ¶ 15. CSL Plasma restricts potential donor based on age, weight, medical conditions, and the potential donor's geographic radius to the donation center. Id. ¶ 15. Answers to medical history questions and a physical examination determine eligibility to donate. Id. ¶ 14.

III. Compensation

Donors receive compensation for the time they spend donating plasma; CSL Plasma provides compensation via a debt card it provides. [80] ¶¶ 30, 31. On average, a donor earns $40.00 per donation. Id. ¶ 32. CSL Plasma also offers a rewards program through which donors can earn additional money by donating more frequently. Id. ¶ 33. From time to time, CSL Plasma also offers special promotions encouraging donors to donate more frequently, which can result in additional compensation. Id. ¶ 34. CSL Plasma also offers increased compensation for donors donating twice within a week to drive volume. Id. ¶ 36. CSL Plasma offers higher compensation to new donors, who receive $100.00 at the first donation and $125.00 at the second donation. Id. ¶ 37. Further, donors can receive additional compensation for donating a certain number of times in a year and for completing feedback surveys. Id. ¶ 38. Additionally, a donor may receive additional compensation for referring others who successfully make two donations. Id.

IV. Procedural History

In June 2020, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA), seeking to enjoin Defendants from refusing to serve individuals with disabilities at their collection centers. [1]. The complaint accuses CSL Plasma of preventing individuals with mental health disabilities who use a service animal or who are deaf from providing plasma and being compensated for their time, in violation of the ADA and the IHRA. Id. ¶¶ 3, 4.

Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment on the single issue of whether CSL Plasma collection centers constitute "places of public accommodation" under the ADA and IHRA. [76]. Defendants oppose the motion. [86]. The United States filed a "statement of interest," advocating in favor of Plaintiff's position that the collection centers qualify as "places of public accommodation" under the ADA. [85].

ANALYSIS

I. The Statutes

Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to provide "expansive protections" from discrimination for individuals with disabilities. A.H. by Holzmueller v. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, 881 F.3d 587, 592 (7th Cir. 2018); see PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 674, 121 S.Ct. 1879, 149 L.Ed.2d 904 (2001). Among its protections, Title III prohibits discrimination against disabled individuals in accessing public accommodations:

No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.

42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). The phrase "public accommodation" "is defined in terms of 12 extensive categories" in the statute. Martin, 532 U.S. at 676, 121 S.Ct. 1879. Relevant here, "public accommodation" includes a "professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment." 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (emphasis added).

Like the ADA, the IHRA "is remedial in nature and is construed liberally to achieve its purpose." M.U. by & Through Kelly U. v. Team Ill. Hockey Club, Inc., 2022 IL App (2d) 210568, ¶ 18, — Ill.Dec. —, — N.E.3d — (Ill. App. Ct. 2022). The IHRA makes it a "civil rights violation for any person on the basis of unlawful discrimination to . . . deny or refuse to another the full and equal enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of any public place of accommodation." 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-102(A). Identical to the ADA, the IHRA defines a "place of public accommodation" to include a "professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment." 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-101(A)(6).

II. Whether CSL Plasma's Collections Center Constitute a "Service Establishment" under the ADA and IHRA

Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment on the threshold legal question of whether Defendants' plasma collection...