In re Aguirre

1

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Roy Vincent Aguirre.

No. A22-1220

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

February 6, 2023

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Crow Wing County District Court File No. 18-PR-22-2701

Jean Gustafson, Brainerd, Minnesota (for appellant Roy Aguirre)

Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wing County Attorney, Rockwell J. Wells Assistant County Attorney, Brainerd, Minnesota (for respondent Crow Wing County Social Services)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman Judge; and Reilly, Judge.

OPINION

BJORKMAN, Judge

Appellant challenges his recommitment as a person who poses a risk of harm due to a mental illness and as chemically dependent, arguing that the district court (1) clearly erred by finding he meets the criteria for recommitment due to mental illness, (2) erred by committing him as chemically dependent because it was not part of the initial commitment, (3) clearly erred by finding that commitment is the least-restrictive suitable disposition, and (4) abused its discretion by conducting the recommitment hearing in his absence. We affirm.

FACTS

In February 2021, appellant Roy Aguirre was civilly committed as a person who poses a risk of harm due to mental illness. That August, he was provisionally discharged but his commitment was continued for 12 months. His provisional discharge was revoked in early May 2022.

Shortly thereafter, Aguirre was charged with assault and threatening violence following an altercation with his girlfriend and police that included brandishing a knife at officers. The district court appointed Charles Chmielewski, Ph.D., to conduct a competency evaluation. Dr. Chmielewski reviewed Aguirre's "considerable history" of mental illness and substance abuse, with past diagnoses of "either a psychotic disorder or a delusional disorder, in addition to alcohol and methamphetamine use disorder." And he noted that alcohol apparently "played a major role in [Aguirre's] most recent alleged offenses."

Dr. Chmielewski also conducted a brief interview with Aguirre during which Aguirre ranted incoherently, denied any mental illness, and became "increasingly enraged." Based on the information he obtained, Dr. Chmielewski concluded that Aguirre was not competent to stand trial. Although Aguirre's hostility made it difficult for Dr. Chmielewski to formulate a diagnosis, he "suggest[ed]" diagnoses of psychotic disorder (not otherwise specified), alcohol-use disorder, and antisocial personality traits (rule out). And he opined that in Aguirre's "current mental state there is a very substantial risk of harm to others or to himself, especially if he was free to move about in the community, and/or free to use alcohol," and recommended civil commitment. Based on his report, the district court found Aguirre incompetent to stand trial.

Respondent Crow Wing County Social Services (the county) then conducted a commitment prescreening investigation. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.07, subd. 1 (2022) (requiring screening and report before commitment petition). As part of its investigation, the county sought to interview Aguirre, but he refused. It prepared a prescreening report detailing Aguirre's recent altercation, prior hospitalizations, and diagnoses, and recommended commitment because less-restrictive alternatives require voluntary participation or provide inadequate care.

The county then petitioned the district court to commit Aguirre as a person who poses a risk of harm due to a mental illness and as a chemically dependent person. After a remote hearing, the district court determined that Aguirre "continues to meet" the criteria for commitment as a person who poses a risk of harm due to mental illness and "meets" the criteria for commitment as a person who is chemically dependent and ordered Aguirre's recommitment. Aguirre appeals.

DECISION

On appeal from a civil-commitment order, we review a district court's factual findings for clear error. In re Civ Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 223 (Minn. 2021). In doing so, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings of fact, do not find our own facts, and do not weigh or reconcile conflicting evidence. Id. at 221-22.

But we review questions of law, including statutory interpretation, de novo. In re Brown, 640 N.W.2d 919, 922 (Minn. 2002).

I. The district court did not clearly err by finding that Aguirre meets the criteria for recommitment based on his mental illness.

Between 60 and 90 days after civilly committing a person, a district court must review the commitment to determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that (1) the person "continues to have a mental illness, developmental disability, or chemical dependency"; (2) involuntary commitment is "necessary" for the protection of the person or others; and (3) "there is no alternative to involuntary commitment." Minn. Stat. § 253B.12, subds. 1(b), 4(a) (2022). The court need not find "a recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or others, or a recent failure to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care," only that these circumstances are "likely" to occur unless the patient is recommitted. Id., subd. 4(b) (2022). If so, the district court may continue the commitment for up to 12 months. Minn. Stat. § 253B.13, subd. 1(a) (2022). Where, as here, the 12-month continued commitment period has ended, the court may recommit the person only upon a new commitment petition and proof of the three criteria for continuing commitment. Id., subd. 1(b) (2022).

Aguirre argues that the record cannot support the district court's findings as to the three criteria because the county employee who signed the commitment petition was not personally present for the hearing and did not testify as to the criteria. But he cites no authority imposing such a requirement. Cf. Minn. Stat. § 253B.08 (2022) (establishing hearing procedures but not requiring petitioner's presence or testimony); see In re Civ. Commitment of Kropp, 895 N.W.2d 647, 653 (Minn.App. 2017) (declining to address an issue that was inadequately briefed), rev. denied (Minn. June 20, 2017). Nor did that person's absence result in procedural or evidentiary shortfalls. Counsel for both parties were present throughout the recommitment hearing. Dr. Chmielewski and Aguirre's case manager participated in the hearing. And while the lack of a transcript prevents us from reviewing their testimony,^[1] the record contains the doctor's competency-evaluation report and the county's prepetition screening report, both of which provide ample evidence of Aguirre's mental illness and the likelihood of harm if he is not committed. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not clearly err by finding that he meets the criteria for a mental-illness recommitment.

II. The district court did not err in committing Aguirre as chemically dependent.

An initial commitment based on chemical dependency requires clear and convincing evidence that (1) the person to be committed is engaged in "habitual and excessive use of alcohol, drugs, or other mind-altering substances"; (2) as a result, the person is "incapable of self-management or management of personal affairs" and has engaged in conduct that "poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to self or others"; and (3) there is no suitable alternative to commitment.

Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.02, subd. 2, .09, subd. 1(a) (2022). For a chemical-dependency recommitment, a new petition is not required; the district court need only find that the three criteria for continued commitment are satisfied. Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.12, subd. 4, .13, subd. 1(a) (2022).

Aguirre argues that the district court erred by recommitting him based on chemical dependency because he was not initially committed for that reason. But he identifies no authority precluding a court from doing so. To the contrary, a recommitment following a 12-month continuation requires a "new petition" for civil commitment. Minn. Stat. § 253B.13, subd. 1(b). This means that the petition may assert and a court may consider new bases for commitment, provided the court applies the correct statutory framework. The district court did so here, making findings and conclusions addressing the criteria for an initial chemical-dependency commitment. The record supports the district court's findings on those criteria.

III. The district court made sufficient, supported findings that commitment is the least-restrictive suitable disposition.

Both initial and renewed commitments require consideration of whether there is a suitable, less-restrictive alternative. Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.09, subd. 1(a) (initial commitment), .12, subd. 4 (continued commitment), .13, subd 1(b) (recommitment incorporating continued-commitment criteria). Alternatives to commitment may include "dismissal of [the] petition; voluntary outpatient care; voluntary admission to a treatment facility, state-operated treatment program, or...