In re Arjmand

238 N.E.3d 1067

2024 IL 129155

IN RE MARRIAGE OF Masud M. ARJMAND, Appellant,

and

Muneeza R. Arjmand, Appellee

(Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, et al., Appellees).

(Docket No. 129155)

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed January 19, 2024

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County, the Hon. Timothy J. McJoynt, Judge, presiding.

Bryan M. Sims, of Sims Law Firm, Ltd., of Naperville, for appellant.

Anthony Sammarco, of The Stogsdill Law Firm, P.C., of Wheaton, for appellee Muneeza Rahman.

Robert Radasevich, Joshua H. Burday, and Andrew T. Hamilton, of Neal Gerber & Eisenberg LLP, of Chicago, for other appellees.

Michael G. DiDomenico, of Lake Toback DiDomenico, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers.

OPINION

JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 At issue in this case is whether, in conjunction with an appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016), the appellate court had jurisdiction to consider prior orders denying appellant’s petition and motion for substitution of judge. For the following reasons, we affirm the appellate court’s judgment concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the petition and motion.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 This appeal takes place in the context of a dissolution proceeding that has remained ongoing for well over a decade. In 2009, petitioner, Masud M. Arjmand, filed a petition to dissolve his marriage to respondent, Muneeza R. Arjmand. The same year, the circuit court entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage that incorporated the parties’ marital settlement agreement. However, in 2011 respondent filed a petition to vacate the dissolution judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILC 5/2-1401 (West 2010)), alleging that the judgment was unconscionable because the marital settlement agreement was secured by coercion and fraudulent concealment of income and assets. The circuit court, via Judge Timothy J. McJoynt, granted the petition in 2012, leaving in place only the dissolution of the parties’ marriage.

¶ 4 Petitioner appealed the circuit court’s ruling and sought to stay the proceedings in the circuit court while the appeal was pending. In February 2013, the circuit court granted petitioner’s motion and, "as a condition of bond," restricted the parties’ ability to encumber or dispose of certain investment assets that they owned before the entry of the initial dissolution judgment, including stocks and funds held in brokerage accounts.

¶ 5 The appellate court entered an order in October 2013 affirming the circuit court’s grant of respondent’s section 2- 1401 petition. In re Marriage of Arjmand, 2013 IL App (2d) 120639, 376 Ill.Dec. 144, 998 N.E.2d 686.

¶ 6 In July 2014, respondent’s attorney, Bryan Estes of the Stogsdill Law Firm (collectively, the Stogsdill defendants) sent a letter to Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC (Morgan Stanley), enclosing a copy of the February 2013 order and requesting compliance with the order. Morgan Stanley then restricted petitioner’s access to the assets that he held with the company.

¶ 7 In April 2015, Morgan Stanley sought to intervene in the dissolution case to clarify the February 2013 order with respect to petitioner’s accounts, as the parties had made conflicting demands regarding the accounts. The circuit court tabled the request pending resolution of several appeals by petitioner related to the February 2013 order.

¶ 8 In August 2015, petitioner filed a complaint in the Cook County circuit court against Morgan Stanley and several affiliated entities (collectively, the Morgan Stanley defendants) and the Stogsdill defendants, alleging various causes of action stemming from the restriction of petitioner’s access to his assets. Petitioner alleged significant damages resulting from, among other things, being unable to pay substantial business and personal obligations. The action was transferred to the Du Page County circuit court, where it was dismissed with prejudice by Judge Ronald Sutter in August 2016 as an improper collateral attack on an order entered in the dissolution proceeding.

¶ 9 In December 2017, Judge McJoynt found that Accenture Founders Shares stock that petitioner held with Morgan Stanley was his nonmarital asset but that the injunctive portions of the February 2013 order remained in full force and effect as to petitioner and respondent only.

¶ 10 Petitioner filed a petition under section 2-1401 in August 2018 seeking to partially vacate the August 2016 order. Judge Sutter denied the petition, and the appellate court affirmed the ruling. Arjmandv. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, 2019 IL App (2d) 180785-U, 2019 WL 3247031.

¶ 11 On December 23, 2019, petitioner filed a new complaint, within the dissolution proceeding, against the Morgan Stanley and Stogsdill defendants (collectively defendants), raising largely the same claims.

