In re Aaron C.

IN RE: AARON C.

No. 2599

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2015

October 28, 2016

UNREPORTED

Meredith, Leahy, Beachley, JJ.

Opinion by Beachley, J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

The Circuit Court for Prince George's County, sitting as the juvenile court, adjudicated appellant, Aaron C., involved in attempted robbery and second-degree assault. Appellant was committed to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Services for placement and ordered to pay $1,006 in restitution. In this appeal, appellant presents the following questions for our review:

1. Did the juvenile court err in denying appellant's motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds?

2. Did the juvenile court err in ordering appellant to pay $1,006 in restitution without first ensuring that he had the ability to pay that amount?

We find no error and affirm.

BACKGROUND

On September 25, 2014, A.R. was walking to the mall when he saw "a group of four guys" walking toward him. One of the individuals, later identified as appellant, stopped and demanded A.R's cellular telephone. When A.R. refused, appellant punched him in the face, jumped on him, placed him in a "neck lock," and again demanded his phone. A.R. freed himself from appellant's grip and ran away. A.R. reported the incident to the police.

On October 15, 2014, police arrested appellant in connection with the attempted robbery. Appellant's mother met with police and provided them with her then current address (6229 Springhill Court, #202 Greenbelt, MD 20770). On April 7, 2015, the State filed a juvenile petition and complaint for restitution against appellant and sent a proper summons to the Springhill Court address. The summons was returned as undeliverable, and both appellant and his mother failed to appear at the subsequent arraignment on April27, 2015. The date for the arraignment was reset, and a new summons was sent to a different address (608 Galveston Place SW, Washington, DC 20032) on April 28, 2015. On May 12, 2015, appellant and his mother again failed to appear for his arraignment, and again the summons was returned as undeliverable. The court rescheduled the arraignment for June 15, 2015, and stated that it would attempt to call the telephone number in the file (presumably provided by appellant's mother). The court also requested that service be made by the sheriff.

The State was again unable to effectuate service; appellant and his mother failed to appear on June 15, 2015. At that time the court reported that it had a new address and phone number for appellant, which the State had obtained from the Board of Education.¹ The court indicated that it would call the new number and ordered that a new summons be sent to the new address.² The arraignment was reset for July 7, 2015. When appellant and his mother failed to appear on July 7, the court ordered the sheriff's office to effectuate service; the attempt was unsuccessful. When appellant failed to appear at the arraignment scheduled for August 18, 2015, the juvenile court issued a writ of attachment for appellant.

On October 14, 2015, appellant's mother received a voice message indicating that appellant had a pending court case before the juvenile court.³ She contacted the Public Defender's Office, and counsel for appellant entered an appearance on October 15, 2015. It was later revealed that both the State and the court had incorrect contact information for appellant. According to appellant's mother, appellant and his family had moved to a different address "in approximately October of 2014," but neither appellant nor appellant's mother informed the court or the police of the move (or that such a move was imminent). On November 6, 2015, the court remanded appellant to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Services pending an adjudication hearing scheduled for December 7, 2015. The court granted a joint motion to postpone the adjudication hearing to December 15, 2015.

At the adjudication hearing, appellant's counsel argued for dismissal of appellant's case on speedy trial grounds. The juvenile court denied the request and found as follows:

Let me just say that I am looking at the date stamp on the Petition April 7th, 2015. And this matter came before the Court apparently on 4/27, at least in the jacket it is listed before the Magistrate....Four twenty-seven, 5/12, 6/15, 7/17 and 7/8, starting on 6/15 -- apparently the Court called the new number and the numbers provided here and left a message. Called again on 7/17, left another at the same number and left a message. Called again on 7/8 and left a message.

And what is in this file that follows after that, the Court apparently -- I am looking at a date stamped return June 9, two thousand -- that was issued -- and apparently it went back out for service and the Sheriff attempted service apparently a number of times.

