In re Amani O.

221 Conn.App. 59

301 A.3d 565

IN RE AMANI O. ^*

AC 46293, (AC 46327)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 23, 2023

Officially Released August 10, 2023^**

James P. Sexton, assigned counsel, with whom was Gail Oakley Pratt, assigned counsel, for the appellant in Docket No. AC 46293 and the appellee in Docket No. AC 46327 (respondent father).

Evan O'Roark, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for the appellant in Docket No. AC 46327 (petitioner).

Evan O'Roark, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, for the appellee in Docket No. AC 46293 (petitioner).

Joshua Michtom, senior assistant public defender, for the minor child in both appeals.

Cradle, Suarez and Clark, Js.

CRADLE, J.

In these two related appeals, the respondent father, Carlos O., and the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, appeal from the trial court's order granting the emergency motion filed by the attorney for the minor child, Amani O., to cease reunification efforts with the respondent. ¹ The respondent also appeals from the court's order rejecting the petitioner's proposed permanency plan for Amani, which called for reunification with the respondent. In their respective appeals, the respondent and the petitioner claim that the court exceeded its authority when it ordered that the Department of Children and Families (department) cease reunification efforts with the parents. ² The respondent also claims that the court improperly rejected the petitioner's proposed permanency plan, which, he argues, will irreparably prejudice him in the pending trial proceedings. We agree with the respondent and the petitioner that the court exceeded its authority by ordering the department to cease reunification efforts and, therefore, reverse and vacate the court's judgment as to that order. We further conclude that the court's rejection of the petitioner's proposed permanency plan was not an appealable final judgment and, therefore, dismiss the portion of the respondent's appeal that challenges that action.

The following procedural history is relevant to this appeal. ³ Shortly after Amani was born in 2020, the department, acting on behalf of the petitioner, invoked a ninety-six hour hold on her, filed a neglect petition, and moved for an order of temporary custody. The court granted—and later sustained—temporary custody. Meanwhile, the petitioner proposed, and the court accepted, a permanency plan with a goal of revocation of commitment and reunification of Amani with her parents. On February 10, 2021, the court, C. Taylor, J. , adjudicated Amani neglected and committed her to the care and custody of the petitioner. On April 6, 2022, the attorney for the minor child filed an emergency motion to cease increasing visitation with the parents because she was unsure whether they had stopped smoking tobacco, thus posing a health risk to Amani, who is diagnosed with reactive airway disease. Judge Taylor held a hearing on that motion that same day. The court temporarily granted the emergency motion to cease increasing visitation, ordered that visitation not take place in the parents’ homes, and appointed a guardian ad litem for the limited purpose of examining the respondent's apartment to determine whether secondhand smoke was present.

On April 14, 2022, the attorney for the minor child filed an emergency motion to cease reunification with the respondent, arguing that it was still unknown whether the respondent had quit smoking. ⁴ The court held a hearing on the emergency motion on April 22, 2022, during which the guardian ad litem reported that she "did not smell or observ[e] any active smoking" but noticed a "stale odor of cigarette smoke that ... permeated from the carpet, the furniture, [and] ... the walls" of the respondent's home. During the hearing, the respondent argued that the emergency motion should be denied because the guardian ad litem's report demonstrated no evidence of secondhand smoke, only a stale smell of smoke. The court granted in part the emergency motion to cease reunification efforts by ordering that Amani no longer visit the respondent parents in their respective homes "until [the court addressed] the issue of secondhand smoke" at a more extensive hearing to be scheduled for a later date. Then, on July 26, 2022, the petitioner filed a motion for review of a permanency plan, seeking to reunify Amani with the respondent. Rebecca T. and the attorney for the minor child objected to the permanency plan. The court heard arguments on the motion for review of the permanency plan as part of the proceedings on the emergency motion to cease reunification efforts.

Subsequent hearings on the motion to cease reunification efforts were held over five nonconsecutive days spanning from May to November, 2022. On January 19, 2023, the court issued an order that stated: "The court grants the child's emergency motion to cease reunification efforts with the parents." On January 31, 2023, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the emergency order to cease reunification efforts, arguing that the department is statutorily required to make reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the parents. The court denied that motion on March 8, 2023, without explanation, and instructed the department to "consider how to protect the child from secondhand smoke." Also on January 19, 2023, the court rejected the petitioner's proposed permanency plan for reunification of Amani with the respondent and returned the matter to the petitioner "for the filing of a different permanency plan." ⁵

These expedited appeals followed. ⁶ On May 3, 2023, the court issued an articulation of its judgment granting the emergency motion to cease reunification efforts, in which it cited to In re Ava W. , 336 Conn. 545, 248 A.3d 675 (2020), explaining that its order was necessary to safeguard the health of the child. ⁷ Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The petitioner and the respondent claim that the court exceeded its statutory authority under General Statutes § 17a-111b (a) by ordering the department to cease reunification efforts. ⁸ The attorney for the minor child argues that the court properly exercised its authority under General Statutes § 46b-121 (b) (1). We agree with the petitioner and the respondent.

This claim presents a question of statutory interpretation, over which we exercise plenary review. See Cerame v. Lamont , 346 Conn. 422, 426, 291 A.3d 601 (2023). "When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature .... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "Further, in construing statutes, we presume that there is a purpose behind every sentence, clause or phrase used in an act, and that no part of a statute is superfluous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carpenter v. Daar , 346 Conn. 80, 103 n.17, 287 A.3d 1027 (2023).

We therefore must first consider the text of the relevant statutes. Section 17a-111b provides in relevant part: "(a) The Commissioner of Children and Families shall make reasonable efforts to reunify a parent with a child unless the court (1) determines that such efforts are not required pursuant to subsection (b) ⁹ of this section or subsection (j) of section 17a-112, ¹⁰ or (2) has approved a permanency plan other than reunification pursuant to subsection (k) of section 46b-129...." (Emphasis added; footnotes added.)

The plain language of § 17a-111b requires the department to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parent with the child unless certain specific conditions are met. In the present case, the court did not make any findings that would satisfy the exceptions enumerated in § 17a-111b, and the parties do not dispute that none of those exceptions applies. Because none of the exceptions to the statutory mandate of § 17a-111b applies in the present case, the court did not have authority to order that the department cease reunification efforts.

The attorney for the minor child, however, argues that the court had the authority to order "a temporary cessation of [reunification] efforts to protect the child's well-being, pursuant to the trial court's broad authority under ... § 46b-121 (b) (1) ...." Assuming, arguendo, that the court relied on § 46b-121 (b) (1) in issuing its order for the department to cease reunification efforts with the parents, we nonetheless conclude that the court exceeded its authority. Section 46b-121 (b) (1) provides in relevant part: "In juvenile matters, the Superior Court shall have authority to make and enforce such orders directed to parents ... guardians, custodians or other adult persons owing some legal duty to a child therein, as the court deems necessary or appropriate to secure the welfare, protection, proper care and suitable support of a child subject to the court's jurisdiction or otherwise committed to or in the custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families ...."

"A plain reading of § 46b-121 (b) (1) in its current form quite apparently grants the Superior Court comprehensive authority to issue orders in juvenile matters. The statute broadly enables the court to issue any order that it deems not only...