In re Angeles Roca First Judicial Dist. Phila. Cnty.

173 A.3d 1176

IN RE: ANGELES ROCA FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT PHILADELPHIA COUNTY

Appeal of: Angeles Roca

No. 42 EAP 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: May 9, 2017

Decided: November 22, 2017

Kathleen Marie Kotula, Esq., PA Department of State, for Participant Bureau of Commissions, Elections and Legislation.

City Commissioners of Philadelphia, Participant pro se.

Samuel C. Stretton, Esq., for Appellant.

Elizabeth Ann Flaherty, Esq., Robert A. Graci, Esq., Judicial Conduct Board of Pennsylvania, for Appellee.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of Judicial Discipline (the "CJD") removing Appellant from office. One issue we are asked to address is whether that tribunal must apply the doctrine of stare decisis when sanctioning a jurist.

I. Background

The underlying facts were developed at trial before the CJD and via stipulation.¹ At all relevant times Appellant served as a Philadelphia common pleas judge in the family division. Her term overlapped with those of former Philadelphia Municipal Court Judges Joseph Waters and Dawn Segal.² During this period, the FBI was investigating Waters' activities; the investigation included wiretap surveillance of his telephone communications. Several conversations between Waters and Appellant were recorded in 2011 and 2012.

In September 2011, Appellant called Waters regarding Judge Adam Beloff.³ In the call, Appellant told Waters that the son of a court employee was to appear before Beloff on drug charges and asked whether Beloff would be receptive to discussing that case ex parte, to which Waters responded in the affirmative. Appellant then confirmed that she had Beloff's phone number, and Waters stated that he would speak with Beloff in person. See Board Exh. 17, transcript, at 1–2.

In June 2012, Appellant asked Waters for advice on how her son, Ian Rexach, should proceed relative to a tax judgment. By way of background, Rexach owned a barbershop in Philadelphia. The city filed a code enforcement complaint against him for failure to pay the city's business privilege tax. When he did not appear for the hearing, a $5,000 default judgment was entered against him. He filed a pro se petition to open the judgment, which was denied due to the lack of a meritorious defense. Thereafter, a phone conversation occurred between Appellant and Waters, which included the following excerpt:

Appellant: I have a question ... Can you file a motion for reconsideration with [Segal]?

Waters: Yeah. You file a Motion for Reconsideration with her and I'll talk to her.

Appellant: Huh?

Waters: I said file a Motion for Reconsideration with her and I'll talk to her.

Appellant: Okay.

Waters: Why didn't you call me first?

Appellant: Because I didn't know it was late, so I just sent him over and I said, "Just go open it." I didn't know it was beyond the 30 day period. Otherwise, I would have called.

Waters: Yeah.

Appellant: It was on May 15th and he wrote in the petition, "I apologize I got this mixed up with another court date in Municipal Court," and then he wrote, "I wish to reopen my case so that I can resolve this matter and make payments." The bitch denied it. That's a pretty good ... [laughs] ... I mean it's not a legal defense, but give me a break.

Stipulation ¶ 19. From the above, Appellant understood that Waters would talk to Segal about the petition in her son's case. Appellant did not attempt to dissuade him from doing so. See id.¶ 20.

Appellant learned that Segal would not be presiding over these types of petitions after June 29, 2012. Seeking to ensure that Segal presided over her son's petition, on June 29, 2012, Appellant called Waters to encourage him to intervene, as follows:

Appellant: Do you have [Segal's] number?

Waters: Who?

Appellant: Dawn Segal.

Waters: Uh.

Appellant: He [Rexach] just filed for reconsideration. They said she [Segal] does ‘em right today. So we need to call her today.

Waters: Oh. Okay. I'll call Dawn right now. All right.

Appellant: It's Ian Rexach. She said call Monday and by Monday she [Segal] would have already decided the decision [sic].

Waters: All right. What's his name?

Appellant: It's Ian Rexach....

Waters: ... I'll call her right now.

Appellant: And it was a Motion for Reconsideration. All right?

Waters: All right. Bye-bye.

Appellant: Thank you ....

Id.¶ 27. From this conversation, Appellant understood that Waters would call Segal on behalf of Appellant's son in regard to the petition for reconsideration. See id.¶ 28.

