Case Law In re Angeles

In re Angeles

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OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Brian L. Zavin (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for appellant.

Michelle W. Cole (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for appellee.

Panel: HOTTEN, NAZARIAN, JAMES R. EYLER (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

NAZARIAN, J.

Cristian A.1 appeals the decision of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, sitting as a juvenile court, to deny his motion to dismiss. The State charged Cristian with multiple counts, including second-degree assault and resisting and interfering with arrest, after an altercation with a police officer. Cristian moved to dismiss the State's complaint as untimely, and the court denied the motion. Because an intake officer properly authorized the filing of a delinquency petition, and because the circuit court correctly found that Cristian has not proven that the State's delay in filing the complaint caused him actual prejudice, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 26, 2012, shortly after Cristian's seventeenth birthday, his younger brother Ricardo was involved in a fight at a McDonald's in Silver Spring. Cristian was not implicated in the altercation and was not there when it occurred. Detective Jeffrey Bunge of the Montgomery County Police saw the fighting from the police station across the street. He witnessed Ricardo punching another individual and began to approach the scene.

The fight broke up as Detective Bunge arrived and the participants fled, including Ricardo. Detective Bunge and Officer Daniel Sassi found Ricardo approximately fifteen minutes later. They pursued him, and Detective Bunge eventually stopped him. Detective Bunge identified himself, drew his gun, and told Ricardo to get on the ground. Ricardo complied and as Detective Bunge began to put him in handcuffs, Cristian arrived at the scene. Cristian had heard that his brother was involved in a fight and had come looking for him. Cristian ran toward Detective Bunge and Ricardo yelling, “That's my brother, that's my brother, leave him alone.” Detective Bunge and Corporal Tony Galladora, who had come to assist the other officers, told Cristian to stop, but he continued to approach his brother and Detective Bunge. Corporal Galladora stopped Cristian and brought him to the ground. According to the testimony of Corporal Galladora and Officer Jeffrey Rea, Cristian got back up, assumed a fighting stance, and said, “What's up? What's up?” Officer Rea, who was standing behind Cristian, subdued him with a Taser and then arrested him.

The State filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) with the Department of Juvenile Services (“DJS”) on November 15, 2012, twenty days after Cristian's arrest on October 26.2 A juvenile intake officer (the “Intake Officer”) reviewed the Complaint that day and authorized the filing of a formal delinquency petition (the “Petition”) without conducting an intake interview with Cristian. As luck would have it, Cristian was arrested for first-degree assault on that same day, November 15, 2012, in an unrelated incident (the “assault action”), although these charges were nol prossed on January 11, 2013.

The Intake Officer determined in the delinquency action that Cristian's detention in the assault action would likely last beyond the twenty-five-day timeline allottedfor an intake officer to make a decision on whether to file a petition. See Md.Code (1974, 2013 Repl.Vol.), § 3–8A–10(c) of Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”).3 Accordingly, the Intake Officer authorized the filing of the Petition in keeping with CJP § 3–8A10(c) and without conducting an intake interview with Cristian. The State filed the Petition on December 11, 2012, charging Cristian with second-degree assault, disorderly conduct, conspiracy to commit disorderly conduct, resisting and interfering with arrest, attempting to resist and interfere with arrest, and attempting to obstruct and hinder a police officer.

Cristian moved to dismiss on February 13, 2013. He argued that the State had violated CJP § 3–8A–10(m), which requires law enforcement officers to file the initial complaint with DJS within fifteen days of when a juvenile is brought into custody.4 The State had filed the Complaint on November 15, 2012, twenty days after Cristian's arrest on October 26, 2012, and five days late 5 under the statute. Cristian argued that the State's delay in filing violated “statutory timeliness” and due process, and “caused [him] actual prejudice,” since he was not provided the opportunity for an intake interview, which might have convinced the Intake Officer to refrain from authorizing the filing of the Petition.

