In re Adoption of R.J.S.

Page 502

901 A.2d 502

In re: Adoption of R.J.S. Appeal of: R.J.S., Sr., Natural Father In re: Adoption of J.S Appeal of: Chester County Department of Children, Youth and Families In re: Adoption of J.S., a Minor.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued January 31, 2006.

Filed May 30, 2006.

Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Chester County, Orphans' Court Division, Nos. AD-04-0103 and AD-04-0104, Wood, J.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ira D. Binder, Oxford, for R.J.S., Sr.

Barbara W. Miller, Chester Springs, for R.J.S. and J.S.

Gerald K. McOscar, West Chester, for D.L., participating party.

Lawrence J. Persick, West Chester, for CYS, participating party.

BEFORE: McCAFFERY, PANELLA, and JOHNSON, JJ.

OPINION BY McCAFFERY, J.:

¶ 1 Appellant, R.J.S., Sr. ("Father"), appeals from the trial court order terminating his parental rights to his two minor sons, R.J.S. and J.S. Father specifically argues that his parenting efforts were stymied by the court's prior custody order barring him from any contact with the children. In a cross-appeal, Chester County Department of Children, Youth and Families ("DCYF"), appeals from the order denying its petition to terminate the parental rights of D.E.S. ("Mother"). DCYF contends that it has proven the statutory requirements for termination of Mother's parental rights under 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), to wit, that the children have been removed from the parent for at least twelve months, that the conditions which led to the removal still exist, and that termination of Mother's rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the children. Upon review, we affirm the order terminating Father's parental rights, but we vacate the order regarding Mother's parental rights and remand for proceedings to address the needs and welfare of the children.

¶ 2 The facts and procedural history underlying this appeal are as follows. Mother and Father are the parents of two sons, R.J.S., born on January 20, 1996, and J.S., born on February 15, 1997. Mother was seventeen (17) years of age at the time of the first child's birth, and she and Father never married. In late 1996, Father was arrested after he repeatedly stabbed Mother, who was pregnant with the second child. Father was convicted by a jury in 1997 of aggravated assault and related offenses, and sentenced to eight (8) to twenty (20) years in prison. A custody order from October 2001, mandated that Father was to have no contact with the children.

¶ 3 DCYF involvement with the family began in 1997. On December 10, 2001, the children were adjudicated dependent, based on lack of proper parental care and control, after DCYF repeatedly found the children without supervision. Legal and physical custody of the children was granted to their maternal grandmother. DCYF was to provide to Mother a service known as Life Skills, which is an individualized service designed to aid clients in resolving the problems that had led to their children's dependency. Mother was ordered to work with Life Skills, to obtain housing and employment, and to have supervised visits with the children.

¶ 4 Regular review hearings were conducted through the end of 2002. At some point during this time, legal custody of the children was transferred to DCYF, although they remained in the physical custody of a family member. On February 13, 2003, a permanency review hearing was held, following which physical custody was transferred to DCYF and the children were placed in foster care. The problems necessitating the foster care placement at that time were lack of housing, neglect of the children, and dental neglect. A permanency goal of reunification was established.

¶ 5 In August 2003, Mother moved to Puerto Rico with her paramour, L.F.R.,¹ and remained there until February 2004. Mother's only contact with the children during this time was a single letter.

¶ 6 After additional permanency hearings on March 2, March 31, and May 11, 2004, the court ordered a goal change on September 17, 2004, from reunification to adoption. The court found minimal compliance by Mother with the reunification plan and little progress toward alleviating the circumstances that had led to placement of the children. In addition, the court authorized DCYF to file petitions to terminate parental rights to the children.

¶ 7 On October 28, 2004, DCYF filed petitions for termination of the parental rights of both Mother and Father. A termination hearing was held on April 5, 2005, which incorporated the testimony and exhibits from the hearings in March and May 2004. Additional testimony was presented from the DCYF adoption case-worker from Mother, and from L.F.R., who had become Mother's fiancé by then. Father failed to appear, even though he had been paroled from prison, had been served with notice of the termination petition and hearing, and had court-appointed counsel. By order dated May 16, 2005, the court terminated Father's parental rights, based on its finding that Father had never parented the children. However, the court denied DCYF's petition to terminate Mother's parental rights. The court's decision was based on its conclusion that in the six months preceding the hearing, Mother and her fiancé had made progress in overcoming obstacles and improving their situation, with the goal of eventually regaining custody of the children.

¶ 8 Father filed a timely appeal, and DCYF then cross-appealed, challenging the denial of termination of Mother's parental rights.

¶ 9 Father presents one issue for our review:

Did the trial court err as a matter of law or commit an abuse of discretion by involuntarily terminating [Father's] parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. Section[s] 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8)[?]

(Father's Brief at 4). Father's argument is that he was prevented from participating in his sons' lives during the time he was in prison because of the custody order from October 2001, that proscribed any contact. Father insists that he had been unable to modify the custody order, despite numerous efforts, and that this inability had prevented him from participating in the dependency actions. We disagree with Father's assertion.

¶ 10 DCYF also presents one issue for our review:

Whether the orphans' court erred in denying the petitions for termination of parental rights of the children's mother, where clear and convincing competent evidence established that the statutory grounds for termination existed, and that the needs and welfare of the children would best be served by the termination of parental rights?

(DCYF's Brief at 4). We agree with DCYF's contention that Mother's conduct met the statutory grounds for termination. However, we conclude that insufficient evidence was offered regarding the needs and welfare of the children, particularly with regard to emotional bonds with Mother, to determine whether their best interests would be served by termination of Mother's parental rights.

¶ 11 In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, "we are limited to determining whether the decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence." In re In the Interest of S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 892 A.2d 824 (2005) (quoting In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1199 (Pa.Super.2000)). "We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have adequate support in the record so long as the findings do not evidence capricious disregard for competent and credible evidence." In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73 (Pa.Super.2004) (quoting In re Diaz, 447 Pa.Super. 327, 669 A.2d 372, 375 (1995)). The trial court, not the appellate court, is charged with the responsibilities of evaluating credibility of the witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the testimony. Id. at 73-74; In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa.Super.2002). In carrying out these responsibilities, the trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. M.G., supra at 73-74. When the trial court's findings are supported by competent evidence of record, we will affirm "even if the record could also support an opposite result." S.H., supra at 806 (citation omitted). Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support, the trial court's termination order must stand. In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1286 (Pa.Super.2005).

¶ 12 Before filing a petition for termination of parental rights, the Commonwealth is required to make reasonable efforts to promote reunification of parent and child. In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1276 (Pa.Super.2003). However, the Commonwealth does not have an obligation to make such efforts indefinitely. The Commonwealth has an interest not only in family reunification but also in each child's right to a stable, safe, and healthy environment, and the two interests must both be considered. Id. "A parent's basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his or her child is converted, upon the parent's failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child's right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment." In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 388 (Pa.Super.2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004) (quoting In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007, 1013-14 (Pa.Super.2001)). When reasonable efforts to reunite a foster child with his or her biological parents have failed, then the child welfare agency must work toward terminating parental rights and placing the child with adoptive parents. The process of reunification or adoption should be completed within eighteen (18) months. In re N.W., 859 A.2d 501, 508 (Pa.Super.2004) (citation omitted). While this time frame may in some circumstances seem short, it is based on the policy that "[a] child's life simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting." M.E.P., supra (citation omitted).²

¶ 13 Termination of...