That day, Segal reviewed the petition for reconsideration and issued a rule to show cause why the relief requested should not be granted. Although Segal did not preside over Rexach's case thereafter, on July 1, 2012, she called Waters to advise him that she "took care of it" and to "tell her it's done." Waters then called Appellant and left a voice message stating that Segal had just stated that "she took care of that thing," i.e., Rexach's petition for reconsideration. Waters again called Appellant and discussed the matter, confirming that it had been "taken care of" by Segal. Appellant responded, "All right. Cool. Thanks." The default judgment against Rexach was ultimately vacated and the case against him was withdrawn upon his payment of $477 in taxes. Id.¶¶ 30–39.

In 2013, FBI agents interviewed Appellant in the presence of her attorney. During the interview, Appellant denied that judges call each other asking for favors. She stated, "We don't do that here at all." Stipulation ¶ 41. She added that she would never call another judge to request a favor for a family member. See id.¶¶ 42–43. Further, when asked in the interview what she would do if a family member was in trouble, Appellant stated that "they would be on their own." N.T., Sept. 8, 2016, at 187.

In March and May of 2015, the Judicial Conduct Board sent Appellant informal letters of inquiry concerning her contacts with other judges. At the time, Appellant was unaware that her conversations with Waters had been recorded. In her written responses, Appellant made several representations which were inconsistent with the content of the recorded phone conversations. For example, she indicated that: she only had one conversation with Waters, limited to procedural advice about a petition for reconsideration in the City of Philadelphia v. Rexach matter; after advising her son to file a motion for reconsideration, she had no further contemporaneous knowledge about the case; she never requested preferential treatment in the Rexach case and, to her knowledge, none was given; Waters never offered to request special consideration from Segal; Appellant was not aware of whether Waters actually had contacted Segal, and if Waters did contact Segal, it was without Appellant's knowledge. See id.¶¶ 44–55.

After Appellant met with a federal prosecutor and heard the recordings of the intercepted conversations, she supplemented her written responses to the Board, admitting that Waters offered to speak to Segal on her behalf, and that she did not discourage him from taking such action. Appellant also conceded that she had placed a second call to Waters asking him to request that Segal consider the Rexach matter promptly, and that Waters eventually told Appellant it was "taken care of." Appellant added, "I should have stayed out of the matter completely." Id.¶¶ 56–61.

Finally, despite her knowledge that Waters engaged in ex parte communication with Segal, Appellant did not report his misconduct to the Board. Id.¶ 62.

In June 2016, the Board filed an amended complaint with the CJD alleging that Appellant had violated Article V, Sections 17(b) and 18(d)(1) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, as well as several provisions of Pennsylvania's former Code of Judicial Conduct (the "Code"), mentioned below.⁴ The alleged Section 17 (b) violation was derivative of a Code violation, as Section 17 (b) prohibits judges from "violat[ing] any canon of legal or judicial ethics prescribed by the Supreme Court." PA. CONST. art. V, § 17 (b). As for Section 18(d)(1), that provision states that judicial officers may not engage in conduct which, among other things, "prejudices the proper administration of justice or brings the judicial office into disrepute," PA. CONST. art. V, § 18 (d)(1), and it also indicates that any transgression of these standards or of Section 17 can subject the jurist to discipline, up to and including suspension or removal from office. See id. The complaint alleged that Appellant had, indeed, prejudiced the proper administration of justice or brought the judicial office into disrepute.

The Code provisions at issue were Canons 2A, 2B, and 3A(4), which state:

Canon 2. Judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities.

A. Judges should ... conduct themselves at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

B. Judges should not allow their family, social, or other relationships to influence their judicial conduct or judgment. They should not lend the prestige of their office to advance the private interests of others; nor should they convey or knowingly permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.

Canon 3....

A. Adjudicative responsibilities....

(4) Judges ... except as authorized by law, must not consider ex parte communications concerning a pending proceeding.

Code of Judicial Conduct (1974), Canons 2A, 2B, 3A(4).

Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion, which was denied. She elected not to file a responsive pleading, however, at which point the complaint's factual allegations were deemed denied. See C.J.D.R.P. No. 413.

The case proceeded to trial at which the CJD heard the evidence summarized above. In regards to the 2011 call, Appellant testified that she never followed through and contacted Beloff because she "knew it was not the right thing to do." N.T., Sept. 8, 2016, at 218; see also id. at...