At an adjudication hearing on February 15, 2013, the circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, noting that “it's just too speculative to think that the case would have been not petitioned and there's really no showing of any prejudice to the defense. So if it was delayed four days or six days, or whatever, I don't think that's sufficient in and of itself to dismiss it.” The circuit court found that Cristian was “involved” 6 in attempting to interfere with arrest and attempting to obstruct and hinder a police officer performing his lawful duties. At the disposition hearing on March 7, 2013, the court sustained Cristian's probation pursuant to the recommendation of DJS. Cristian filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

Although the parties have focused largely on whether or when Cristian should have been interviewed, our analysis, and the Intake Officer's ultimate responsibility, revolves around the more fundamental question of whether the officer conducted an appropriate investigation of the juvenile's case before recommending that a petition be filed. Because we are satisfied with the Intake Officer's investigation and rationale for deciding not to conduct an intake interview, and because Cristian's claims of actual prejudice are too attenuated, we affirm.

After a juvenile is taken into custody, the State may file a complaint with DJS. The complaint must be filed within fifteen days from the date a juvenile is arrested. See CJP § 3–8A–10(m). In turn, the intake officer must review the complaint “within 25 days as to whether the court has jurisdiction and whether judicial action is in the best interests of the public or the child.” CJP § 3–8A–10(c)(1). As part of this inquiry, “it is incumbent upon the intake officer to review all of the evidence reasonably available to him or her.... Ordinarily an intake interview is an essential part of the preliminary review unless the juvenile refuses to participate or is unable to participate.” In re Kevin Eugene C., 90 Md.App. 85, 92, 599 A.2d 1233 (1992) (second emphasis added). After this investigation, and within the twenty-five-day time period, the intake officer makes a recommendation to the State's Attorney and may [a]uthorize the filing of a petition,” [p]ropose an informal adjustment of the matter,” or decide not to authorize a petition at all. CJP § 3–8A–10(c)(3)(i)(iii).7 Violations of CJP § 3–8A–10 may result in dismissal of a petition, but only if the respondent has demonstrated actual prejudice.” CJP § 3–8A–10(n) (emphasis added).

Because Cristian's claims include a constitutional dimension (he alleges a violation of his due process rights), we review his contentions against “our own independent constitutional analysis.” Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 220, 792 A.2d 1160 (2002) (citing State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 415, 572 A.2d 544 (1990)); see also Butler v. State, 214 Md.App. 635, 655, 78 A.3d 887 (2013). We perform a de novo constitutional appraisal in light of the particular facts of the case at hand; in so doing, we accept a lower court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.” Glover, 368 Md. at 221, 792 A.2d 1160.

Cristian argues that the State's failure to file a timely complaint under CJP § 3–8A10(m) caused him actual prejudice.8 He contends that had the State filed the Complaint within the statute's timeframe, he could have participated in an intake interview and this interview might have convinced the Intake Officer not to authorize the filing of the Petition.

The Intake Officer reviewed the belatedly-submitted Complaint and decided to authorizethe filing of the Petition without interviewing Cristian. The Intake Officer anticipated that Cristian couldn't participate in an interview, especially given the twenty-five-day timeframe allotted for a decision on whether or not to file a petition, because of Cristian's arrest, which the officer believed would result in a detention. See CJP § 3–8A10(c)(3); see also Kevin Eugene C., 90 Md.App. at 91–92, 599 A.2d 1233. Put differently, the Intake Officer assumed Cristian would be unavailable for an interview since he had been arrested.

Cristian contends that he was in fact available for an intake interview up until his arrest on November 15, 2012.9 He claims he was prejudiced by the delay in filing the Complaint, which deprived him of an interview, because there was “at least a reasonable possibility that a delinquency petition would not have been filed had an intake hearing been conducted.” Cristian claims that in an intake interview, he would have [had] the opportunity to persuade the [Intake Officer] to pursue an informal adjustment or deny authorization for the filing of a petition.” He points to several mitigating factors that he would have discussed during the intake interview, including his abusive upbringing and his attempts to protect his younger brother, and that he contends may have convinced the Intake Officer not to file a petition. Cristian admits, however, that “there is no guarantee that the [Intake Officer] would have taken a different course had there been an opportunity for an intake hearing.”

Picking up on this concession, the State claims that Cristian has “failed to establish actual prejudice.” The State...

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