In re Adoption of Zak

87 Mass.App.Ct. 540

32 N.E.3d 361

ADOPTION OF ZAK (and two companion cases¹ ).

No. 13–P–780.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

Argued Dec. 10, 2014.

Decided June 19, 2015.

Sherrie Krasner for the father.

Deborah Sirotkin Butler, Arlington, for the mother.

Kari B. Kipf–Horstmann, Assistant Attorney General, for Department of Children and Families.

Ann Balmelli O'Connor for Zak.

Yvette L. Kruger, for Carol & another.

Present: KATZMANN, HANLON, & MALDONADO, JJ.

Opinion

MALDONADO, J.

The mother and father separately appeal from Juvenile Court decrees terminating their parental rights. In addition, the judge ordered posttermination and postadoption visitation for both parents.² The father and mother contend that the termination of their parental rights lacked evidentiary support. They also argue that the judge erred in denying placement of the children either with the mother's aunt or father's mother. Finally, the mother, but not the father, challenges the terms of posttermination and postadoption visitation. She asserts that the children's best interests favors more than the three yearly visits the judge ordered.

Carol and Nick cross-appealed. They contest the judge's orders for posttermination and postadoption visitation, arguing that there should be no postadoption visitation, and assert that the judge erred in failing to consider the effect on the children of domestic violence as it relates to those visits.

Having in mind the trial judge's careful and thorough findings of fact and rulings of law, we conclude that the judge did not abuse her discretion in terminating the mother and father's parental rights, or in refusing to place the children either with their maternal great-aunt or paternal grandmother; we therefore affirm those portions of the decrees. However, we vacate the posttermination and postadoption visitation orders and remand for further consideration and specific findings regarding whether posttermination and postadoption visitation is in the children's best interests, given the domestic violence that they have witnessed.

1. Termination of parental rights. The mother and father assert that the termination of their parental rights was based upon a single 2006 incident of domestic violence.³ They contend that, aside from this single violent attack, the record supports only a pattern of loud arguing and no other violence. They note that they present with no other serious shortcomings, such as a history of incarceration, mental illness, or substance abuse; therefore, they complain, the termination of their parental rights lacks record support. We disagree.

“To terminate parental rights to a child and to dispense with parental consent to adoption, a judge must find by clear and convincing evidence, based on subsidiary findings proved by at least a fair preponderance of the evidence, that the parent is unfit to care for the child and that termination is in the child's best interests.” Adoption of Jacques, 82 Mass.App.Ct. 601, 606, 976 N.E.2d 814 (2012). “Unless shown to be clearly erroneous, we do not disturb the judge's findings, which are entitled to substantial deference.” Id. at 606–607, 976 N.E.2d 814.

Here, contrary to the mother's and father's assertions, the judge found, and the record supports, significantly more incidents of domestic violence and harm to the children than the single 2006 incident that the mother and father admit occurred.^{4 , 5} For example, in January, 2008, police responded to the mother and father's apartment after receiving a telephone call for an early morning incident of domestic disturbance. Upon arrival, the police heard a woman screaming, “He is hitting me.” Two hours later, police returned to the home after the father telephoned them again; they found the apartment in disarray. Police were again called to the home on August 3 and August 8 of that year for reports of domestic disturbances. The police reported to the residence at approximately 3:00 a.m. on August 8. The father said the mother was “out of control” and had run out of the apartment naked. Police found that a glass had been smashed against a wall and broken glass remained shattered on the apartment floor. Zak and Carol were in the home at that time.

On February 17, 2010, at about 2 a.m. , police were called again to the mother and father's apartment for a domestic disturbance. When a downstairs neighbor spoke to the police, he reported that it sounded like the male in the apartment was “beating” the female. The father was arrested for assault and battery,⁶ and, as he was being removed from the apartment, he admonished the mother, “Tell them I didn't hit you.” The mother was found in a closet with a shirt over her head. She told the police that the father had

pushed her; she had bruises on her person. Again, Carol and Zak were present during the incident. Roughly two hours later, police were called again to the apartment. The mother, Carol, and Zak met the police outside the apartment. The mother claimed that the father had kicked them out of the apartment, and “physically pushed [Zak] out of the apartment.” The father was then arrested for assault and battery.

