In re Baker

313 Ga. 359

870 S.E.2d 356

INQUIRY CONCERNING Judge JaDawnya BAKER.

S20Z1070

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: March 8, 2022

Charles Prescott Boring, Judicial Qualifications Commission, 1995 North Park Place SE, Suite 570, Atlanta, Georgia 30339, for Appellant.

Ronald J. Freeman, Sr., Johnson & Freeman, LLC, 6323 Roosevelt Highway, Union City, Georgia 30291, Janise L. Miller, Post Office Box 11229, Atlanta, Georgia 30310, Richard L. Robbins, Joshua Barrett Belinfante, Robbins Ross Alloy Belinfante Littlefield LLC, 500 14th Street, NW, Atlanta, Georgia 30318, for Appellee.

Ronnie K. Batchelor, Gwinnett Co. Justice & Administration, 75 Langley Drive, Lawrenceville, Georgia 30045-6900, for Other Party.

Per Curiam.

This judicial discipline matter was submitted to this Court pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of the Judicial Qualifications Commission ("JQC"), seeking approval of the discipline by consent agreement between the Director of the JQC and JaDawnya Baker, Judge of the Municipal Court of Atlanta, to resolve the formal charges brought against Judge Baker with the issuance of a public reprimand. The agreement, entered into between the JQC Director and Judge Baker, was submitted to the JQC's Hearing Panel, which approved the agreement and filed it with this Court for approval. Because Judge Baker's admitted violations of periodically dismissing cases without the legal authority to do so justifies the recommended, and agreed-to, discipline of a public reprimand, we approve the agreement. We do so despite our reservations, explained below, about whether, based on the substance of the allegations within the consent agreement, all of the agreed-to violations constitute violations of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct.

After a complaint against Judge Baker was filed with the JQC, the Investigative Panel authorized a full investigation, which included consideration of Judge Baker's written responses and a meeting in person with her before the panel. At the direction of the Investigative Panel, the Director then filed formal charges against Judge Baker, and she filed an answer. Following further investigation and evaluation of the evidence, as well as extensive discussions with counsel for Judge Baker, the Director amended the formal charges in anticipation of reaching an agreement with Judge Baker on discipline by consent.

Pursuant to JQC Rule 23, Judge Baker and the Director then entered into an agreement to resolve the formal charges with a public reprimand. In authorizing this resolution, the Investigative Panel considered in mitigation Judge Baker's lack of prior disciplinary complaints; her relative inexperience on the bench¹ ; her seeking out guidance of various mentors within the judiciary; her admission that she made mistakes and engaged in activities which she recognizes were inappropriate; her expressed willingness to learn from her mistakes and receive guidance regarding how to improve as a judge; and her history of public service and positive and active role in the legal community. The agreement was submitted to the Hearing Panel, which voted unanimously to accept the agreement and file it with this Court for approval. See JQC Rule 23 (A).

1. Counts 1 through 12 of the formal charges allege that in her interactions with court security officers and her chambers staff, Judge Baker violated Rule 1.2 (A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires judges to "act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary," and Rule 1.3, which says that "[j]udges shall not lend the prestige of their office to advance the private interests of the judge or others." As to Rule 1.2 (A), the discipline by consent agreement focuses on "integrity," which the Terminology section of the Code defines as "probity, fairness, honesty, uprightness, and soundness of character."

As for the facts underlying these charges, Judge Baker acknowledges in the discipline by consent agreement that in May 2015, she had a court security officer drive his personal vehicle to a store to pick up alcoholic beverages and deliver them to a private event celebrating Judge Baker's appointment to the bench; that around September 2016, she had a court security officer drive his personal vehicle from the courthouse to a store in Cobb County to pick up a chair and deliver it to the judge's personal residence in Atlanta; that the following month, she had a staff member assist her in returning the chair by driving to the judge's residence, where the judge loaded the chair into the staff member's vehicle, and then driving to the store while the judge followed in her own vehicle, which the staff member claimed caused her to get behind on her daily work assignments² ; and that on a Friday afternoon in June 2018, Judge Baker emailed two staff members and requested that one of them bring her robe, robe bag, and a stole from the courthouse to her personal residence for an event "unrelated to court business" that Sunday, and that a staff member delivered the items later that afternoon.

Judge Baker also acknowledges that from May 2015 through October 2019, she periodically asked staff members to contribute their own money to an office fund, to which Judge Baker also contributed, to purchase food and other items for communal use in chambers, to shop for the items, and, on one occasion, to return an item. Judge Baker further acknowledges that evidence exists with which the Director could properly prove that from July through November 2016, she had the staff member who helped her return the chair use the staff member's personal vehicle to drive Judge Baker to attend private events and to run errands unrelated to court or city business.³

We are hesitant to conclude that Judge Baker violated Rule 1.2 (A) or 1.3 and to impose discipline based on these facts alone, for several reasons.⁴ First, the discipline by consent agreement does not state that the occasional assistance with personal matters that court security officers and chambers staff provided to Judge Baker occurred during their work hours – something that was alleged in the formal charges, which are not incorporated by reference in the agreement. Notably, all the cases cited in the agreement in support of finding a violation involved personal tasks done for a judge during work hours. See, e.g., Gentry v. Judicial Conduct Commission , 612 S.W.3d 832, 849 (Ky. 2020) ; In re Brennan , 504 Mich. 80, 929 N.W.2d 290, 311 (2019). Second, the agreement does not say whether the officers and staff members voluntarily assisted Judge Baker or instead felt compelled to perform the tasks to maintain their jobs. Third, with one exception, the agreement does not suggest that the personal assistance provided to Judge Baker interfered with an employee's job duties. Fourth, the agreement cites no authority, and we have found none, to support the view that maintaining a small common office fund for food and similar items, to which chambers staff and the judge alike contribute, constitutes a violation of Rule 1.2 (A) or Rule 1.3. In any event, we need not address these issues further, because whether or not we consider these counts, we would conclude that a public reprimand is an appropriate...