And as a result of the attempts of service a number of times it was indicated, quote, "7/20 the Defendant does not live here, 7/20, it went back out at 2105, 7/27, 2000 hours, does not live at this address.

Madam Clerk, the Court will deny the request at this time to dismiss.

The juvenile court adjudicated appellant involved and, at the disposition hearing on January 11, 2016, ordered that appellant be placed in a Level B facility. The court then indicated that it would likely hold the restitution hearing at a later date, despite the fact that the issue of restitution was to be heard that day. Nevertheless, the court instructed the parties to "not excuse any witnesses at this time." The court then recessed for lunch.

Following the lunch break, the court reconvened and decided to move forward with the restitution hearing as scheduled. Appellant's counsel requested a continuance because appellant's mother allegedly misunderstood the court's earlier instructions and left the courthouse. The court reminded appellant's counsel that it had instructed the parties to "keep the witnesses here," and appellant's counsel responded that appellant's mother "misunderstood and she left." The court denied the motion to continue.

The State presented evidence that, as a direct result of the attack, A.R. suffered medical expenses totaling $1,006. Following the State's case, appellant's counsel again moved for a continuance, which the court denied. Appellant then testified regarding his employment and financial situation, specifically that he had no job, no savings account, and no money. Appellant also testified that he was completely unfamiliar with his mother's finances, including her current income, debt level, and expenses. The court orderedappellant to pay restitution in the amount of $1,006, but no restitution order was issued against appellant's mother.

DISCUSSION

I.

Appellant argues that the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. Specifically, appellant maintains that the length of time between his arrest and his trial - fourteen months - was presumptively prejudicial and that the State's lack of diligence in notifying him of the pending charges was the primary reason for the delay. Appellant also maintains that the delay resulted in actual prejudice in that it caused him anxiety and concern and decreased his ability to present an adequate defense.

A juvenile's right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. See, e.g., State v. Kanneh, 403 Md. 678, 687 (2008); In re Thomas J., 372 Md. 50, 70 (2002). When we review a circuit court's judgment on a motion to dismiss claiming deprivation of the right to a speedy trial, "we make our own independent constitutional analysis." Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 220 (2002). "We perform a de novo constitutional appraisal in light of the particular facts of the case at hand; in so doing, we accept a lower court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous." Id. at 221.

In determining whether the right to speedy trial has been violated, we apply the four-factor balancing test announced by the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). See, e.g., Kanneh, 403 Md. at 687; In re Thomas J., 372 Md. at 72; Peters v. State,224 Md. App. 306, 359 (2015), cert. denied, 445 Md. 127 (2015). These factors are: 1) the length of the delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) the juvenile's assertion of his speedy-trial right; and 4) any prejudice to the juvenile. See In re Thomas J., 372 Md. at 72. We assess the relative significance of each factor, both by itself and in conjunction with the other factors, to determine if the State's delay in bringing an individual to trial substantially infringed on the individual's right to a speedy trial. A court must examine the "circumstances peculiar to each particular case" with "no one factor being dispositive." State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 414-15 (1990).

The law is clear that, as a threshold matter, a reviewing court does not examine the Barker factors unless the delay is of "constitutional proportions." State v. Lawless, 13 Md. App. 220, 229 (1971). To do this, we look to the length of the delay and ask whether it "crosses the line from ordinary delay to presumptively prejudicial delay." White v. State, 223 Md. App. 353, 377 (2015). If the delay does not cross this threshold, the inquiry ends. Ratchford v. State, 141 Md. App. 354, 359 (2001).

Whether a particular delay is sufficient to trigger a speedy trial analysis "depends, to some extent, on the crime charged." Peters, 224 Md. App. at 360. A complex case involving DNA evidence and multiple witnesses, for instance, may allow for a longer delay, whereas a relatively uncomplicated case involving only one witness may trigger a speedy trial analysis sooner. Id. at 360-61. Nevertheless, "[t...