IML v. State

61 P.3d 1038

2002 UT 110

In re I.M.L., a minor, Appellant, v. STATE of Utah, Appellee.

No. 20010159.

Supreme Court of Utah.

November 15, 2002.

Stephen C. Clark, Janelle P. Eurick, Richard A. Van Wagoner, Robert J. Shelby, Salt Lake City, for appellant.

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Laura B. Dupaix, Kent M. Barry, Asst. Att'ys Gen., Salt Lake City, Leo Kanell, Beaver, for appellee.

Jeffrey J. Hunt, David C. Reymann, Salt Lake City, Amicus Curiae.

DURHAM, Chief Justice.

¶ 1 In this case we consider the application of a law drafted more than one hundred years ago to the most modern of preoccupations—the Internet. I.M.L., a high school student, was charged with criminal libel for creating an Internet web site on which he displayed disparaging comments about his teachers, classmates, and principal. He moved to dismiss, claiming that the statute under which he was charged unduly burdens free speech and is unconstitutional on its face. The juvenile court denied the motion. We reverse.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 During the 1999-2000 school year, I.M.L. was a student at Milford High School in Milford, Utah. He was sixteen years old. During that time he created an Internet web site on his home computer. The site included a page that listed various students at Milford High and purported to describe each person's sexual history. A second page stated that Milford High's school principal is a "town drunk" and accused him of sleeping with the secretary of the high school. Another page listed various faculty at the school and made arguably or potentially derogatory comments about most of them, stating, for example, that one teacher is a "[p]ossible [h]omosexual leading a double life," and that another is "[p]ossibly addicted to speed or some other narcotic." Finally, a page was dedicated to defending a female student who had apparently been slandered on some other person's web site. I.M.L. left a piece of paper containing the Internet address of his web site in the high school computer lab so that others would find the site.

¶ 3 After receiving complaints about the site,¹ the Beaver County Sheriff's Department began a criminal investigation, which led to the arrest of I.M.L. After being arrested and waiving his right to counsel or the presence of a parent, I.M.L. admitted creating the site and stated that he had done so in order to respond to similar sites created by other students at his high school.² He stated that he made disparaging comments about the faculty because he "just [didn't] like them" and was "just messing around with them." He stated that he attacked the principal's character because he "hate[d]" the principal.

¶ 4 I.M.L. was charged with criminal libel, in violation of Utah Code section 76-9-502, and criminal slander, imputing unchastity to a female, in violation of Utah Code section 76-9-507. The State decided not to pursue the slander charge, and the juvenile court dismissed that charge without prejudice.

¶ 5 I.M.L. moved to dismiss the libel charge, arguing that the criminal libel statute is unconstitutional on its face. He argued that the statute fails to punish only "actual malice," as defined by the United States Supreme Court, and does not provide for truth as an absolute defense. The juvenile court denied the motion, holding that the term "malicious" in the statute should be interpreted to have the same meaning as "actual malice" in First Amendment analysis and that the statute, when read in conjunction with the Utah Constitution, provides sufficient protection for truthful statements.

¶ 6 At I.M.L.'s request, the juvenile court certified its order as final, and I.M.L. appealed the order to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals determined that the matter was appropriate to consider as an interlocutory appeal and certified the appeal to this court.

STANDING

¶ 7 I.M.L. concedes the State's factual allegations for purposes of this appeal, but reserves the right to dispute them should the case go to trial. Thus, in this appeal I.M.L. does not claim that his statements were true or that they were made without knowledge or recklessness. Because this is a facial challenge based on the First Amendment, however, I.M.L. has standing regardless of whether his conduct was constitutionally privileged. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 815-16, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1974). The United States Supreme Court has allowed standing in such cases "because of the `danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application.'" Id. at 816, 95 S.Ct. 2222 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963)).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 "`A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a question of law, which we review for correctness.... When addressing such a challenge, this court presumes that the statute is valid, and we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality.'" State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, ¶ 5, 31 P.3d 547 (quoting State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ¶ 6, 980 P.2d 191).