¶ 12 Days later, on December 27, 2019, petitioner filed a "Third Petition for Substitution of Judge [f]or Cause and for Assignment to a Judge in a Different Appellate District," pursuant to section 2-1001(a)(3)(ii) (735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(3)(ii) (West 2018)) of the Code of Civil Procedure.¹ The petition contained many allegations regarding the restriction of petitioner’s Morgan Stanley account. Petitioner filed an amended petition for substitution the following month. Judge McJoynt ruled that there could be cause if petitioner’s allegations were accepted as true, such that he would have another judge rule on the petition. Judge Robert Kleeman denied the petition on June 3, 2020, and he later denied petitioner’s motion to reconsider.

¶ 13 Petitioner then filed, on July 6, 2020, a "Motion for Substitution of Judge as of Right or Alternatively for Recusal as to [Morgan Stanley] Complaint." See id. § 2-1001(a)(2)(ii). Judge McJoynt denied the motion on August 6, 2020, on the basis that he had already made hundreds of substantive rulings in the dissolution case and there was no evidence of interest, bias, or prejudice. He subsequently denied petitioner’s motion to reconsider.

¶ 14 On November 19, 2020, Judge McJoynt granted defendants’ motionsto dismiss the complaint against them with prejudice, based on res judicata from Judge Sutter’s ruling. He also granted the Morgan Stanley defendants’ request to dismiss two counts with prejudice for failing to state a claim against those defendants. Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider, which Judge McJoynt denied on April 28, 2021. The order contained findings under Rule 304(a) that there was no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal of the denial of the motion to reconsider and the November 19, 2020, dismissal order, nunc pro tunc. Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal, citing the April 2021 order and "all orders in [the] procedural progression leading to it." He stated that he sought reversal of the April 2021 order and the November 2020 dismissal order.

¶ 15 In a summary order, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint as barred by res judicata, because Judge Sutter’s 2016 dismissal was not based on the merits of the claims. No. 2-21-0285, ¶ 10 (2022) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)). It remanded the case for the circuit court to consider whether the dismissal was proper on any other grounds. Id. ¶ 11. This portion of the judgment is not at issue here.

¶ 16 Petitioner also challenged the denials of his petition and motion for substitution of judge. The appellate court stated that there was no Illinois Supreme Court rule allowing for an interlocutory appeal from the denials of the substitution requests. Id. ¶ 12. Therefore, they could be reviewed only on appeal from a final order. Id. Petitioner relied on Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center v. Berlin, 268 Ill. App. 3d 184, 186-87, 205 Ill.Dec. 325, 643 N.E.2d 276 (1994), rev’d on other grounds, 179 Ill. 2d 1, 227 Ill.Dec. 769, 688 N.E.2d 106 (1997), where the Appellate Court, Fourth District, held that it could review a decision on a motion for substitution of judge in conjunction with an interlocutory appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). The appellate court here stated that Berlin was from another appellate district and therefore not binding on the court. No. 2-21-0285, ¶ 13. The appellate court instead relied on the Second District case In re Marriage of Nettleton, 348 Ill. App. 3d 961, 970-71, 285 Ill. Dec. 19, 811 N.E.2d 260 (2004), which disagreed with Berlin on the basis that Illinois Supreme Court rules do not allow review of such orders in interlocutory appeals. No. 2-21-0285, ¶ 13. The appellate court therefore concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the rulings on the petition and motion for substitution of judge. Id. ¶ 14.

¶ 17 We granted petitioner leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). We allowed the Illinois Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers to file an amicus curiae brief in support of petitioner’s position. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS

[1] ¶ 19 The Illinois Constitution grants the appellate court jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judgments of the circuit courts. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6. The constitution further allows this court to "provide by rule for appeals to the Appellate Court from other than final judgments of Circuit Courts." Id. Therefore, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review judgments, orders, or decrees that are not final, unless an Illinois Supreme Court rule provides for jurisdiction.

Johnson v. Armstrong, 2022 IL 127942, ¶ 19, 463 Ill.Dec. 794, 211 N.E.3d 355.

[2–4] ¶ 20 In this case, petitioner appealed pursuant to Rule 304(a), which states in relevant part:

"If multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, an appeal may be

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