In November, 2011, the mother requested and obtained a G.L. c. 209A abuse prevention order against the father. In the affidavit supporting the order, the mother affirmed that she “was scared for [her] life.” In February of 2012, the mother asked to have the order vacated; however, in March, 2012, one month later and only two months before trial, she obtained a second c. 209A order. At that time, the mother stated that she did not “feel safe.” Over time, the mother has gone to domestic violence shelters with the children and has fled with the children to her aunt's house late in the evening. The trial judge did not credit either the mother's or father's minimization of these incidents.

The judge also found that the children had been the subject of physical violence. Zak testified that both parents had beaten him with a belt. Zak also testified that, on one occasion, the father struck him, causing him to fall back and hit a bedframe. Zak testified that he was scared when his parents argued, and he stated that he was “done with the fighting.” Carol stated to a court investigator that she feels “sad and scared” when her parents argue and fight, and that the scariest fighting is when “they push and fight.” Both children have been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder.

On this record, we see no error in the judge's finding of a pattern of violence and verbally abusive behavior that affected the children adversely. See, e.g., Care & Protection of Lillith, 61 Mass.App.Ct. 132, 137–142, 807 N.E.2d 237 (2004). “It is well documented that witnessing domestic violence, as well as being one of its victims, has a profound impact on children.” Custody of Vaughn, 422 Mass. 590, 599, 664 N.E.2d 434 (1996). “[A] child who has been either the victim or the spectator of such abuse suffers a distinctly grievous kind of harm.” Id. at 595, 664 N.E.2d 434. See Loebel v. Loebel, 77 Mass.App.Ct. 740, 748, 933 N.E.2d 1018 (2010).⁷

Moreover, the harm that domestic violence and unrest caused the children was not the only factor rendering the mother and father unfit. The judge found that “[b]oth parents have failed to consistently participate or engage in services” “offered ... by the Department [of Children and Families (department) ],” and that “the parents' behaviors have not changed” from the services they did receive. See, e.g., Adoption of Rhona, 63 Mass.App.Ct. 117, 126, 823 N.E.2d 789 (2005) (“refusal to cooperate with the department ... is relevant to the determination of unfitness”). For instance, after attending a batterer's program, the father claimed to have learned that he “is not a batterer.” The father “has not benefitted in any significant way from therapy”; his “work with [his therapist] on Father's issues of power and control is not complete,” nor is his “work with [his therapist] on conflict resolution between Father and Mother.” The mother, in her own words, did not “follow up with [individual] counseling.” By the time of trial, the mother was not partaking in domestic violence services, nor was she attempting to engage in those services. The judge also found that “the Mother was lying to the [department's] workers about her contact with, and relationship with,” the father, and that she “was being dishonest with her therapist.”

In addition, the parents demonstrated other concerning behaviors during visits with their children while the children were in foster care. Both the father and mother failed to appear at visits or showed up late to visits, which resulted in those visits being cancelled after the children had already arrived at the visitation center. The mother and father also left visits early. During one visit in 2010, after Carol urinated on herself, the mother took her to a restroom, pulled down her pants, and stated she observed black marks in her vaginal area, prompting the agency to call the police because the mother believed Carol was being sexually abused. The subsequent doctor's examination showed no signs of abuse. During another visit in 2012, while holding Nick, the father said, “Let me see your penis, I haven't seen you in a long time,” and looked down his pants. During yet another 2012 visit, the father allegedly struck or tapped Nick on the face for refusing to take water, which resulted in the department filing a G.L. c. 119, § 51A, report against the father. The judge's subsidiary

findings of fact amply support her decision to find the parents unfit and to terminate their parental rights.

2. Placement of the children with family members. The mother contends that the children's best interests favors placement with her aunt—the children's biological great-aunt. The father argues for family placement with either his mother (their biological grandmother) or their maternal great-aunt.

We review the judge's placement determination for abuse...