ANALYSIS

¶ 9 I.M.L. claims that Utah's criminal libel statute is unconstitutionally overbroad because it fails to require "actual malice" as defined by the United States Supreme Court and allows prosecution for true statements.³ Before addressing I.M.L.'s arguments,⁴ we briefly review the development of criminal libel law.

I. CRIMINAL LIBEL AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

¶ 10 The history and development of statutes criminalizing forms of defamation have been discussed in a number of cases and commentaries. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67-68, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964); Fitts v. Kolb, 779 F.Supp. 1502, 1506-09 (D.S.C.1991); Gottschalk v. State, 575 P.2d 289, 291-92 & n. 3 (Alaska 1978) (identifying several journal articles); Eberle v. Mun. Ct., 55 Cal.App.3d 423, 427-30, 127 Cal.Rptr. 594 (1976); State v. Browne, 86 N.J.Super. 217, 206 A.2d 591, 594-97 (Ct.App.Div.1965). From the earliest times, such laws prohibited defamatory comments about public or private citizens. Fitts, 779 F.Supp. at 1506-07; Gottschalk, 575 P.2d at 291. The prohibition against defamation was seen to serve two purposes: first, the laws were deemed necessary to prevent political unrest arising from criticism of government officials; second, they were intended to maintain public order, which might otherwise be disrupted by duels or other violence brought on by criticism of private citizens. Fitts, 779 F.Supp. at 1507; Gottschalk, 575 P.2d at 291. Under these laws, any statement that tended to degrade or disgrace another-whether opinion or fact, truthful or false-was considered defamatory. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 67-68,85 S.Ct. 209; Fitts, 779 F.Supp. at 1507; Gottschalk, 575 P.2d at 291. Indeed, true statements were considered the greater danger, "for, as the woman said, she would never grieve to be told of her red nose if she had not one indeed." Fitts, 779 F.Supp. at 1506-07 (quoting Kelly, Criminal Libel and Free Speech, 6 Kan. L.Rev. 295, 301 (1958)); see also Gottschalk, 575 P.2d at 291.

¶ 11 The passage of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution did not initially diminish the use of criminal defamation statutes:

Thus, the Sedition Act of 1798 made unlawful writing, publishing or speaking anything "false, scandalous and malicious ... against the government ... or the President... with intent to defame ... or to bring them ... into contempt or disrepute...." This unpopular act was not long in existence, but was never held unconstitutional. Further, it has not been orthodox constitutional doctrine that the First Amendment was intended to bar criminal defamation, although some of our most eminent judges have believed it was. The primary substantive reform effected by the American states was to modify the rule that truth was no defense. Most states... made truth a defense so long as the otherwise defamatory statement was uttered with good motives and for a justifiable end.

Gottschalk, 575 P.2d at 291-92 (citations omitted). Like that of many other states, see Garrison, 379 U.S. at 73 n. 7, 85 S.Ct. 209, the Utah Constitution modified the common law so that evidence of truth could be offered as a defense to defamation, provided the statement was made with good intent. Utah Const. art. 1, § 15.

¶ 12 The common law of criminal defamation remained otherwise in force until well into the twentieth century. Gottschalk, 575 P.2d at 292. Then, in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), the United States Supreme Court held that civil sanctions could not be imposed based upon defamatory statements made concerning a public official unless the statements were false and made with "actual malice." 376 U.S. at 280, 84 S.Ct. 710. The Court defined "actual malice" as making a statement "with knowledge that [the statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. The Court reasoned that such a rule was necessary to maintain the principle that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and ... may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." Id. at 270, 84 S.Ct. 710.

¶ 13 In Garrison, the Court held that the same rule applies to criminal defamation. The Court struck down Louisiana's criminal libel statute, finding that the statute infringed upon protected speech by punishing false statements concerning public officials made without "actual malice":⁵

[E]ven where the utterance is false, the great principles of the Constitution which secure freedom of expression in this area preclude attaching adverse consequences to any except the knowing or reckless falsehood. Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred; even if he did speak out of hatred, utterances

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